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NOT ALL’S FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR: DYNASTICISM AND COMPOSITE STATE 






Some composite states, notably Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire, 
outlived the Peace of Westphalia by over one hundred years. This is puzzling for the 
study of international politics because good theoretical reasons expect the multiple 
countervailing pressures acting on these states to have brought about a rapid decline and 
dissolution. 
In this dissertation, I propose a theoretical approach that satisfactorily accounts 
for why some composite states survived until the dawn of the Napoleonic Wars. The 
theory of dynasticism and dynastic deterrence argues that dynastic intermarriage and 
proximate kinship ties between dynastic rulers created deterrent effects that led to 
stability on the level of sovereign control. The most direct consequence of this theory is 
that hereditary monarchs with dynastic aims will tend to avoid waging wars of absolute 
conquest against each other, though wars of limited gains are not precluded. Given the 
inability of competing explanations—a reconstructed early modern realism and 
intergenerational leadership learning—to account for both the manner of survival and 
demise of composite states that lived till old age, it can be strongly inferred that dynastic 
deterrent effects ensured longevity by protecting such polities from facing conquest-
attempts from other monarchs, the most serious existential threat these composite states 
could have faced. 
The reason that dynastic deterrence holds is because dynastic wives and families 
of origin play the role of hostages. The parental house of the dynastic wife will tend to 
avoid wars of conquest against the kingdoms wherein reside their daughters, and 
similarly dynastic husbands will avoid conquering the birth-dynasty of their wives. In 
addition, wars of conquest damage the reputation of the dynastic house of a monarch, and 
this in turn harms the marriage chances of dynastic heirs. Wars of conquest, then, act at 
cross-purposes with the ubiquitous motive of dynastic aggrandizement, which aims to 
uplift the power and prestige of the dynastic house, and were largely disdained (with 
some exceptions) by the rulers of ancien régime Europe. It should be noted that this 
dynamic did not hold in the colonies, but I do not attempt in this dissertation to answer 
the question of why. 
In the empirical case analyses, I use this theoretical framework to explain the 
early dissolution of two composite states (England-Scotland and the Iberian Union) when 
juxtaposed with other composite states that survived for longer in their same regions, and 
the longevity and eventual demise of two further composite states (Poland-Lithuania and 
the Holy Roman Empire) after weathering some near-death crises. 
Oft mentioned but rarely studied directly, dynasticism and dynastic intermarriage 
have been largely ignored by the field of International Relations. This is unfortunate, as 
the ties of marriage and kinship between early modern dynastic rulers represent a fertile 
source of theoretical insights and empirical material for testing contemporary theories 
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THE PUZZLE OF COMPOSITE STATE LONGEVITY 
 
In this introduction, we outline the puzzle of composite state longevity in ancien 
régime European politics in the period between the Peace of Westphalia and the French 
Revolution. The puzzle consists of why, after the supposed entrance of the sovereign 
unitary territorial state with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, significant cases of cross-
territorial (or ‘composite’) states continued to exist and thrive well after the relatively 
centralized ‘absolutist’ state emerged to become a powerful form of government. The 
main approaches to understanding this puzzle are elaborated in the following chapter. 
The specific mechanism that accounts for the longevity of some ancien régime composite 
states is as follows. 
In brief, the theory of dynasticism and dynastic deterrence asserts that dynastic 
intermarriage and proximate kinship ties between dynastic rulers create deterrent effects 
that lead to stability on the level of sovereign control. The most direct consequence of 
this theory is that hereditary monarchs with dynastic aims will tend to avoid waging wars 
of absolute conquest against each other, though wars of limited gains are not precluded. 
These dynastic deterrent effects protected composite states at key moments from the 
conquest-attempts of other monarchs, the most serious existential threat that these 
composite states could have faced.  
The reason that dynastic deterrence holds is because dynastic wives and their 
families of origin play the role of hostages. The parental house of the dynastic wife will 
tend to avoid wars of conquest against the resident kingdom of their daughters, and 
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similarly the husbands of dynastic wives will avoid such wars of conquest against the 
birth-dynasty of their wives. In addition, wars of conquest damage the reputation of the 
dynastic house of a monarch, and this in turn harms the marriage chances of dynastic 
heirs. Wars of conquest, then, act at cross-purposes with the ubiquitous motive of 
dynastic aggrandizement, which aims at uplifting the power and prestige of the dynastic 
house, and were largely disdained (with a few exceptions) by the rulers of ancien régime 
Europe. It should be noted that this dynamic did not hold in the colonies, but I do not 
attempt in this dissertation to answer the question of why. 
In this introduction, we limit ourselves to the task of clearing the ground: 
describing the early modern composite state, as well as elaborating the concept of 
composite state death and laying out the puzzle of composite state longevity that calls for 
explanation, before we move in the next chapter to an in-depth examination of the main 
competing explanations. 
The surviving cross-territorial political units of the post-1648 European system—
such as elective monarchies and composite monarchies—have been largely taken by 
international relations scholarship to be an endangered species soon to die an inevitable 
death. The reason for this view is that the Peace of Westphalia granted to the princes of 
the Holy Roman Empire the power to make treaties with other monarchs, thus 
eviscerating the sovereign authority of the Holy Roman Emperor and raising the princes 
to the status of sovereign ruler. According to the conventional view, the constant exertion 
of self-help pressures on the units of the European system meant the dissolution of the 
feudal order (as signified by the Westphalian Peace) sharply increased systemic pressures 
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on states to undergo structural changes and simplify their territorial complexity in order 
to survive the fierce competitive pressures of early modern warfare.  
Many historical sociologists similarly believe that even without the Peace of 
Westphalia, the gradual intensification of military competition, as evidenced by signs of a 
‘military revolution’ which took place during the early seventeenth century and driven by 
the innovations of Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years War,1 led to similar 
outcomes, with a pressure on smaller states to strengthen themselves militarily, 
amalgamate, or face certain conquest. This view is well captured by Tilly, when he writes 
that the question of how European states converged on different variations of the national 
state can be answered as follows:  
Only those states survived that held their own in war with other states; and…over the 
long run the changing character of war gave the military advantage to states that could 
draw large, durable military forces from their own populations, which were increasingly 
national states.2 
 
The state formation paradigm in sociology shaped by Tilly3 has migrated into the 
field of political economy, and in recent work the variable of capital accumulation and 
economic capacity has been argued to have played a greater role in state formation and 
survival than previously acknowledged.4 According to this argument, wealth (and the 
economic capacity that underlay it) was the critical factor that gave units a decisive 
																																																								
1 Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” in Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1967). 
2 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 63. 
3 The urtext in the state formation paradigm is Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in 
Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). The essays of Hintze constitute an early and 
influential forerunner of this approach. See Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed Felix 
Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). The hitherto understudied aspect of court 
development, was developed in Norbert Elias, The Court Society (New York: Pantheon, 1983). An 
important recent work in the field emphasizing the role of representative assemblies on the state formation 
process, is Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 




advantage in waging war, as it allowed these units to hire large mercenary armies as a 
means of self-help. This approach has a number of problems that render it of limited 
utility for our research. Firstly, the increasing role of colonial resource extraction in 
supporting the war-making efforts of European states from the sixteenth century onward 
is ignored by the overemphasis on city-states, and this omission weakens the conclusions 
drawn.5 Secondly, not all early modern states utilized mercenary armies, as “by the 
eighteenth century European wars were being conducted by professional armed forces” 6 
rendering the emphasis on mercenaries somewhat anachronistic. However, despite these 
limits, it is significant that important cases of late survival composite states (such as 
Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire), were laggards in terms of capital 
accumulation and colonial expansion, and nonetheless managed to survive until the late 
eighteenth century. Though the factor of capital accumulation is of limited utility in 
solving the puzzle of composite state survival, it nonetheless points to the confounding 
nature of the case. 
From the classical state formation perspective, then, as well as the more recent 
political economy framing, the survival of heterogeneous and decentralized states seems 
anomalous, and Tilly writes (without giving a sufficient explanation) that the survival of 
the Holy Roman Empire is puzzling.7 Alongside the survival of the Holy Roman Empire 
until the time of the Napoleonic Wars, we have a number of other puzzling phenomena 
according to this viewpoint, including: the persistence of the personal union between 
																																																								
5 As Howard notes, “the capacity to sustain war and so maintain political power in Europe became, during 
the seventeenth century, increasingly dependent on access to wealth either extracted from the extra-
European world or created by the commerce ultimately derived from that wealth.” Michael Howard, in 
European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 38. 
6 Ibid., p. 54 
7 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 65. 
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Great Britain and the Electorate of Hanover into the nineteenth century; and the survival 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in some form until the relatively late date of 
1795. Though not all of these cases can be examined in this dissertation, we tackle in 
general terms the counter-intuitive phenomenon of composite state persistence, and its 
explanation.   
 
The Early Modern Composite State and its Origins 
 
Political units can productively be differentiated into a number of distinct ideal-
typical categories, according to the nature of the relationship between a ruler and subject 
within the spatial institution of territoriality. Not only does this approach foreground the 
complexity of some early modern units when compared with the simple structure of the 
unitary sovereign state that would soon become dominant, but the international aspect of 
rulership in the composite state can also be seen with clarity. However, the schema is not 
limited in its usefulness to the early modern period, and can be applied also to the modern 
era of international relations. 
In early modern politics, complex inter-territorial rule constituted an important 
modality of politics in addition to the simple intra-territorial rule that would gradually 
become the dominant form on the European continent in the nineteenth century. The 
distinction between these forms of rule, when placed in the context of the type of political 
unit in which it applied, can be captured by the following analytical categories: 
A) Simple States: Intra-territorial rule where ruler-subject ties are contained 
entirely within the boundaries of a single territorial state. 
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B) Composite States: Inter-territorial rule where ruler-subject ties cross the 
boundaries of two or more states. 
Composite states, as the subject matter of this dissertation, encompass both 
composite states where the tie between a ruler and subject is direct, (for instance 
composite kingdoms such as England-Scotland), and those where the tie was indirect, 
(such as the Holy Roman Empire, where the relationship between ruler and subject was 
mediated by an intermediate level of rulers). I call the former primary composite states, 
and the latter secondary composite states. Composite states antedated most simple states 
in European history for the simple reason that the European feudal system came about as 
a result of the incomplete fragmentation of the Carolingian Empire, itself a cross-
territorial political entity. As is widely known, medieval international relations were 
characterized by “a tangle of overlapping feudal jurisdictions, plural allegiances and 
asymmetrical suzerainties.”8 
In the medieval context, as sovereign territoriality had not yet emerged, rulership 
was characterized by a complex division of loyalty and authority shared between a 
multitude of different rulers on multiple levels, for instance kings, archbishops, dukes, 
bishops, and barons. At the apex of this complex structure was the diarchy of Pope and 
Emperor. The crux of medieval politics was the political tie between the lord and vassal, 
whereby a vassal rendered homage and fealty to a lord in a formal ceremony, pledging in 
the process to render armed assistance to the lord in case of need.9 Though the lord did 
not pledge fealty to a vassal, this feudal tie was reciprocal and thus a true political 
																																																								
8 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory,” Review of International Studies 
15, no. 1 (1989):  p. 11. 
9 Carl Stephenson, Mediaeval Feudalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942). 
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relation, as the lord was also bound by obligations, and vassals were justified in deserting 
a lord where these obligations were contravened. With the emergence of the sovereign 
territorial state, it finally became possible to conceive of the distinction between domestic 
and international domains of political activity, but before this, vassals could pledge 
fealty, or allegiance, to multiple lords, even though homage—or total submission—could 
only be pledged to one.10 
The transition from medieval to early modern, and modern politics, entailed first 
and foremost what Wight has called “a revolution in loyalties” as the King came to exert 
an increasing dominance over his rivals to men’s loyalty: the feudal barons and the 
Pope.11 By suppressing the feudal barons and challenging the authority of the Pope, the 
King and his domain—the kingdom—gradually came to monopolize the ties of loyalty of 
the people within its zone of authority, whereas the ability of fiefdoms and the 
overarching unifying body of Christendom gradually lost their ability to command part of 
the obedience and loyalty of these same people. Loyalty itself became less multivocal and 
more univocal, and the right claimed by Kings—according to the theory of the ‘divine 
right of kings’ which came to prominence in the late Middle Ages—to act as 
intermediary between God and man, gave further succor to monarchical authority. 
Though the power actually exercised by early modern monarchs was significantly weaker 
than the absolute power held by republican leaders such as Oliver Cromwell and 
Napoleon, nonetheless the kingdom as dominant unit had made possible its later 
																																																								
10 The interlocking ties of feudal obligations, though they did not take place in the context of exclusivist 
territoriality, are nonetheless an important context for the development of sovereign forms of allegiance, as 
it was just such multiple forms of allegiance that sovereign territoriality sought to contain through the 
development of the institution of permanent allegiance owed by a subject to first a sovereign, and later to 
abstract laws. Ashwini Vasanthakumar, “Treason, Expatriation and ‘So-Called’ Americans,” Georgetown 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 12 (2014): pp. 187-224. 
11 Martin Wight, Power Politics (New York: Continuum, 1978), p. 25.	
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transformation into the modern state by gaining a decisive advantage over its 
competitors. 
Though the early modern period appears as a mere transitional phase due to the 
distortions of hindsight, where an ill-matched constellation of dissimilar units—such as 
the more unitary kingdom of France and other more composite units such as Poland-
Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire—existed alongside each other, from the 
viewpoint of the historical present this assemblage was more a simple outcome of 
differences in the dynastic strategies of houses such as the Habsburgs and the Bourbons 
than it was the death struggle of pre-modern and modern state forms. Nonetheless, even if 
we accept that the coexistence of simple and composite polities was a natural state of 
affairs and the early modern more than a transitional moment, the dominance of the 
kingdom did clear the ground for imagining the domestic sphere by establishing a 
continent-wide system of interacting monarchies. The Holy Roman Empire was one of 
the few composite states where the boundary between internal and external was weak due 
to the indirect nature of the ties between ruler and subject, and some aspects of the 
multivocal loyalties of feudalism could survive.  
The concept of the ‘composite state’ was first articulated by H. G. Koenigsberger 
in 1975, and he understood the term to mean a state where there existed “more than one 
country under the sovereignty of one ruler.”12 He goes on as follows about the 
characteristics of such composite states: 
[C]omposite states or monarchies could consist of completely separate countries, divided 
by sea or by other states, such as the dominions of the Habsburg monarchy in Spain, Italy 
and the Netherlands…or they might be contiguous, such as England and Wales, Piedmont 
																																																								
12 H. G. Koenigsberger, “Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale: Monarchies and 
Parliaments in Early Modern Europe,” in Politicians and Virtuosi (London: Hambledon Press, 1986), p. 12. 
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and Savoy, or Poland and Lithuania. With the exception of England and Wales, they 
would always have kept their separate representative assemblies, as England and 
Scotland did in the seventeenth century.13 
 
Historians such as Koenigsberger and Elliott argue that such composite states, 
where more than one country is under the sovereignty of one ruler (and where ruler-
subject ties straddle state boundaries), were an important form of political organization in 
early modern Europe.14 Although composite monarchies have been differentiated into 
non-contiguous and contiguous types, I believe that the division of composite states into 
primary and secondary composite states (with direct and indirect ruler-subject ties, 
respectively) is more productive in differentiating composite states with distinct dynastic 
dynamics. We see this in later chapters, where secondary composite states are seen to 
possess the advantageous property of maintaining kinship ties between the first and 
second level of dynastic rulers (a property facilitating longevity).  
The rulers of composite states largely went about acquiring territory through 
dynastic marriage and inheritance rather than via force, and it was in large part the un-
coerced nature of the amalgamations that brought about the composite nature of these 
states. For this reason, composite states generally were, at least at time of origin, dynastic 
states. And it was the desire for dynastic aggrandizement on the part of the houses that 
ruled these composite states that led them to employ dynastic strategies to continue to 
acquire territories even after the first appendage was incorporated. For this reason, many 
early modern composite states were composed of more than two component polities. As 
Wight has noted of the Habsburgs, their dynastic house resembled “a kind of 
																																																								
13 Ibid. 
14 J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present 137 (November, 1992): pp. 48-71. 
See also Harald Gustafsson, “The Conglomerate State: A Perspective on State Formation in Early Modern 
Europe,” Scandinavian Journal of History 23 (1998): pp. 189-213. 
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international organization, a dynastic confederation of many states (Austria, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Naples, Milan, Bohemia, Hungary, Portugal), asserting the principles 
of international Catholicism.”15 
Composite states also came about when the dynastic line died out and a kingdom 
needed to adopt the ruler of another (often weaker) realm as their own. This characterized 
the personal union between England and Scotland under James I as well as England and 
Hanover under George I. The task of consolidating a legitimate and authoritative line of 
monarchs over a domain was not easy in early modern Europe. The vicissitudes of 
heredity meant that even with a male heir, there was no guarantee the heirs would have 
an aptitude for the exercise of political power, and the task of building legitimacy for a 
ruling dynasty often took multiple generations before robust loyalty of the local nobility 
could be obtained.16  
For this reason, outsourcing or delegating the function of rule to another already 
established dynastic ruler could offer significant advantages to a ruling aristocratic elite, 
especially as there still did not exist strong nationalistic prejudices against rule by 
foreigners. Not least of the benefits was that a relatively seamless succession would 
preserve the traditional rights and privileges of the nobility whereas discontinuity and 
breakdown of order could endanger them. However, adopting the ruler of a stronger 
polity for one’s kingdom could considerably weaken the power of the local nobility. It is 
telling in this regard that the three dynasties adopted by the English during succession 
																																																								
15 Martin Wight, Power Politics, p. 36. 
16 Ronald Asch discusses the difficulty of establishing a robust leadership lineage in his “Monarchy in 
Western and Central Europe,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350-1750, 
ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Orr discusses the vagaries of heredity and its 
destabilizing influence on the consolidation of a dynasty’s rule in Clarissa Campbell Orr, “Dynasticism and 




crises of the early modern period—the Stuarts from Scotland, William of Orange from 
the Netherlands, and the Hanoverians from Hanover—were all from significantly weaker 
polities than England. 
But the dynastic marriage was nonetheless the most common pathway through 
which a composite state came into being. One of the most stable composite states in 
Europe, the Castile-Aragon personal union, was brought about in 1469 by the marriage of 
Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile, and the territories of Burgundy and 
Spain were united in a personal union when the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V 
inherited these countries from his father and mother, respectively. 
Another reason for the formation of composite states was not strategy but 
necessity. The European feudal system of the late Middle Ages was one where kings had 
not yet been able to monopolize the use of violence, and were faced with fierce 
competition from powerful barons. As Mann has termed it, the despotic and 
infrastructural power of feudal authority was low, and thus such authority could not 
penetrate and coordinate society without the support of other power groups.  
The politics of the latter Middle Ages consisted of lineages of rulers and dynasties 
with well developed courts but with little of the bureaucratic apparatus we now consider 
to be essential to statehood. The absence of a permanent administrative structure meant 
that leaders depended heavily on maintaining personalistic ties of mutual obligation, 
loyalty, and acquiescence with members of the nobility scattered across non-contiguous 
territorial areas.17 Leadership limited to a unitary territorial area was partly an outcome of 
																																																								
17 The historiographical debate on absolutism has become more skeptical of the usefulness of ‘absolutism’ 
as a historical category, as Ludovician France under Louis XIV is now seen as less absolute in its ability to 
exercise central authority than its own ideology would suggest. Mettam, in one of the opening salvos of this 
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the increasing military capacity of modern rulers, which allowed them to unify former 
patchworks of domains into sovereign territories. This increased military capacity was 
not possible until around the time of the military revolution that was said to have taken 
place during the Thirty Years War. 
 
Defining Composite State Death 
 
As it is not self-evident what ‘death’ might mean when we examine the death of a 
composite state, we must define what we mean by the death of a composite state. All the 
while we should keep in mind that in early modern Europe the state as an administrative 
entity was rudimentary when compared to the personal rule of a leader or monarch. Thus, 
when I use the word ‘state’ in the following, I use it as shorthand for a political entity 
existing during the early modern period, and it must be kept in mind that some of these 
entities were very far from the typical Weberian state with a monopoly of legitimate 
violence in a defined territory. It should be noted that a composite state does not die in 
the same way that a ‘simple’ or non-composite unit dies. 
If, in early modern Europe, the end of a line of political rulers (dynastic or non-
dynastic) over a territorial entity18 is taken to be equivalent to its ‘death,’ then a simple 
																																																								
revisionist perspective, notes that “whole aspects of the internal administration of the kingdom were never, 
and never could be, under the crown's sole and direct control. Much of government within the realm was 
always a dialogue between the crown and a series of local elites, institutions and social groups, each one 
jealously guarding its traditional and undeniably legal privileges. The king sought their co-operation but 
could never hope totally to dominate them.” Roger Mettam, “Louis XIV and the Illusion of ‘Absolutism’,” 
Seventeenth-century French studies 5 (1983): p. 29. 
18 The territorial entity of the early modern period was a much less sharply defined one than the modern 
territorial state, with geological frontiers and zones of overlapping juridical rights rather than pure 
geographical and cartographic lines being the basis of territorial distinction. It was only in 1697, with the 
Treaty of Riswijck, that the geographical line came to be accepted as a legitimate basis of demarcating 
territory. For more clarification on these and related issues, see Peter Barber, “Maps and Monarchs in 
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political entity ceases to be either when the state as a whole ceases to exist, or when a 
simple entity ceases to be ‘simple’ in form. The abolition of a dynastic lineage and its 
replacement with another ruling regime (such as the overthrow of ancien régime France 
and its replacement by a republican form of government), also constitutes a form of 
‘death,’ although this type is only of interest to the main focus of our study—composite 
state death—through the spillover effect of the death of absolutist states on the death of 
composite states. The end of a ‘simple’ state can also take place when it is incorporated 
into, or amalgamated with, another juridically separate territorial entity (simple or 
composite) in such way becoming part of a composite state. Such incorporation or 
amalgamation may take place voluntarily or via coercion: voluntary means include the 
legal inheritance of multiple domains by one ruler, (i.e. the amalgamation of the 
territories of Castile and Aragon through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the 
fusion of the Burgundian territories with the Spanish monarchy via inheritance by 
Charles V), whereas pure coercive means includes conquest, though there were few true 
annexations of simple political units during the early modern era.  
On the other hand, a composite political entity can die through a greater number 
of separate pathways. These dissolutive pathways are death by amalgamation, secession, 
conquest and disestablishment. Firstly, as in the case of simple entities we have 
amalgamation or union, but here amalgamation means losing the property of 
‘compositeness,’ namely becoming simple. This entails becoming a single juridical entity 
																																																								
Europe 1550-1800,” in Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe, ed. Robert Oresko, 
G.C. Gibbs, and H. M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Peter Sahlins, “Natural 
Frontiers Revisited: France’s Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century,” The American Historical Review 
95, no. 5 (1990): pp. 1423-1451; David Buisseret, ed, Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of 
Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992).  
	
	 14	
when multiple juridically independent realms are merged to become one realm, with only 
a single ruler, parliament or assembly remaining to represent the different realms. An 
example of such a union is the ‘incorporating union’ of the kingdoms of England and 
Scotland in 1707, with two previously independent realms becoming one juridically 
unified realm. Secondly, we have secession, which in the case of a composite state means 
death through the breaking apart of its constituent parts and decomposition into ‘simple’ 
components to be ruled by different rulers. An example of this is the end of the political 
union of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal under a single monarch (1580-1640), which 
came to an end with the Portuguese Restoration War and the final recognition of the 
legitimacy of the Portuguese monarch by the Spanish regent, Mariana of Austria, in the 
Treaty of Lisbon of 1668.  
Thirdly, we have the conquest pathway of composite state death involving the 
military annexation of the whole of a composite polity. In the early modern period, such 
wholesale conquest almost never took place as most annexations were generally 
piecemeal, for instance in cases such as the annexation of Luxembourg (then a part of the 
composite Spanish domain) by Louis XIV in 1684. Partition, a subcategory of death by 
conquest, entails the destruction of a composite state via annexation of its whole territory 
and division by more than one ruler. Though there were a number of partition schemes in 
existence since the late seventeenth century—for instance the Treaty of the Hague (1698) 
which was signed by France, England, and the United Provinces and called for the 
partition of Spain upon the death of the childless Habsburg ruler, Charles II—the only 
ancien régime example of partition was the successive partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth (1772-1793) by Prussia, the Habsburg monarchy, and Russia. Finally, we 
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have the pathway of composite state death by disestablishment. This is in some ways 
similar to composite state death via conquest, as the only case conforming to this 
pathway—the Holy Roman Empire—was subject to dissolution by Emperor Francis II in 
1806 as a means to avoid the dreaded outcome of domination of the Reich by Napoleon’s 
France. Nonetheless, just as suicide in the face of imminent death by homicide must 
justifiably be considered a separate category from mere death by homicide, composite 
state death by disestablishment is analytically a separate pathway to composite state death 
from death by conquest.  
Needless to say, these are ideal-typical distinctions, and in actuality a combination 
of voluntary and involuntary means are invariably involved in the dissolution of a 
composite polity.19 Though the multiple pathways away from compositeness are worthy 
of investigation in their own right, we are interested in examining cases of these distinct 
pathways to composite state death mainly for the light that such an examination will shed 
on the protective factors underpinning the late-survival of some of these composite 
polities. However, we have chosen our empirical cases based on their status as 
representative cases of each of these distinct pathways. 
 
The Puzzle of Composite State Longevity in Ancien Régime Europe 
																																																								
19 The complications and blurring of these ideal-typical distinctions can arise in particular empirical cases, 
as exemplified by England during the mid seventeenth century. In a composite political realm, an internal 
revolt could lead to the abolition of a separate polity in one or more of the dynastically linked territories, as 
took place during the English Civil Wars when a short lived republic was founded after the monarchy was 
abolished. Here, the Kingdom of Scotland was not immediately absorbed into the newly formed 
Commonwealth, leading to a separation of the two formerly united entities—a situation that was soon 
changed with Cromwell’s invasion and subjugation of Ireland and Scotland and the formation of the 
Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland in 1653. This move away from compositeness was to be 
short-lived, however, as the unified republic would be unable to sustain itself after the death of Cromwell in 
1658. The pre-civil war status quo of personal union of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland 




The emergence of composite states is not a counter-intuitive phenomenon. 
However, the longevity of composite states in Europe well into the early modern period 
is a fact requiring explanation. In this section, we answer the question of why composite 
state longevity in ancien régime Europe is puzzling. Though the traditional approach, 
which posits a radical rupture with the Peace of Westphalia, is not without its problems, 
more sophisticated approaches to institutional development in the early modern period 
also lead us to expect composite polities to have become moribund not long after the 
Peace of Westphalia. That this expectation is contradicted by historical evidence leads to 
the conclusion that the late survival of some composite states is counter-intuitive. 
 
The Standard View of Westphalia and its Critics 
The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the ruinous Thirty Years’ War, has been 
interpreted as the moment when sovereignty was granted to the principalities of the Holy 
Roman Empire, fatally weakening the Emperor in his claim to suzerainty over the 
electors of the Empire and dealing a death blow to the Holy Roman Empire as a cross-
territorial polity.20 This perspective, which constituted the standard interpretation of the 
meaning of the Westphalian settlement, saw the Peace of Westphalia as the end of feudal 
hierarchy and cross-territorial rule and the beginning of a sovereign system where princes 
brooked the right of no superior to intervene in their territory.  
As Leo Gross has written:  
																																																								
20 Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), p. 276. 
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[I]n the political field it [the Peace of Westphalia] marked man’s abandonment of the idea 
of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new system characterized by the 
coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one 
another, and free from any external earthly authority…the idea of an authority or 
organization above the sovereign states is no longer.21  
 
The confessional autonomy (and nominal religious equality) given to the electors 
and princes of the Holy Roman Empire through the preceding Peace of Augsburg of 1555 
and the principle of Cuius regio, eius religio (translated as ‘Whose realm, his 
religion,’),22 as well as the mutual agreement not to interfere in the territory of the 
signators to the treaty, leads to the inference that the environment of Europe became 
strongly antagonistic to the survival of hierarchical structures after 1648.23 
When combined with the Waltzian motif of systemic socialization and the 
neorealist argument that if units in a system do not adequately emulate the structural and 
military innovations of the leading states, they tend to ‘fall by the wayside,’ we arrive at 
the prediction that international systems will generally tend toward structural ‘sameness’ 
of units, especially in the case of units at the core of systemic competition.24 In the early 
modern system following the Westphalian Peace, neorealist theory leads to the 
expectation that core states most implicated in military competition, including Poland-
																																																								
21 Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” American Journal of International Law 42 (January 
1948): pp. 28-29. 
22 This phrase was not coined until a later critique of the peace published in 1586. Peter H. Wilson, The 
Holy Roman Empire, Second Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), p. 42. 
23 It has been perceptively noted by Osiander that the principle of Cuius regio, eius religio was in fact 
amended by the Peace of Westphalia such that it reverted to the religious status quo as it was in 1624. 
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International 
Organization 55 (Spring, 2001): p. 272. 
24 The key passages of the neorealist argument about systemic socialization are found on pages 118, and 
127-8 of Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). A key passage 
states that: “the close juxtaposition of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise 
from a failure to conform to successful practices. It is this ‘sameness,’ an effect of the system, that is so 
often attributed to the acceptance of so-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to 
power. In power, most of them quickly change their ways. They can refuse to do so, and yet hope to 
survive, only if they rule countries little affected by the competition of states. The socialization of 




Lithuania (the victim of a number of destructive invasions) and the Holy Roman Empire 
(engaged in a fierce rivalry during the eighteenth century), would have quickly adjusted 
structurally to the emerging standard set by the territorially simple state, or otherwise 
disappeared.25 
This traditional view has become subject to criticism from those who view the 
Peace of Westphalia not as signaling the end of feudal hierarchy in the way that Gross 
and mainstream scholarship would suggest. In general terms, Krasner has shown that 
components of cross-territorial authority postdate the Westphalian Peace, and the 
hermetically sealed and autonomously acting unitary state is as much an ideal as it was a 
reality.26 Osiander, more specifically, has made some persuasive arguments for why 
Westphalia did not in fact mandate a system of sovereign equality. His view is that, upon 
detailed analysis, the Peace of Westphalia did not treat either the question of sovereignty, 
the prerogatives of the emperor and the Pope, or the independence of European actors, 
and so could not have mandated an entirely new regime of sovereign equality. Rather, he 
views the two treaties comprising the Peace of Westphalia—the Treaty of Münster and 
the Treaty of Osnabrück—as specifically concerned with the internal affairs of the Reich.  
Moreover, only a very limited internationalization of the internal affairs of the 
Empire took place through France and Sweden being made guarantors of the settlement 
with authority to intervene in the Reich, though this provision was limited by the fact that 
																																																								
25 Recently, Alastair Iain Johnston has made the argument that the neorealist approach does not allow for 
the possibility of ecological ‘niches’ where different traits can survive in micro-habitats despite overarching 
pressures toward homogenization. This is an argument that overlaps with my own, though we do not 
explicitly use the framework of evolutionary biology here. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), Chapter 1.	
26 Stephen Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). He also, correctly, argues that Westphalia like 
sovereignty (exclusive control over a given territory) predates the Westphalian Peace. 
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intervention was allowed only if the Imperial Estates could not resolve their dispute 
satisfactorily within a certain period of time.27 In fact, far from increasing, French 
influence in the Empire declined significantly after 1648, though this was related to the 
animus engendered by Louis XIV and his aggressive scorched earth policies in the 
Palatinate preceding the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697), which contrary to his aim of 
sowing division, succeeded only in uniting the princes of the Empire against him.28 
This argument has much to commend it. It is more in line with contemporary 
historical research both in correctly pointing to the main subject of the Westphalian 
settlement (the relations between the imperial princes and emperor), and in noting the 
absence of a firm rupture between feudal hierarchy and modern anarchy. Whaley argues 
that the Westphalian peace did not grant full sovereignty to the princes, only giving them 
a lesser form of territorial sovereignty (Landeshoheit) consisting of political and 
ecclesiastical rights over their territories—already established before the treaties—as well 
as granting them the right to enter into alliances with foreign powers (as long as these 
alliances were not directed against the Emperor or the Reich).29 In other words, the 
princes still “feared a strong France or Sweden more than they feared the generally weak 
Habsburgs, whom they knew; they wanted to return to the balance of powers between 
																																																								
27 It should also be noted that intervention required invitation by the injured party to be legitimate. 
28 Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” p. 266. Wilson further notes 
that both France and Sweden, through a circuitous route, came to support the preservation of the Empire for 
their respective diplomatic ends. Peter Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 1527-
1528. On Imperial unity against Louis XIV, see John Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714, (Essex: 
Pearson, 1999). 
29 Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 626-627. 
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‘emperor and Reich’ that had been the basis of the German polity since the reign of 
Maximilian I.”30  
Nonetheless, Osiander’s judgment that the most significant transition to modern 
international politics took place with the French revolution and the industrial revolution 
in the nineteenth century takes us too far in the other direction. It is clear from the fact 
that many contemporary observers saw power in the Empire as shifting towards the 
electors and away from the Emperor, that the Peace of Westphalia did still represent a 
real challenge to dynastic rulers exercising authority across borders. Moreover, during the 
reign of Louis XIV covering the second half of the seventeenth century, France—a 
relatively centralized state—was the dominant Western European power, and this 
dominance was the catalyst for the War of the Spanish Succession.31 The armies of Louis 
during this period were “strong enough to stand against coalitions of all the other great 
powers.”32 In Northern Europe and the Baltic, Sweden was the dominant power until its 
losses during the Great Northern War, and like France it was also a relatively unified 
state for the time. From 1740 onwards, Prussia—itself a component of the Holy Roman 
Empire and a relatively unitary state—exerted strong pressures on the pattern of 
interactions in Central Europe. Given that the leading states, in military terms, for much 
of the post-Westphalian period were those structurally close to the unitary state, the 
complete erasure of the Westphalian Peace as a significant historical milestone is 
premature. In following sections, we examine why composite state survival is puzzling 
																																																								
30 Ibid., p. 626. 
31 Wight, Power Politics, Chapter 2. 
32 John Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714 (London: Longman, 1999), p. 361. 
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from the perspective of work in the constructivist paradigm, as well as evolutionary 
biology. 
 
Selection Pressures post-Westphalia 
The significance of the threat to composite states represented by the Westphalian 
settlement can be garnered from Nexon’s more recent theory, which views the Peace of 
Westphalia more as a symptom than cause of international change. He argues that 
sociological transformations in the nature of confessional loyalty were more pivotal in 
threatening the Imperial structure than were the Peace treaties as autonomous causal 
movers in their own right. According to this view, composite polities faced the prospect 
of internal fragmentation through confessional decomposition in the wake of the 
reformation. More damagingly, the traditional ‘divide and rule’ strategies deployed by 
the rulers of composite states to suppress such challenges, was fatally weakened by the 
confessional polarization introduced by the reformation. Religious belief was a more 
powerful driver of collective mobilization than the opacity of feudal obligations. This 
opened the way for external powers to intervene in the territory of others to protect co-
religionists in neighboring populations, leading to the internationalization of domestic 
conflicts and exhausting the governance capacities of composite rulers. According to 
Nexon, damage to the network coherence of cross-territorial leadership preceded both the 
Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia, which were symptoms and not a cause of 
the decline of composite leadership.33 
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In other words, the coherence of confessionally diverse political entities was 
rapidly undermined during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries due to the effects 
of the Reformation. The Holy Roman Empire might, then, be expected to have undergone 
either a rapid rationalization or dissolution after the point when confessional identity 
became a dominant form of loyalty in its sociological structure. The mechanism through 
which such decomposition would likely have come about, is that of a cascade of 
defections whereby increasing weakness of the political center is taken advantage of by 
princes to break free of imperial authority. Similar processes of cascading defections 
were pivotal in two contemporaneous cases, the English Civil Wars and the Portuguese 
War of Restoration, both of which can be framed as cascading rebellion set off by a 
challenge to the authority of a political center.34 
Against such expectations, it is remarkable that what was witnessed in the Reich 
was far from a decomposition, as the period has been called that of ‘imperial recovery’ by 
some prominent scholars.35 Not only did the Holy Roman Empire—the entity which 
should have been most injured by the transformations Nexon describes—remain 
nominally intact until its eventual dissolution during the Napoleonic wars, but it retained 
elements of vitality throughout the post-Westphalian period. Thus, recent scholars of the 
late history of the Holy Roman Empire have challenged the dominant view that the 
																																																								
34 J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), pp. 787-788. In the case of 
Portugal, the revolt of the Catalans of 1640 and Olivares plan to send the Portuguese nobility into Catalonia 
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35 Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, Second Edition; Peter H. Wilson, From Reich to Revolution 
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Empire after Westphalia was merely a moribund entity masking factual sovereignty on 
the level of the principalities and territories. Clearly the reign of Leopold I covering the 
second half of the seventeenth century marked a strengthening of the imperial center due 
to the military successes enjoyed by imperial forces (with the help of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth) against the Ottomans.  
As can be seen from this discussion, even without the disruptive forces of 
nationalism, which were only to emerge fully in the nineteenth century following the 
Napoleonic Wars, the post-Westphalian survival of composite polities in Europe seems to 
be theoretically difficult to explain given what has been depicted as the comparative 
strength of religious loyalties over feudal loyalties in domestic societies. Spruyt weighs 
into this discussion and puts forward the additional evolutionary mechanism of 
institutional selection for why we should expect composite polities to demise shortly after 
critical events such as the Peace of Westphalia. For him, the critical mechanism driving 
institutional selection exists on the meso-level, and strengthens the leaders of territorially 
homogeneous polities who can limit domestic free-riding as well as enable credible 
commitments to be made between the monarchic rulers.36 According to Spruyt, this 
process set in train a positive feedback loop whereby the emerging system of sovereign 
states and its leaders was further strengthened by their increasing numbers. The existence 
of feedback loops such as this suggests that the institutional fitness of declining units 
should have decreased not at a linear but at an exponential rate after the emergence of the 
sovereign states system. 
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The View from Evolutionary Biology 
The puzzling nature of composite state survival is also evident when these 
dynamics are seen through the lens of evolutionary biology and demography. In the 
organic world, demographic approaches to mortality have isolated some important 
regularities, including that mortality increases exponentially for many species until a 
certain point late in the life-cycle, a pattern first identified by Benjamin Gompertz in 
1825.37 Gompertz observed that a person’s risk of death in a given year doubles every 
eight years of the lifespan. In more recent studies, there have been ambiguous results that 
point towards a plateau and even a deceleration of mortality at advanced ages.38 
Gompertz originally postulated that death is the result of both chance, and an increased 
inability to withstand destruction.  
More recent evolutionary approaches argue that death is a consequence of “the 
declining force of natural selection with age,” a process whereby late acting mutations 
accumulate after the age when reproductive pressures generally decline.39 The fact of 
aging and death has been seen as a frequent but puzzling fact for evolutionary theory to 
explain. Rose notes that the puzzle of aging is based on the fact that, even while natural 
selection tends to increase the mean fitness of a population, evolution has nonetheless 
“frequently produced organisms with survival and reproductive rates that decline with 
adult age.”40 The answer put forward by some evolutionary biologists to explain this 
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puzzle is that it is the absence of fissile reproduction—namely reproduction by division 
rather than by sexual reproduction and fusion—which leads to greatly diminished forces 
of selection at later ages.41 
Social and political units do not reproduce themselves sexually, but rather 
maintain structural features over time through social evolution and processes that ensure 
structural continuity in areas such as leadership, language and socialization. Thus, for 
social and political units, the pressures leading to dissolution do not come during a 
specific phase of a predetermined life span but rather follow crises that threaten social 
and political reproduction. The main threats to the integrity of a political unit come from 
external attack, internal rebellion, and crises of leadership succession.  
As we need a view of mortality that can simultaneously encompass the cessation 
of both biological and social entities, we draw on Humberto Maturana’s theory of 
autopoeisis, which takes death to be the cessation of an entity’s ability to continuously 
maintain its unity and autonomy from its environment across time via homeostatic 
mechanisms. These homeostatic mechanisms allow a living entity to “continuously 
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them.”42 Niklas 
Luhmann, in applying and extending the concept of autopoeisis to the study of social 
systems, asserts that ‘reproduction,’ not in the sense of the production of new entities but 
																																																								
41 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
42 This notion of life—which mortality negates—is taken from Maturana and Varela’s work on autopoiesis. 
More fully, they argue that an autopoeitic entity, of which humans and other biological organisms are one 
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the constant renewal of system elements, is the key task that social systems must 
accomplish continually to survive. He asserts that: 
All elements pass away. They cannot endure as elements in time, and thus they must 
constantly be produced on the basis of whatever constellation of elements is actual at any 
given moment. Reproduction thus does not mean simply repeatedly producing the same, 
but rather reflexive production, production out of products.43 
 
Thus, from this perspective, illnesses and ailments of vital systems entail the 
danger of positive feedback mechanisms being initiated that can endanger the ongoing 
homeostatic reproduction of autonomy and the systems that ensure this. Diseases 
contracted in vulnerable states of systemic health are much more likely to cascade 
through positive feedback, leading to the onset of terminal decline and death. Death, in 
this view, is equivalent to becoming too weak to sustain the organism’s defenses against 
centrifugal forces that are always acting to impair ongoing homeostasis. Once one or two 
of these core homeostatic processes are damaged or when invading organisms have 
successfully breached the outer defenses of the immune system, the floodgates are 
opened and homeostasis becomes critically threatened.  
Gilpin, echoing the evolutionary approach in his theory of international change, 
argues that international systems are prone to change due to their governance being 
subject to self-limiting mechanisms. In particular, he argues that the systemic 
management provided by dominant states—which he takes to be a fact of international 
history—are subject to diminishing returns and increasing costs as leading powers find it 
increasingly difficult to raise the costs of defending the systemic status quo.44 A recent 
anthropological approach to societal collapse concurs in pointing to the salience of 
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diminishing returns in setting off mechanisms that lead to decline and collapse. Tainter in 
his theory of societal collapse, notes that: 
[C]ontinued investment in sociopolitical complexity reaches a point where the benefits 
for such investment begin to decline, at first gradually, then with accelerated force. Thus, 
not only must a population allocate greater and greater amounts of resources to 
maintaining an evolving society, but after a certain point, higher amounts of this 
investment will yield smaller increments of return. Diminishing returns…are a recurrent 
aspect of sociopolitical evolution, and of investment in complexity. 45 
 
Thus, evolutionary theories of longevity and social systemic decline and 
breakdown note that the resilience and dynamism of political leadership plays a key role 
in sustaining the autonomy of the unit or system, and once its resilience is impaired, the 
decline of the group begins and accelerates as diminishing returns processes kick in. As 
decline begins, not only do leaders lose ground vis-à-vis internal challengers, but they 
also become increasingly threatened by external challengers. Jervis mirrors these points 
when he notes that “expansion initially leads to more expansion…it then generates 
counterbalancing forces that retard or reverse expansion…in the final stages, retreats 
undermine the state’s power, leading to its collapse and accelerating the growth of 
another state.”46  
The thrust of the evolutionary perspective suggests to us the following 
expectation of systemic evolution following the Peace of Westphalia. The combined 
pressures acting upon system units around the time of the Peace of Westphalia—which 
included not only the reformation but also the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years’ 
War and the rapidly increasing costs of military competition—were increasing rapidly 
and acting in unison across Western and Central Europe to put immense pressure on the 
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ruling dynasties of the time. Against such a backdrop, the expectation is that territorially 
heterogeneous, decentralized and less integrated polities (i.e. composite states) would 
have quickly become subject to dissolution and state death. The fact that some composite 
states survived until the Napoleonic Wars is therefore puzzling from two independent 
perspectives: constructivist IR theory which expects cross-cutting alliances to break apart 
loosely integrated entities; and cyclical theories of political development which expect 
such pressures to set off decreasing returns processes and accelerate leadership decline. 
And yet, despite these expectations, we observe the survival of a number of important 
composite polities until the cusp of the nineteenth century.  
 
The Objection of Path Dependence 
A powerful objection calling into doubt the counter-intuitive nature of composite 
state survival post-Westphalia must be treated with caution given what we know about 
biological and institutional demise. Path-dependence is a framework that attempts to 
explain the counterintuitive longevity of seemingly suboptimal equilibria in time. In the 
political science literature, path dependence has been taken to refer to situations where 
“once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high.”47 
According to this view, positive feedback and increasing returns explains why specific 
outcomes become consolidated during critical junctures—especially early in a particular 
process—and then stubbornly remain in place despite what seem strong countervailing 
trends.  
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The example of ‘varieties of capitalism’ is given by Pierson as a case of the 
ability of path dependence to explain what seems to be the counterintuitive existence of 
multiple configurations of economic markets in different countries despite strong 
international pressures toward convergence. The start-up costs of an institutional market 
structure are substantial, giving rise to the resilience of existing structures even when 
countervailing pressures exist.48 The path dependent argument would run, then, that the 
multiple crises of the early seventeenth century, despite seeming to pose severe 
challenges for the composite polities of the European system, nonetheless were not as 
threatening as they may seem due to the advantages and increasing returns reaped by the 
historically older polities which have an important time advantage over the centralizing 
polities, such as France and others. Amongst the advantages held by the composite 
polities would include the advantage of possessing a robust network of patronage 
relations and, in the case of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg dynasty, the 
prestige associated with the traditionally preeminent title of ‘Emperor.’ 
However, the approach of path dependence is hobbled by two important 
weaknesses. Firstly, it is unclear in which circumstances path dependence and increasing 
returns processes can be expected to be effective, and in what circumstances decreasing 
returns and accelerating decline can be expected to be salient. Pierson, by way of 
explanation, offers parameters for conditions usually marked by increasing returns; those 
characterized by multiple equilibria, contingency, sequencing effects and inertia. 
However, as these parameters—the existence of multiple futures, non-determinism, 
temporality, and conservatism—are characteristic of most political conditions, we are no 
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closer to a criterion that might allow us to predict when increasing returns and when 
decreasing returns are dominant.  
Secondly, systems theory suggests that increasing returns processes can turn into 
decreasing returns processes and vice versa: “positive feedback can prevail for a period 
of time only to be replaced by negative feedback, or the sequence can occur in 
reverse…this means that stimuli that set off positive feedback at one point in time can set 
off negative feedback at another as the state of the system changes.”49 The framework of 
path dependence is not of much help when we wish to know the conditions in which 
increasing or decreasing returns hold sway, nor does it have strong analytical tools to tell 
us when increasing returns shift into decreasing returns or vice versa. 
Thus, the ongoing resilience of key composite polities well into the post-
Westphalian period is still a historical fact confounding expectations and in need of 
explanation. Moreover, the question of what factors facilitated the survival of these 
composite polities for so long into post-Westphalian ancien régime Europe is an 
inexplicably overlooked question that urgently calls for examination using the conceptual 
tools provided by international relations. 
I provide now, a short outline of the overall work. In Chapter One, I provide three 
historically grounded approaches to understanding composite state longevity: 
dynasticism, ‘early modern’ realism, and leadership learning. Although analysis of the 
empirical cases shows that dynasticism—and in particular the mechanism of dynastic 
deterrence—is the most satisfactory explanation for why some composite states reached 
an advanced age, I do not test these approaches at this point. Rather, at the end of this 
																																																								
49 Jervis, System Effects, p. 126. 
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chapter I outline my overall research strategy, including issues of case selection. In 
Chapter Two, I undertake an in-depth historical analysis of two case contexts—the 
British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula—in order to understand the diverging pathways of 
composite states that were dissolved at a comparatively earlier stage in their lifespan. We 
find that, despite the multiple interacting causal forces at play, the role of a credible 
external threat was a vitally important factor in accelerating amalgamation attempts by 
composite state rulers, and dynastic recognition and alliances were vitally important for 
successful secessions.  
Having found through these preliminary cases that the role of the perception of 
threat arising from the external environment was a crucial factor in composite state 
dissolution, I proceed in Chapter Three to elaborate in detail a theory of dynastic 
deterrence—a derivation of the approach of dynasticism—that I argue has great 
explanatory power in comprehending the longevity of some composite states. The reason 
why early death composite states are examined before late survival composite states is 
due to our conception of state survival as the successful negotiation of near-death crises 
by the rulers of a state. For this reason, early death states (and their process of 
dissolution) are critical source material upon which we can establish the gravest threats 
faced by composite states. The third chapter outlining the specific theory of dynastic 
deterrence is introduced after the second, as some of the puzzling phenomena the theory 
attempts to explain are thrown into greater relief by the preceding empirical analysis.   
In Chapter Four, I provide a detailed analysis of two late-survival composite 
states: Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire. Taking the cue from the earlier 
finding that external threats were decisive in bringing about early amalgamation, I place 
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particular emphasis in this chapter on examining ‘near-miss’ existential crises these states 
faced, and asking how they managed to avoid death in these cases. Through a comparison 
of these near misses and ultimate dissolution, I demonstrate that it was dynastic kinship 
ties between the rulers of these states and other dynastic rulers that protected them by 
deterring full conquest and/or annexation attempts by other states.  
Though the role of military power is not supported, leadership learning was 
shown to play a part, paradoxically, in teaching some atypical dynastic rulers the 
advantages of flouting dynastic norms. It was these atypical dynastic rulers, such as 
Charles XII and Frederick II, who would play a pivotal role in weakening the force of 
dynastic norms as the eighteenth century progressed. In light of the fact that it was the 
failure of dynastic deterrence that led to the final dissolution of late-survival composite 
states, and ‘near-death’ crises of composite states were overcome due to the dynastic 
deterrence mechanism, the operation of dynastic deterrence is seen to be sufficient in 
explaining composite state longevity. In the Conclusion, I put forward a set of remaining 
questions regarding systemic transformations in the late ancien régime and their role in 
creating opportunities rife for exploitation by atypical dynastic leaders. The strategies and 
goals of these atypical dynastic leaders was one of the main drivers of the eventual 
dissolution of late survival composite states, and though their detailed study is outside the 
scope of this dissertation, we point here to the important questions that must still be 
answered about their role and influence. These questions and their comprehensive 
investigation would constitute a systematic research paradigm of early modern politics in 




APPROACHES TO COMPOSITE STATE LONGEVITY IN ANCIEN RÉGIME 
EUROPE 
 
What are the existing approaches that explain the resilience and longevity of 
composite states after the Peace of Westphalia? In this chapter we outline three 
compelling approaches for understanding the longevity of composite states in early 
modern Europe. The dependent variable to be explained is the longevity of some 
composite states, which survived longer after the Peace of Westphalia than theory tells us 
should have been expected. 
Though akin to theories in the Waltzian sense of statements that explain laws or 
regularities, these approaches are broader and are grounded in relations between a 
particular type of unit. They attempt to explain the evolution of the early modern 
European system and its units in terms of the nature of these relations. Strategic 
dynasticism posits that the early modern system was shaped by co-evolutionary relations 
between dynasties, and takes the nature of interactions between these dynasties to have 
been grounded in common interests (the aggrandizement of the dynasty, which depended 
on marriages and recognition between dynasties) and thus entailed positive-sum 
dynamics. Early modern realism sees systemic evolution to have been based on 
competitive interactions between states, and takes the nature of these inter-state relations 
to have been close to ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ competition for limited resources. 
Leadership learning takes the early modern system to have developed primarily due to 
cross-generational learning patterns both within and across dynastic lineages. 
	
	 34	
These approaches, though they do not perfectly map onto the three paradigms of 
contemporary IR theory—realism, liberalism and constructivism—nonetheless mirror the 
central dynamics of these three paradigms in the historical context of early modern 
politics in a way that brings their essence to bear on the period. One pitfall to avoid when 
undertaking historical analysis is anachronism, and the danger of anachronism has not 
been sufficiently cognized in the application of IR theory to historical cases. Rather than 
automatically assuming that contemporary theories have trans-historical validity, a 
careful contextualization is necessary to ensure that theories do not overemphasize the 
role of institutions and practices which either did not yet exist, or were less 
consequential.1  
It should also be noted that each of these basic approaches operates primarily on 
one level of the ‘levels of analysis’ schema.2 Strategic dynasticism operates on the third 
level of inter-unit (or international) interactions, and views these relations as 
determinative of state longevity. During the early modern period, regardless of the 
bureaucracies that were developing in the period, what corresponds today to international 
relations took place primarily between ruling dynasties. Early modern realism operates on 
the unit level and takes both domestic and regime variables to be primary determinants of 
state survival. Leadership learning operates on the individual level, but historicizes the 
																																																								
1 Liberalism and its emphasis on markets as well as liberal institutions and norms, cannot be transposed un-
amended onto early modern states, as markets and liberal institutions did not have the prominence then that 
they do now. Instead of such an a-historical approach, I have chosen to extract the essence of liberalism and 
constructivism—namely the positive-sum nature of much economic rationality and the historically evolving 
(not timeless) nature of international systems, respectively—and anchored them in the contemporary actors 
and institutions best placed to be ‘carriers’ of these essences. 
2 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); J. David Singer, 
“The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14, no. 1 (1961): pp. 77-92; 
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976); Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): pp. 335-370;  
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decision-maker by embedding them in diachronic learning lineages. In the context of 
early modern Europe, dynastic upbringing and education was a finely honed means to 
transmit knowledge and learning across generations. Because of the intentional focus of 
dynastic education on learning lessons from the past, we take this to be an extremely 
important variable in deciphering the puzzle of composite state survival. We now briefly 
describe each of these approaches in a preliminary manner. 
The first approach—strategic dynasticism—takes the main protective factor 
explaining composite state longevity to be a series of interlocking kinship networks 
forged through marital unions between the ruling houses of composite states and those of 
other states on its external periphery. This theory takes it that the relations between the 
dynastic rulers of early modern Europe were characterized to a significant extent by co-
evolution rather than mere competition as has been presumed by previous IR 
interpretations of this era. Rather than a zero-sum struggle for survival between dynastic 
rulers, the dynastic fabric of early modern politics was one that tied together the major 
ruling families of Western and Central Europe in a web of collaborative kinship relations, 
and these kinship ties gave rise to an ancien régime strategic culture entailing a norm of 
sovereign co-existence, where sometimes fierce military conflict precluded absolute goals 
such as the overthrow of a rival dynasty. Though in a later chapter we give a more 
detailed account of the dynastic deterrence mechanisms that arose from this network of 
dynastic ties, in this chapter we give a broad-strokes account of the dynastic approach 
that fills in the historical and cultural context of these ties. 
The second approach is that of ‘early modern’ realism and competitive power 
politics, which argues that it was political and military power gained through the 
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combined resources of composite states—dynastic and non-dynastic—that gave rulers of 
composite states a military advantage enabling enhanced survival capabilities in the 
environment of early modern international competition. This approach applies classical 
realist principles to the question of composite state survival, and notes the advantages 
held by composite states in warfare as being sufficient to allow them to compete 
successfully against more integrated territorial states until the latter began to gain the 
advantage through the quality of their resources, in particular the solidarity and cohesion 
they could draw on based on an emerging cultural homogeneity in their societies. 
The third approach posits the protective factor as existing on the level of the ruler, 
and cross-generational learning by successive dynastic rulers is taken to be the variable 
forestalling the disintegrative forces associated with composite rule. Leadership learning 
in the early modern period involved the gradual adoption of moves to strengthen direct 
rule within the immediate sphere of a ruler’s patrimonial authority. But it also 
encompassed the development of an increasingly effective response to internal rebellions, 
which did not endanger the cohesion of the composite state itself by pushing 
centralization too far. Cross-generational learning is difficult to discern, as measuring it 
depends not only on the successful response to crisis, but also the gradual decline over 
time of severe threats (such as rebellions) to internal rule. Evaluating the effectiveness of 
learning thus depends on measuring the non-occurrence of a certain class of political 
events, rather than on their occurrences. In the following sections, we lay out these 
approaches and the specific mechanisms comprising their hypothesized empirical effects. 
The manner in which these approaches interact with each other in the context of 
this research, is as follows. Due to the fact that these approaches operate primarily on 
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different levels of analysis, these approaches are largely independent of each other 
(although interaction effects clearly do occur) and we can think of variation occurring on 
each level (while keeping the other levels constant). For this reason, and due to the fact of 
causal equifinality assumed by this research, it is possible that more than one of these 
approaches is confirmed by this research, but it is important to determine the underlying 
mechanisms through which longevity—where it occurs—was brought about. Due to the 
distinct mechanisms proposed by the different approaches, it is unlikely that more than 
one approach is confirmed in its entirety as having caused an outcome of composite state 
longevity. However, overdetermination is a fact of social reality, and different causes do 
at times lead to a single outcome. Dynasticism posits close dynastic kinship ties to be 
protective, so the more integrated a ruling dynasty is in a network of kinship ties with 
ruling dynasties in its immediate vicinity, the less vulnerable it is to core threats to its 
sovereignty. If the ruling dynasty of a state is not integrated into a network of kinship ties 
with its dynastic neighborhood, the more vulnerable it will be to conquest attempts. Non-
dynastic states, such as (at its limit) elective monarchies and republics, should be seen to 
be especially vulnerable to conquest attempts and/or prone to attempt the conquest of 
others. Due to being particularly insulated from conquest attempts, dynastically highly 
networked states are expected to stand a better chance of reaching an advanced age. 
In the case of early modern realism, the key variable is the composite nature of 
the state itself. According to this view, composite states have an important advantage in 
terms of being able to draw on greater resources for their defense, when compared to 
early modern states relatively simple in structure, such as the absolutist state. The 
expectation arising from this is that composite states have a greater capacity to wage 
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defensive war successfully than they would if they were broken up into their constituent 
parts. Moreover, due to these defensive capabilities, we expect composite states to stand a 
better chance of reaching an advanced age because they are able to prevent catastrophic 
defeat in war and also because the rulers of other states are deterred from invading 
composite states due to their relative invulnerability to conquest. 
Leadership learning is a difficult approach to operationalize, but at its heart 
successful learning depends on a leader (or prospective leader) having access to learning 
resources to aid them in mastering the art of government. Though hereditary monarchs 
hardly claimed a monopoly over the tools of learning as it related to rulership, 
nonetheless hereditary monarchies were in many ways educational laboratories expressly 
directed at instilling in young heirs the required temperament and cognitive tools to 
successfully rule their state. For this reason, we hypothesize that dynastic rulers were 
more empowered to learn from the mistakes of their forebears than the rulers of non-
dynastic states (such as the rulers of true elective monarchies and republican states). Even 
within the category of dynastic rulers, first sons given the full benefit of dynastic 
instruction in the art of kingship and latter members of a dynastic line with the benefit of 
a retrospective view of the mistakes of predecessors are expected to be in an 
advantageous position to forestall disintegrative domestic forces. Critical mistakes—such 
as misconceived reforms leading to inadvertent rebellions endangering a dynasty’s grip 
on power or military decisions endangering the security of the state—must be avoided by 
future generations in a leadership lineage for a dynasty to be successful. 
In this way, it is possible to evaluate the causal efficacy of each approach in 
explaining the dependent variable of composite state longevity after the Peace of 
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Westphalia. Though we undertake a comprehensive evaluation of these approaches 
through the use of the comparative-historical method in the chapters that follow, these 
qualitative methodologies are sufficient to demonstrating—when applied to the 
comparative cases to follow—that the approach of dynasticism has the most explanatory 
purchase on the puzzle of composite state longevity in early modern Europe. This is due 
to its ability to satisfactorily explain the manner in which some late surviving composite 
states overcame moments of existential crisis, but also due to the ability of this approach 
to explain the manner in which late survival composite states met their ultimate end. 
 
Dynasticism and Co-evolution 
 
The dynastic nature of early modern rule is often noted, though it is under-
theorized by scholars of IR. The very object of analysis, when it is the relations between 
ruling dynasties (or families), is hard to grasp for a discipline that holds relations between 
unitary territorial states (or the ‘inter-national’) or relations between leaders as the central 
unit of analysis. However, the system of dynasticism which created networks of kinship 
stretching across territorial boundaries, is an important part of the fabric of early modern 
politics. Dynasticism as a strategy for increasing one’s power and prestige was pursued 
actively by hereditary ruling dynasties in the early modern period. And pursuing 
dynasticism reaped ample rewards in the form of active support and benign neglect on the 
part of dynastic allies and rivals alike. Despite the recent upsurge of research on 
composite states and the early modern period more generally, a comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical analysis has yet to be undertaken of the mechanisms through 
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which such dynastic strategies operated and their overall effectiveness in bringing 
substantive advantage to the rulers who deployed them.  
One initial observation recommends the focus on dynasticism as a variable 
important to understanding composite state longevity. In wars between the dynasts of the 
early modern period in Europe, change of leadership was rarely coerced after loss in a 
major war, a fact suggesting limits to the warfare of this period, and a degree of 
complicity between dynastic leaders ensuring survival of the dynastic fabric. In other 
words, not all was considered fair game when it came to early modern dynastic love and 
war. Wars of the early modern period framed by the dynastic principles of the time, even 
when affected by balance of power considerations, were wars fought for the recognition 
of dynastic claims by opposing rulers. To gain recognition for a claim, the opponent one 
wished to gain recognition from had to survive, not be destroyed. As Lynn writes, the 
early modern in Europe “was an era in which states struggled for discrete advantage, not 
to destroy other states or regimes and not to decide great issues of religion or ideology.”3 
It was only with the rise of Revolutionary France that the conception of war being aimed 
at the overthrow of an antagonistic ruler became widespread. 
 
The Means and Ends of Dynasticism 
Dynasticism when operating normally was a system of interdependence that 
forged competitive yet collaborative bonds between dynasties and prevented the 
escalation of dynastic rivalries to zero-sum conflicts aimed at the destruction of rival 
dynasties. Rather, the terms of competition between dynasties during the early modern 
																																																								
3 John A. Lynn, “International rivalry and warfare,” in The Eighteenth Century: Europe 1688-1815, ed. T. 
C. W. Blanning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 183. 
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period was a constant jostling for greater status and prestige than one’s rivals.4 Limited 
territorial aggrandizement was also an important axis of dynastic competition. The 
formalized and rule-driven nature of this competition protected dynastic leaders from 
being overthrown in the wake of destructive wars—even where they had proven the 
weaker belligerent. Dynastic ties of kinship continued to be built between competing 
dynasties despite the seasonal alternation of war and peace, and an inter-dynastic 
marriage between the ruling families of dynastic states often marked the successful 
conclusion of a peace treaty between belligerent parties. 
At the outset, we outline the ends which dynasticism, as a strategy deployed by 
early modern rulers, was intended to secure, and the means through which these ends 
were sought. The dynastic network in early modern Europe operated primarily through 
ties of kinship entailing influence and support between royal and noble dynasties both 
across territorial boundaries and within them. Though the competitive and destructive 
aspect of dynasticism is well known, the collaborative and co-evolutionary aspect has not 
been sufficiently appreciated.5  
The complex and contradictory nature of dynasticism is well exemplified through 
the central means by which dynastic ends were sought, namely the inter-dynastic 
marriage. Though we will also examine other dynastic strategies—such as the dynastic 
alliance and dynastic prestige—the most integral means of seeking dynastic ends was the 
dynastic marriage. Beyond being necessary for the continuation of a noble or royal 
																																																								
4 But importantly, prestige allows for absolute gains, as the prestige gains of one dynasty do not necessitate 
the loss of another’s.	
5 The destructive aspect is well depicted by Howard, as he writes of the early modern period that “every 
child born to every prince anywhere in Europe was registered on the delicate seismographs that monitored 
the shifts in dynastic power. Every marriage was a diplomatic triumph or disaster. Every stillbirth…could 
presage political catastrophe.” Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 14. 
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dynasty, the arrangement of an inter-dynastic marriage offered an opportunity for the 
main power-holders of a dynasty to secure the main end of dynastic politics, an increase 
or consolidation of the status of one’s dynastic lineage in the status hierarchy of the 
European dynastic system. This goal of maintaining or increasing the status of one’s 
dynasty in the hierarchical system outweighed the more typically modern imperative of 
increasing power in terms of material resources such as territory, military capability, 
wealth, and population. Dynasticism permeated the European aristocratic system, and for 
royal and non-royal dynast alike the goal of devoting one’s efforts to uplifting one’s 
family’s status transcended the drive for individual achievement. As Scott notes, “the 
overriding goal was always the success of the family and the increase of its fame and 
fortune…”6 
The primary prerequisite to maintain or increase dynastic status is of course to 
ensure dynastic continuity, and this required a smooth succession to another member of 
the dynasty—preferably male—after the death of a dynastic power-holder. Such 
succession could not be achieved without marriage and the generation of healthy 
offspring. However, marriage itself involves risks as the marriage tie entails the 
incorporation of a member of another dynasty into one’s own. Such a circumstance meant 
that not only was dynastic succession partially dependent on the co-operation of other 
dynasties in offering eligible marriage candidates, but that one’s own family dynamics 
could be influenced by the family of a bride and, most problematically, one’s own 
dynastic possessions could (at a later date) be claimed by the members of a rival dynasty 
																																																								
6 H. M. Scott and Christopher Storrs, “The Consolidation of Noble Power in Europe, c.1600-1800,” in The 




in case of a breakdown in the normal chain of succession. On the other hand, marriage 
offered the opportunity for dynasties to accumulate prestige and sometimes even 
territorial possessions if a fortuitous marriage was entered into, as family inheritance was 
then “the principle means of transmitting wealth, status, and privilege.”7 
Ronald Asch succinctly captures the nature of dynastic strategy in the early 
modern period—and the opportunities that an advantageous marriage could proffer—as 
follows: 
[D]ynastic ‘states,’ in practice of course often no more than ‘loose conglomerates of self-
governing territories,’ could be created almost out of nothing by an astute combination of 
family policy—essentially marrying the right woman, preferably a potential heiress, at 
the right time—political ruthlessness, and the ability to construct legitimacy for the newly 
won status…8 
 
With the purpose of dynasticism being the ennoblement of a dynasty in the status 
hierarchy vis-à-vis its rivals, the dynastic marriage was an especially well-suited means 
to achieve both the primary imperative of dynastic survival and the additional goal of 
dynastic elevation. This goal of elevation held for noble families in general as much as it 
did for royal dynasties. As Hurwich writes succinctly of the German noble family, “the 
goal…was to ‘maintain and elevate the lineage’…that is, to continue the family in the 
male line and to enhance its territorial base and its prestige through marriage alliances 
with other families of at least equal rank,” a point that can be generalized to noble 
families across the continent.9  
 
																																																								
7 Clarissa Campbell Orr, “Dynasticism and the World of the Court,” in A Companion to Eighteenth-
Century Europe, ed. Peter H. Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 436. 
8 Ronald Asch, “Monarchy in Western and Central Europe,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern 
European History, 1350-1750, ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
9 Judith J. Hurwich, “Marriage Strategy among the German Nobility,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 




For royal dynasties, much of the political jostling associated with dynastic 
competition was a quest for the ‘precedence’ of one’s dynasty as well as the 
accumulation of honorific titles held by its principal members—two interdependent 
objectives. One of the most intense areas of dynastic competition, precedence was a 
concept associated since the Middle Ages with the hierarchical ranking of the rulers of 
Europe. In the medieval world, the Holy Roman Emperor was long considered to be 
preeminent secular ruler of Christendom and counterpart of the Pope, a dual system that 
led to competition between the Emperor and Pope with regards to their primacy.10 Wight 
describes the system of precedence in the feudal hierarchy as follows: 
From the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries it was assumed that the states of Western 
Christendom fell into a hierarchy. Feudal society was hierarchical; the society of princes, 
though each claimed to acknowledge no superior, likewise ‘observed degree, priority, and 
place, office and custom, in all line of order.’ Hence the rules of the papal curia, with 
their tables of the relative dignity of the monarchs and republics of Christendom.11 
 
Competition for precedence took place between the occupants of the same title. 
The European hierarchy of ranked titles set ‘emperors’ higher than a ‘king,’ a ‘king’ 
higher than an ‘elector,’ an ‘elector’ higher than a ‘duke,’ and so on. And within each of 
these categories, dynasties and the rulers at their heads vied for a higher position in the 
rank. For instance, within the category of the Kings who formed a level below the 
Emperor, jostling for precedence is demonstrated by the quest for supremacy between the 
French and the Spanish monarchs during the seventeenth century, or the quarrel over rank 
																																																								
10 Nicolson notes that: “the Church was regarded as the soul and the Empire as the body, each dependent on 
the other…the Pope, the visible head of the eternal Church, was entrusted [with] the care of souls; the 
Emperor, being human and temporal, was the guardian of men’s bodies and acts.” Harold Nicolson, Kings, 
Courts and Monarchy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 174. 
11 Martin Wight, (1977), Systems of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 135. 
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between England and Spain, and so on.12 Below the level of polities with ‘crowned 
heads,’ entities such as the Dutch Republic, Venice, and various German electors also 
jostled with each other over questions of precedence.13  
Categorical challenges put into question central categories within the ordering 
system itself, such as the preeminence of the Holy Roman Emperor in the European 
hierarchy, disputed by powerful Kings such as Louis XIV, who contended that the Holy 
Roman Empire was not a continuation of the Carolingian Empire (and thus lacked the 
claims to precedence of the latter). Louis argued, as did other French Kings in history, 
that the Kings of France—having been descended from rulers of the West Frankish 
Kingdom—had a better claim to be descended from Charles the Great (the first Emperor 
crowned by the Pope) than the Emperor himself. Nonetheless, despite occasional 
categorical challenges such as this, the pre-eminence of the Emperor was widely 
recognized even if such precedence was not well aligned with the power hierarchy in 
Europe.14 
 
The Multiple Uses of Dynastic Marriage 
The preeminence of dynastic marriage as the primary means to achieve dynastic 
aggrandizement was a result of the multiplicity of goals it could secure when successfully 
undertaken. Dynastic marriage—or, more to the point, the choice of partner as the consort 
for one’s heirs—was a strategy designed to realize a series of interconnected and often 
diverging goals. These goals included: 1) ensuring dynastic continuity through the 
																																																								
12 Evan Luard, The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 135. 
13 Andrew Lossky, “International Relations in Europe,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 
VI, ed. J. S. Bromley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 170. 
14 Luard, The Balance of Power, p. 134. 
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creation of legitimate progeny; 2) raising the status of a dynasty by supplying brides to or 
receiving brides from other dynasties higher placed in the precedence ranking; 3) 
acquiring possessions including territory and resources through heirs inheriting the titles 
of both their parents; 4) the consolidation of territory already held through marriages 
between allied dynasties; 5) gaining or consolidating wartime alliances; 6) gaining allies 
in elections for elective monarchies; 7) cementing peace between antagonistic dynasties; 
and 8) staking legitimate claims on the territory of rival dynasties.15 Though these goals 
can be summarized in the language of political science as the search for dynastic survival, 
consolidation and expansion, nonetheless analytically these goals are distinct. 
Empirically, we see the choice of consort being undertaken with the aim of 
realizing two or more of these goals simultaneously. In fact, we would argue that such 
‘multivocality,’ or the pursuit of multiple goals simultaneously, is one of the hallmarks of 
dynastic strategy as it was deployed by early modern ruling dynasties.16 The first goal—
that of ensuring dynastic continuity—can be considered the essential end toward which 
all dynastic marriages were oriented, as the rearing of children until marriage and 
parenthood was a prerequisite for dynastic survival. This is akin to what the neorealist 
																																																								
15 Raffensperger in his penetrating study categorizes dynastic marriages as follows: “marriages as part of 
fomenting or resolving a conflict; marriages to create Christianization; marriages that involve speculation 
(an exiled heir/ruler who may return home); and marriages that are part of large, often Europe-wide, 
political arrangements.” Christian Raffensperger, Reimagining Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), p. 72. 
16 Padgett and Ansell use the term multivocality to describe the strategies deployed by Cosimo de’ Medici 
in successfully founding a powerful European dynasty. They argue that for Cosimo, much of the 
effectiveness of his strategies came from such multivocality, or “the fact that single actions can be 
interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously, the fact that single actions can be moves 
in many games at once…the ‘only’ point of this, from the perspective of ego, is flexible opportunism—
maintaining discretionary options across unforeseeable futures in the face of hostile attempts by others to 
narrow those options. Crucial for maintaining discretion is not to pursue any specific goals. For in nasty 
strategic games…positional play is the maneuvering of opponents into the forced clarification of their (but 
not your) tactical lines of action.” (p. 1264) John F. Padgett and Christopher Ansell, “Robust Action and 
the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (1993): pp. 1259-1319. 
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tradition in IR refers to as the ‘survival’ motive of states, though dynastic survival is even 
more tangible than state survival, as dynastic survival can be directly apprehended as it 
entails biological life and death (rather than the state which can only be conceptually 
intuited).17 When other goals were sought alongside dynastic survival, these goals were 
sought as supplements to the survival motive rather than as substitutes to the same. 
The goal of dynastic consolidation, akin to the status quo motivation in IR, was 
oriented toward protecting dynastic possessions. In the case of the Spanish and Austrian 
branches of the Habsburgs as well as amongst other powerful dynasties, consanguineous 
marriage was a common practice intended to consolidate a dynasty’s hold over its 
dominions while restricting the succession claims of the members of out-groups. As 
Fichtner notes of the significance of frequent marriage ties between the branches of the 
Habsburg dynasty, “such a pattern suggests that the function of these unions in empire 
building may not have been primarily to pave the way for new acquisitions but to 
encourage…friendly relations with neighboring states necessary to protect and preserve 
earlier territorial gains.”18 The expansionist motivation was often accomplished through 
marriages by earlier generations of a dynasty when their territorial holdings were small, 
and entailed the use of marriage ties between well-landed dynastic offspring to increase 
the inherited domains of future generations. An expansionist dynasty is similar to the 
concept in international politics of the acquisitive, or greedy state.  
 
Dynastic Strategy and Uncertainty 
																																																								
17 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), pp. 91-92. 
18 Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft,” 
The American Historical Review 81, no. 2 (1976): pp. 258-259. 
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It should be noted that though such a distinction between the various types of 
motivation (status quo versus revisionist) can be made in theory, empirically actors must 
make decisions in the midst of time constraints and an unclear view of the consequences 
of their actions, and thus have only a limited awareness of the goals that a particular 
action will realize. Faced with such limitations of time, choices, and knowledge, actors 
often ‘satisfice,’ or decide in favor of a particular potential consort when an acceptable 
threshold is met.19 The practical limits of choosing the perfect political match for dynastic 
heirs or rulers is particularly evident at times when the need for a successor is urgent. For 
instance, faced with the urgency of ensuring a successor to the weak and ailing Charles 
II, the carefully laid plans for the young king to marry the Archduchess of Austria, Maria 
Antonia, were shelved due to the young age of the archduchess and the time that Charles 
would have to wait to consummate the marriage. Instead, plans were hastily laid for 
Charles II to marry the French princess, Marie Louise of Orleans due to her age, 
perceived fertility, and physical beauty.20 Furthermore, the survival motivation and that 
of consolidation/expansion are intrinsically difficult to differentiate. In the early modern 
system, active military leadership and military success was valorized as the hallmark of a 
great king, and the alliances and materiel a successful political marriage could bring from 
the family of a bride, though not essential for ensuring dynastic succession, may have 
																																																								
19 On bounded rationality and satisficing, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), pp. 111-116. 
20 Silvia Mitchell, “Marriage Plots: Royal Women, marriage diplomacy and international politics at the 
Spanish, French and Imperial Courts, 1665-1679,” in Women, Diplomacy and International Politics Since 
1500, ed. Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 92-94. 
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been understood by the actors involved to be an intrinsic part of the justification for 
dynastic intermarriage.21  
In terms of its efficacy as strategy, dynastic marriage at times facilitated the 
realization of some of these ends, and at other times undermined them and brought about 
destabilizing consequences. The very multiplicity of the ends sought through a dynastic 
marriage meant that the associated opportunities and risks were like a double-edged 
sword: dynastic gains could quickly become losses in changing circumstances, such as 
when dynastic power-holders died without legitimate successors whereupon the members 
of rival dynasties could claim rights to succession based on genealogical lines of descent. 
The destructive consequences of dynastic marriage could not be completely eliminated 
except by an endogamous system of strict intra-dynastic unions, a practice not adopted by 
leading dynasties in Europe. Even the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, with their 
frequent consanguineous marriages, did not adopt a policy of strict intra-dynastic unions, 
though they made a self-conscious attempt to prevent other dynasties from gaining 
succession claims to their patrimony through frequent marriages between cousins of the 
two branches. Even this degree of consanguinity was to prove deleterious, and was 
ultimately to doom their hold over the Spanish Crown. Biological interaction between 
dynasties was one area where the natural monopolizing impulse was self-limiting due to 
evolutionary mechanisms. Historical dynasties in other parts of the world that practiced 
																																																								
21 Black notes that in the early modern period “many rulers saw war as their function and justification as 
defenders of their subjects and inheritance, a source of personal glory, dynastic aggrandizement and 
national fortune.” Jeremy Black, European Warfare 1660-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 213. 
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endogamy to an even higher degree were often beset by fierce rivalries between siblings 
for the spoils of succession.22 
 
The Dialectic of Collaboration and Conflict 
The complex dialectic between collaboration and conflict at the heart of the 
practice of dynastic marriage makes it difficult to comprehend solely in terms of the 
classic categories of modern politics such as power and conflict. Dynastic marriage 
transcends simple dichotomies of conflict or collaboration, as it was often aimed 
simultaneously at consolidating an alliance with another ruling family and undermining it 
by gaining legitimate claims of inheritance to their patrimony. Tying the knot of marriage 
both necessitated the collaboration of rival dynasties, but also undercut such ties by 
fomenting conflict between them. Dynastic unions were often made to secure a dynasty’s 
line of succession and lay claims on the line of succession of another, or made at one 
time to cement an alliance with a friend during war and at other times to secure peace 
with a rival after war. The very multivocality of purpose that dynastic marriage possessed 
led to contemporaries’ understanding of its nature and purposes becoming mired in 
ambiguity. In such a milieu, given the multiple goals that dynastic marriage sought to 
realize, the declared intentions of leaders cannot be the sole criterion by which their 
policies are judged. It is necessary to examine the empirical consequences of dynastic 
policies as much as their intended aims, especially when evaluating their contribution to 
long-term historical outcomes such as the survival of particular institutional lineages and 
forms, which were themselves only partially the outcome of conscious striving.  
																																																								
22 Jeroen Duindam, Dynasties: A Global History of Power, 1300-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), Chapter 2. 
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Conflict between royal dynasties could be mitigated somewhat by restricting 
dynastic unions between them, but this path was unavailable to many royal dynasties due 
to the need to maintain a lofty distance between the royal and noble strata. The primary 
consequence of dynastic marriage beyond ensuring a legitimate successor, at least 
according to contemporary understandings, was that of cementing a political alliance or 
understanding between two dynasties. Despite the frequent occurrence of dynastic 
conflict, the persistent urge to form inter-dynastic unions represents a crucial survival 
mechanism for early modern dynasties, given the dangers of creating kinship relations 
with the members of non-royal dynasties, an act that would have the effect of weakening 
the quasi-divine image of the monarch.23 This drive to elevate a royal dynasty above the 
nobility entailed refraining as far as possible from entering ties of marriage with them, 
and for this reason dynastic marriages between royal dynasties was the primary means 
through which the transcendental position of a ruling dynasty within their societies could 
be ensured. By way of an example, though earlier French ruling dynasties occasionally 
married members of the nobility, the French Bourbon dynasty progressively refrained 
from entering into such marriage alliances in order to consolidate their royal position. In 
doing so, as Scott observes, “the new ruling family was determined to emphasize the 
importance of royal blood in order to assert the dignity of the dynasty and to distance the 
Bourbons from even the greatest of their subjects.”24 Some dynastic families were on 
																																																								
23 “As Duchhardt makes the point, “members of a ruling house usually did not marry minor nobles: thus a 
Habsburg Archduchess did not marry an imperial knight or some minor rural Count…the higher nobility 
did their very best to avoid bad matches, harboring as they did, the potential for a considerable reduction in 
social prestige and the squandering of social capital.” Heinz Duchhardt, Heinz, “The Dynastic Marriage,” 
EGO European History Online, published April 8, 2011, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/duchhardth-2010-en p. 9. 
24 Hamish Scott, “The Line of Descent of Nobles is from the Blood of Kings: Reflections on Dynastic 
Identity,” in Dynastic Identity in Early Modern Europe, ed. Liesbeth Geevers and Mirella Marini (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2015), p. 217. 
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occasion open to marriages with non-royal or non-ruling houses, such as the English 
Tudors or some of the ruling dynasties of Scandinavia and Russia previous to the 
nineteenth century. But dynasties such as the Habsburgs, Bourbons, Wittelsbachs, 
Wettins, and the houses of Savoy and Braganza were very careful to refrain from entering 
into dynastic unions with non-royal families.25 
 
Dynastic Coexistence and the Early Modern Court 
Despite the endemic possibilities for conflict built into the institution of dynastic 
intermarriage, nonetheless dynasticism was a force that ameliorated the destructiveness 
of competition between early modern states ruled by hereditary dynasties. It did so by 
shaping the goals of dynastic rule in the context of the early modern royal court, and in 
this sense facilitated the co-evolution of different political units. The socializing impact 
of royal courts on the foreign policy objectives of monarchs have to date only been 
treated in a fragmentary manner, but this approach brings the constitutive role of courts to 
center stage.  
Dynastic marriage and the circulation of royal dynastic consorts around Europe 
integrated the system of royal courts, and created what I call the recognition of an 
adversary’s right to exist between ruling dynasties sharing kinship ties. This emergence 
of a higher level of normative understanding arising from the systematic interaction of 
actors is similar to the emergence of the structure of anarchy and its causal consequences, 
																																																								
25 Daniel Schönpflug, “One European Family?: A Quantitative Approach to Royal Marriage Circles 1700-




depicted by Waltz in his Theory of International Politics.26 Emergent structures arising 
from interaction come to constrain the behavior of the actors themselves, with time. In a 
similar manner, the network of royal courts had an imperceptible but very real effect in 
shaping the relations between early modern political units. However, this imperative of 
dynastic coexistence, which led to what I call in later chapters a ‘conquest taboo’ or 
‘conquest desistance,’ nonetheless did not have a strong independent existence, and its 
effect was relatively weak when close dynastic kinship ties were not present. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the implicit narrative of mainstream scholarship in the field of 
state and systemic formation, the dynamic existing between different types of units with 
dynastic ties was not one of uninhibited competition, but was one where collaboration 
and recognition occurred despite military competition.  
When competition for precedence, succession rights or glory led to the outbreak 
of armed conflict between polities, and when each state was ruled by a house with 
dynastic ties with its rival, the ensuing conflict tended to aim for limited objectives rather 
than overthrow of the rival dynasty. The recognition of a rival dynasty’s right to exist was 
proportional to the strength of kinship ties between them. On occasion, a rival dynasty 
would be uprooted from their hereditary lands, but would invariably be compensated with 
territorial holdings elsewhere. The critical social context in which such norms were 
formed and internalized was the network of European courts, encompassing dominant 
royal courts such as Versailles and Vienna as well as subsidiary ones such as the 
Saubandian and Bavarian courts. In these social settings, royal dynasties and the high 
nobility engaged in a complex interaction. 
																																																								
26 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
	
	 54	
Royal Courts and the Routinization of Conflict 
In order to understand the full significance of the royal court as a setting for the 
creation of normative understandings about the limits of military and political conflict, 
we demonstrate the dynamics existing in the socializing power of the ancien régime royal 
courts by way of a series of analogies between courts and other forms of social conflict. 
The key to the ability of courts to ameliorate the severity of dynastic competition is the 
notion of the routinization of conflict. 27 
The model of Norbert Elias depicting the early modern court as the space where 
the monarch captured the nobility,28 has more recently been shown to be incomplete and 
even misleading in some respects, as studies have discovered that court dynamics did not 
neatly correspond to the Bourbon court depicted by Elias as the ideal-type. Though the 
court could serve as a setting for the domestication of the nobility, it could also buttress 
																																																								
27 Max Weber uses the term ‘routinization’ in the context of charisma, and the manner in which the 
charisma of a founding leader becomes domesticated over time amongst his/her followers. He writes that: 
“In its pure form charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to everyday routine structures. 
The social relationships directly involved are strictly personal, based on the validity and practice of 
charismatic personal qualities. If this is not to remain a purely transitory phenomenon, but to take on the 
character of a permanent relationship…it is necessary for the character of charismatic authority to become 
radically changed. Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in statu nascendi. 
It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both.” (p. 
246) Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume One (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). I 
use the term routinization in an analytically identical manner for the evolution of conflict. Conflict tending 
to an extreme cannot persist. It must either result in the annihilation of one of the other party in short order, 
or become routinized and mediated by rules and conventions. The notion of a permanent revolution is 
oxymoronic, a contradiction in terms. The bellum omnium contra omnes, or the war of all against all, 
similarly, cannot be a permanent ‘state’ of affairs. All regularized conflict between adversaries comes to 
take on rules of procedure and limits by a process of accretion.  
28 The royal court was not an object of systematic scholarly attention until the rediscovery of the court by 
the sociological work of Norbert Elias. Elias posited a macro-historical transformation whereby the former 
dependence of monarchs on the military power of the nobles was outgrown, and where monarchs gradually 
pacified this rebellious power in the context of courtly interaction and court manners. As he states, “the 
transformation of the warriors into courtiers, the change in the course of which an upper class of free 
knights was replaced by one of courtiers” was a critical part of the emergence of monarchical power, and 
he argues that this transformation also entailed an increasing dependence of the nobility on the monarchy 
and employment available in the context of the royal court, as “the produce from their estates…no longer 
allowed them more than a mediocre living…and certainly not a social existence that could maintain the 
nobility’s prestige as the upper class against the growing strength of the bourgeoisie.” See Norbert Elias, 
The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 394-5. 
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the continuing ability of the aristocracy to constrain the ruler.29 Even the Bourbon court 
itself came to be seen as much more complex, with multidirectional interactions 
rendering monarchs constrained in previously unseen ways by court dynamics, such as 
the customary restraints that prevented monarchs from being able to freely exercise their 
right of dismissing holders of court office, which had by that time become de facto 
hereditary within a noble house. Adamson summarizes this argument as follows: 
[I]t was not merely the personal failings of the prince, but the court itself, that imposed 
limitations on the authority and effectiveness of the crown. This was partly a matter of 
expectation and tradition. From vice-regal Dublin to ‘imperial’ Moscow, the court was 
embedded in a culture that esteemed custom and convention at least as much as it did the 
sacred rights of kings. Entrenched conventions governing appointments to court office; 
inherited perks and privileges; deeply ingrained attitudes towards ‘proper’ aristocratic 
conduct and honour: all these served to circumscribe the monarch’s freedom of 
manoeuvre, fencing him in with a series of principles that were difficult, if not impossible 
to break.30 
 
To be sure, a domestication of the nobility took place, but the process was far 
more contingent and bi-directional than had initially been supposed. This was a historical 
process in which both the nobles and the ruler were, to a degree, pacified, as factional 
disputes were routinized and sublimated by the force of the web of emerging and existing 
customs and traditions of the royal court. The king gained the power of surveillance as 
the nobility became tethered to the moorings of the permanent court, but likewise the 
king, try as he might to undermine the high nobility by appointing officials outside of 
their ranks, was still constrained in the extent to which he could wield such control over 
court appointments. The nobles, by sheer force of numbers, could still subtly shape the 
																																																								
29 This is a point noted by Asch. See Ronald Asch, “Introduction: Court and Household from the Fifteenth 
to the Seventeenth Centuries,” in Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility, ed. Ronald Asch and Adolf Birke 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
30 John Adamson, “The Making of the Ancien Régime Court 1500-1700,” in The Princely Courts of Europe 
1500-1750, ed. John Adamson (London: Seven Dials, 2000), p. 16. 
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options available to the king, thus wielding what Bachrach and Baratz call power over the 
‘non decision-making process.’31 
The royal court, then, regardless of whether one views it as a site where the king 
domesticated the nobility or vice versa, was an environment in which political conflict 
was apt to become routinized. In this sense, the court played a role similar to that of the 
parliamentary assembly in shaping the evolution of political conflict. And given that 
courts were the main setting in which the royal dynasties of Europe interacted with each 
other, the interaction of royal dynasties was also routinized. The routinization of conflict 
can be seen as a case of iterated conflict and its stabilization over time. When powerful 
adversaries in a political conflict do not have sufficient means to prevail outright, the 
conflict will begin to repeat itself as a series of iterated encounters, and this iteration has 
a tendency to gradually ameliorate what began as a struggle for life and death into a less 
absolute conflict with an implicit set of parameters set by governing rules and 
conventions. 
Such a routinization of conflict can be seen in the historical evolution of sports, 
where there almost universally occurs a gradual process whereby rules become clarified 
and systematized. The gradual emergence of restraint via a series of mutual 
understandings on the level of nuclear strategy between the superpowers during the cold 
war is another example of the routinization of conflict.32 There is also a family 
resemblance to the evolution of cooperation modeled by political scientists, and the 
																																																								
31 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 
(1962): pp. 947-952. 
32 See Freedman on the historical evolution of this strategic understanding and restraint. Jervis is still the 
most penetrating analysis of the reason why such restraint was predetermined. Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of 
the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989). 
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various factors that may be preconditions for such cooperation to emerge. The example 
chosen by Axelrod of the development of cooperation in the United States Congress is 
instructive for our discussion: 
[I]n the early days of the republic, members of Congress were known for their deceit and 
treachery. They were unscrupulous and frequently lied to each other. Yet, over the years, 
cooperative patterns of behavior emerged and proved stable. These patterns were based 
on the norm of reciprocity.33  
 
The system of early modern royal courts was the critical site where normative 
understandings about the limits of inter-dynastic conflict were formed and disseminated 
throughout dynastic Europe. The system of resident court offices functioned vertically by 
obligating regional nobles from different parts of the realm to participate collectively in 
court activities, thereby expanding their circles of loyalty beyond their own region. 
Horizontally, the royal court served as the locale for diplomatic interactions and the 
creation of inter-court and inter-dynastic networks, and tying all these separate threads 
together was the dynastic marriage. It is no accident, then, that the co-evolutionary 
dynamic tying royal courts to each other and to satellite courts in the provinces of the 
large kingdoms, was driven most of all by dynastic consorts and their attendants who 
were sent around Europe in the service of the dynastic marriage.34 
 
Dynasticism’s Expectations for Composite State Longevity 
The approach of dynasticism, being oriented around the co-evolutionary 
interaction of dynasties, leads the analyst to a specific set of expectations with regards to 
our central research question of composite state longevity. If a composite state is a 
																																																								
33 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. 177. 
34 The court system, in this regard, functions as the primary site of transmission of what Meyer et al. have 
called the ‘normative models of the state.’ See John Meyer et al., “World Society and the Nation-State,” 
American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997): pp. 144-181. 
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hereditary monarchy ruled by a dynasty tightly integrated into a network of kinship ties 
with neighboring ruling dynasties, this composite state should be significantly less 
vulnerable to conquest attempts arising from its environment. This is due to the limitation 
on conquest that holds between dynasties with strong kinship ties, especially direct 
marriage ties. If we assume that the greatest threats to survival a composite state can face 
are those originating in the external environment, we infer that such composite states 
possess an enhanced probability of reaching an advanced age due to these relations 
protecting its dynastic survival. This expectation holds also for elective monarchies, 
provided they are de facto governed by norms of hereditary succession. 
Conversely, if a composite state is an elective monarchy or republic where the 
ruler is non-dynastic or selection of ruler governed by the elective principle and the ruler 
only loosely (or not at all) integrated into dynastic kinship ties with neighboring 
dynasties, we expect such a composite state to be especially vulnerable to conquest 
attempts by neighboring rulers, both dynastic and non-dynastic. By deduction, these 
states may also be especially prone to undertake conquest attempts. Dynastically ruled 
composite states, where the dynastic ruler is not related by kinship with other dynastic 
rulers, or where the dynastic ruler atypically does not pursue dynastic goals, can be 
expected to behave in a manner contrary to dynastic principles and/or be vulnerable to 
conquest attempts.  
These diverging expectations also hold in an analogous manner for non-composite 
states. So absolutist dynastic states are also protected from wars of conquest, and non-






In this section, we outline two alternative explanations for the survival of 
composite states in the early modern period. The first of these alternative explanations is 
an adapted ‘early modern’ realist explanation stressing the military, economic, and 
demographic resources provided by the composite aspect of these states, providing them 
a larger pool of demographic and economic resources to compete militarily than they 
would otherwise if they were separate, and enabling them to survive the competitive 
environment of early modern Europe either directly through warfare or via deterrence. 
The second is that leadership learning, particularly the accumulation of cross-
generational learning facilitated by hereditary monarchies, was a critical factor in aiding 
the rulers of composite states to successfully adapt to the challenges they faced from 
absolutist states. Both of these explanations compete with the dynastic explanation, as 
they put forward alternate mechanisms as being more decisive for composite state 
survival, but locate the explanatory factor not at the ‘international’ level of dyadic and/or 
multilateral relations between dynasties and dynastic rulers, but on the level of state and 
society (e.g. the realist explanation), and the individual (e.g. leadership learning).  
As we have already seen, this categorization of explanations accords with the 
levels of analysis typology in IR scholarship, though it distinguishes between an inter-
generational lineage of rulers, the domestic resources that such rulers have access to, and 
kinship ties between ruling dynasties—an amendment of the classic schema rendering it 
of more relevance to early modern politics by better representing the most significant 
institutions and units involved in the international interactions of the period. As we are 
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wishing to decipher the puzzle of why some composite states were able to survive for 
longer than expected, part of any answer must consider how comparatively decentralized 
states (i.e. composite states) fared in defending themselves militarily against the more 
centralized states of the time, of which we take the absolutist state as one representative 
example. The adequacy of composite states’ rulers responses to the weaknesses they 
perceived in their own domains, or what Waltz calls internal balancing, should also be 
considered.  
Leadership learning and deterrence are both critically tied up with perceptions.35 
Learning is a change in behavior and/or strategy based on limitations perceived by the 
past self, or of predecessors. Deterrence is the use of conditional threats to manipulate the 
calculations of an adversary to prevent them from attacking the state.36 Here, threats must 
be perceived to be threatening (and offensive action untenably costly) in order to induce 
desistance. These considerations, involving as they do actors’ perceptions, mean that 
theories attempting to explain outcomes in this historical period—if they are not to risk 
anachronism and thus lose analytical leverage over their subject matter—must be 
anchored at least in part in the categories through which historical actors saw their world. 
 
‘Early Modern’ Realism 
When it is asked how realism views the phenomenon of composite states given 
that it diverges significantly from the unitary state model, it is tempting to conclude that 
realism has difficulty in conceptualizing such entities. Indeed, most recent strands of 
																																																								
35 For what is still the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of perception in international politics, see 
Jervis’ magisterial Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 
36 Thomas Schelling, “ The Diplomacy of Violence,” in Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1996); Robert Art, “To What Ends Military Power,” International Security 4, no. 4 (1980): pp. 3-35; 
Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).  
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realist thought have difficulty in transposing their explanatory framework to the early 
modern context. Although neorealism has not directly engaged with the phenomenon of 
composite states, in general neorealism takes it that systems have a homogenizing 
tendency, where difference is not easily tolerated and all units in a system come to 
resemble each other due to the strictures of self-help competition. However, it is 
noteworthy that some realist scholars with a historical bent have concluded that the 
formation of a composite state is a logical solution to the problem of self-help under 
certain conditions. 
Martin Wight, in one of the only explicit discussions of the phenomenon of the 
composite state in the realist literature, develops the assertion of Carr that “the small 
country can survive only by seeking permanent association with a Great Power.”37 Wight 
argues that the strategy of becoming a client state (with varying degrees of independence) 
of a great power is a logical strategy for a small state in order to ensure its survival. Such 
a policy of voluntary clientilism entails the sacrifice of autonomy on the plane of foreign 
policy, but he asserts that: 
Tolerable methods, whereby the small country need not lose its individuality, have been 
worked out in the histories of Britain, America and perhaps Soviet Russia. They are of 
two kinds, according to whether the small country loses its political independence 
altogether, thus ceasing to be a Power, or is more loosely associated without being 
absorbed.38 
 
This discussion is given more flesh by Schroeder when he notes that in European 
history most units could not afford to undertake expensive policies of self-help. He notes 
that: “they were like landowners with valuable property which they knew they could not 
possibly insure, first because insurance premiums were ruinously expensive, second 
																																																								
37 E.H. Carr, Conditions of Peace, (London: Macmillan, 1942), p. 55. 
38 Martin Wight, Power Politics, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), p. 31. 
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because against the most devastating dangers no insurance policy was available at any 
price, and third because the very attempt on their part to take out an insurance policy 
would encourage robbers to attack them.”39 From this lesser known realist perspective, 
the phenomenon of the composite state—entailing voluntary clientilism, the pooling of 
resources and the outsourcing of foreign policy to a stronger state—can be seen to be a 
rational strategy to attempt survival when other means would fail. 
Developing this perspective, we propose that a realist explanation which does 
justice to the competitive milieu of early modern politics, views composite states as being 
endowed with significant strengths that allowed them to successfully rebuff military 
challenges from other states, especially when compared to how they might have fared if 
broken up into their constituent parts. This is for the simple reason that the leaders of 
multiple kingdoms were able to draw on an enlarged pool of demographic and economic 
resources for defensive purposes, against both external and internal enemies. The rulers 
of composite states also possessed strong resources to maintain their rule, including the 
ability to use troops from one kingdom to suppress rebellions in another, in effect playing 
their subject provinces off against each other.40  
The advantage in terms of additional capability that rule over multiple territories 
gives to a leader, despite its intuitive sense, has not been sufficiently acknowledged. This 
is because pure quantity seems to us today more of a weakness than a strength, given that 
																																																								
39 Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security, 19 (Summer, 1994), 
p. 116. 
40 H. G. Koenigsberger, “Dominium Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale,” in Politicians and Virtuosi 
(London: Hambledon Press, 1986); J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present 
137 (1992): pp. 48-71. 
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cohesion41 and force employment42 are now seen as more critical measures of capability 
than size. And as multiple nationalities, languages, and religions were more salient in 
composite states, this diversity—as seriously undermining cohesion—has been seen to 
disadvantage composite states in their competition with their centralized counterparts. 
The awareness that the internal homogeneity of a state could be an important measure of 
its power (and a significant source of weakness when absent) was already emerging 
during the latter part of the eighteenth century, particularly due to the extraordinary 
military prowess of Frederick II’s relatively homogeneous and cohesive Prussian army on 
the European military stage. Despite this, the more prevalent view during most of the 
early modern period was that the quantitative advantage given by a larger population and 
territory gave a ruler an important advantage in competition that outweighed any 
disadvantages resulting from possessing a multinational and multilingual polity. After all, 
what could be more intuitive than that more men, territory, more natural resources and 
more tax revenue leads to an increase in power rather than a diminution thereof? 
In this vein, King James I, when discussing the benefits of the personal union 
between England and Scotland that came about due to his accession, as a sitting King of 
Scots, to the English throne, gives first the argument for added power gained through the 
union. This emphasis shows the importance he places on this factor: 
[I]f we were to looke no higher then to naturall and Physicall reasons [for the benefits of 
the Union] we may easily be persuaded of the great benefits that by that Union do 
redound to the whole Island: for if twentie thousand men be a strong Armie, is not the 
double thereof, fourtie thousand, a double the stronger Armie? If a Baron enricheth 
himselfe with double as many lands as hee had before, is he not double the greater? 
Nature teacheth us, that Mountaines are made of Motes, and that at the first, Kingdomes 
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being divided, and every particular Towne or little Countie, as Tyrants or Usurpers could 
obtaine the possession, a Segniorie apart, many of these little Kingdomes are now in 
processe of time, by the ordinance of God, joyned into great Monarchies, whereby they 
are become powerfull within themselves to defend themselves from all outward 
invasions, and their head and governour thereby enabled to redeeme them from forreine 
assaults, and punish private transgressions within.43 
 
Along similar lines, another author, writing a hundred years later in advance of 
the full union between England and Scotland via the Acts of Union of 1707 under Queen 
Anne, writes that: 
England secures an old and dangerous Enemy to be their Friend, and thereby peace at 
Home, and in more safety to carry on Designs abroad. Scotland will not be allarm’d by 
the Threatnings of a powerful and rich Neighbour, nor so easily put under the yoke of a 
foreign Enemy. England gains a considerable addition of brave and courageous Men, to 
their Feet, Armies and Plantations: and we secured by their Protection, and enriched by 
their Labours.44 
 
In other words, rulers as well as elites of the early modern era considered that 
whatever their disadvantages, political unions between kingdoms—whether full 
amalgamation into a single kingdom or composite union under a common monarch—
held substantial advantages in terms of security against external threats due to the 
increase in men, resources, and revenue, that each additional kingdom would accrue to 
the ruler.  
We can discern the importance of quantitative materiel not only from the 
declarations of contemporary actors, but also from another indicator. As we have already 
noted, dynastic marriages were for early modern dynasties a political opportunity of 
signal importance due to the possibility of obtaining a dynastic possession legally through 
inheritance. Territory obtained through inheritance retained greater legitimacy over those 
obtained through other means, and direct successions from parent to child were virtually 
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impenetrable to contestation. The realist explanation understands the early modern 
obsession with acquisition of territory through legitimate dynastic means as primarily 
driven by the concern to expand the military power of the state, and secondarily as an 
efficiency gain due to obviating the need to expend materiel in war. Thirdly, territory 
acquired through dynastic means is preferable, even according to the realist logic, due to 
the stability of possession that it entailed when contrasted with the unstable nature of 
territory acquired through raw conquest. The Count of Olivares, when explaining to his 
master Philip IV of Spain the distinction between his inherited territories and those 
gained through conquest, said that “all [the kingdoms] that Your Majesty possesses 
today, with the exception of a few small parts that it is not necessary to mention, you 
posses by right of succession; only Navarre and the empire of the Indies are conquest.”45  
Most dynasties participated eagerly in the practice of dynastic intermarriage, 
aiming to marry their daughters to the dynastic heir with the most possessions in the hope 
of laying claim to this patrimony and strengthening the resource competitiveness of the 
state. Prussia, a state often understood to have been fixated on military over other forms 
of power, itself continued to expand via dynastic instruments during the early modern 
era. When the Holy Roman Emperor allowed Frederick I to claim the title of ‘King in 
Prussia’ in 1701, he was the ruler of a composite political entity that included the 
Margraviate of Brandenburg, the Duchy of Cleves, the Country of Mark, and the Duchy 
of Prussia, amongst other patrimonial holdings. Late into the eighteenth century, even the 
Prussian rulers continued to expand the state through non-military means, with 
Brandenburg-Ansbach and Brandenburg-Bayreuth being sold to the King of Prussia by 
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the childless last Margrave Charles Alexander, in 1791.46 For a militaristic state such as 
Prussia, dynastic aggrandizement can be interpreted as a means to the further end of 
military consolidation, rather than being an end in itself. 
It was only during the final decades of the eighteenth century that heterogeneity 
within composite states began to be seen as a liability by monarchical rulers, with reform 
attempts being undertaken to homogenize the sociological diversity of the ruler’s 
territorial holdings. As an example here can be cited the abortive reforms implemented by 
Emperor Joseph II to centralize the domains of the Habsburg monarchy and introduce 
centralizing measures—such as making German the official language throughout the 
composite realm—that would fail miserably due to resistance from the Hungarian 
nobility. Through the extensive measures undertaken by early modern rulers to add to 
their territorial holdings through dynastic unions—even at the risk of exacerbating the 
sociological diversity of their realms—we can discern that they saw the advantages of 
possessing multiple independent territories to outweigh any disadvantages of ruling a 
composite state. 
The realist explanation for the resilience of composite states is not that the rulers 
of composite states necessarily had more military power and capabilities than the rulers 
of simple political entities (as composite states were not necessarily the largest entities in 
early modern Europe), but rather that it was the added materiel provided by combining 
territories that significantly enhanced the self-help ability of the constituent parts, 
assisting them to successfully weather the challenges of early modern military 
engagements and enabling them to deter aggressive moves. 
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Dual Mechanisms of the Realist Approach 
We now outline the two main mechanisms via which the realist explanation might 
produce the effect of composite state longevity, greater armed personnel and strengthened 
deterrence. The first pathway is direct military engagement and the additional men, 
resources and taxes gained with each additional territorial holding allowing the rulers of 
composite states to compete in war against absolutist rivals sufficiently to, if not attain 
victory, then at least minimize defeat to a level that fundamental state survival is never 
endangered. As intuitive as this seems, even the mere strength of additional men, 
resources and revenue is not a factor that self-evidently gave the ruler possessing them an 
automatic advantage, especially given the nature of warfare at the beginning of the early 
modern period.  
In the sixteenth century, wealth could offset the deficiencies of a ruler in terms of 
personnel and other factors, as armies were largely drawn from a polyglot pool of Swiss, 
German landsknechte, Italian, and other paid mercenaries.47 These mercenaries happily 
served any master for pay, as national allegiance was not a salient factor in this era for 
recruitment. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the role of trade and the wealth 
generated from offshore colonies gave to the trading powers—the Spanish, Portuguese, 
Dutch, English, and French—an important source of wealth to fund the increasingly 
costly war of the European continent.  
But one development that occurred around the beginning of the period we are 
examining was a vitally important factor allowing composite states to take advantage of 
the resources that cross-territorial leadership offered. This was the decreasing role of 
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mercenaries and the emergence of a class of state agents who were full-time employees 
of the nascent administrative apparatuses that were springing up around this time. These 
developments, of course, presaged the entrance of the standing army onto the European 
scene.  
Transformations of military practice and technology on the one hand and the 
development of a proto-bureaucracy and a nascent state organization on the other, was 
surely an iterative feedback process where the identification of a first cause is difficult if 
not impossible. Be that as it may, there is some agreement that transformations in the use 
of linear formations of drilled and disciplined musketeers led to the need for a massive 
increase in the size of armies, and also made possible the execution of more complex 
strategic plans than had been previously possible.48 The great innovator of these 
strategies was the ruler of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, who through his years of 
campaigns against the Baltic countries and later the Habsburg armies during the Thirty 
Years War created a battle-hardened army renowned for their discipline in being able to 
instantaneously implement hierarchical commands.49 But the trend towards a massive 
increase in armed personnel was a development that the rulers of composite states could 
adapt to by drawing on the population reserves of their composite domains to build 
sufficiently large armies to defend their dynastic possessions. 
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This capacity to massively increase the size of their armies, or so the argument 
runs, was a possibility especially well suited for the rulers of composite states to exploit, 
given that these rulers had access to the manpower, revenue, and other resources 
provided by multiple patrimonial domains. However, the absolutist French case was the 
first context where the fruits of these military transformations were self-consciously 
implemented by bureaucrats such as Michel le Tellier and his son the Marquis de Louvois 
when constructing the much admired armies of Louis XIV as seen by about 1680. To be 
sure, these changes were guided by a civil bureaucracy to administer the army, a 
technique not yet seen in many of the more deeply decentralized states of the period, 
nonetheless these military institutions were copied by all the other rulers of Western 
Europe in quick succession.50 And the quality of troops, according to this explanation, is 
important insofar as the touchstone of an army successful in its deployment of the 
firepower and strategies wrought by these developments was the one composed of a 
disciplined soldiery. The possession of multiple domains, in this regard, obviated to an 
extent the need to resort to less disciplined mercenaries for defense of the state. And the 
ethnic or linguistic homogeneity of such troops was not yet seen as an essential liability 
for an army to succeed in achieving its aims. 
The second mechanism of the early modern explanation of the military 
advantages of composite states is that of deterrence. The assumption underlying this 
mechanism is that rulers of composite states who have access to the additional military 
resources of multiple domains have sufficient military power to deter neighboring (or 
non-neighboring) states from launching wars of conquest against them. Deterrence is 
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conventionally understood in international relations as the use of conditional threats to 
manipulate the value calculus of an opponent in order to prevent them from attacking the 
state. In the early modern period, as deterrence was not yet a formally developed concept, 
and as rulers rarely made formal deterrent threats against their adversaries, we may 
assume much of the deterrence that took place to have been implicit and not explicit.  
Implicit deterrence, then, places the emphasis on a would-be-attacker and asks 
whether they intended conquest of a territory or throne and were dissuaded from pursuing 
their aspired conquest due to having perceived the impossibility or intolerable costliness 
of the same. Yet there should also be some indication that the ruler of the defending state, 
despite not having issued an explicit deterrent threat, nonetheless signaled in some way 
the invulnerability of his domains or the costliness of conquest. This show of strength 
need not correspond to actual capabilities but could be a form of swaggering—namely 
signaling that suggests greater strength than is actually possessed.  
The notion of credibility is less important when considering implicit deterrence 
than when threats are explicit, as can be seen by the frequency in the natural world of 
weak species using mimicry and deception as a survival strategy against stronger prey. 
This use of deterrence, where an implicit signal of the danger or futility of an attack is 
sent without resort to an explicit deterrent threat, though less widely seen in the literature, 
has been termed by Lawrence Freedman as ‘internalized deterrence,’ or as cases “in 
which deterrence is not…deliberately applied as a strategy, yet it still succeeds.”51 This is 
the sense in which I use the term ‘implicit deterrence’ here, and the early modern realist 
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explanation takes it that implicit deterrence was one of the two consequential 
mechanisms working to protect composite states from conquest attempts. 
Tanisha Fazal52 has recently formulated a cogent theory of state death, but her 
theory deals mainly with the period after (not before) the Napoleonic Wars, and the main 
factor predicting death in her study—geographical location as a buffer state between two 
competing rivals—was found not to be a compelling explanatory factor in the 
representative cases of composite state late survival we examined because it begs the 
question of composite state survival. If a peripheral domain of the composite state is 
taken as being a ‘buffer state,’ then it is explicable that the threat of coming under the 
sphere of influence of a neighboring power leads to composite state death by 
amalgamation. But if this be the case, the process of territorial unification involving 
amalgamation should have taken place much sooner, given the advantage the 
monarchical center held vis-à-vis the periphery. The very fact of composite state survival 
well into the post-Westphalian period—especially in cases such as the Reich where many 
peripheral domains were extremely small and vulnerable—not to mention the long-term 
survival of ‘restored’ composite state components such as Portugal, leads to the 
conclusion that Fazal’s buffer state theory is inadequate when extended to ancien régime 
Europe. 
Furthermore, Poland-Lithuania—included here as a case of a late-survival 
composite state—is cited by Fazal as a case supporting her theory. However, the 
Commonwealth’s buffer status remained constant throughout the early modern period, 
and yet variations in its security and military capabilities can be seen which the buffer 
																																																								
52 Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter 5. 
	
	 72	
state theory cannot explain. This, together with our discovery that a weak form of the 
norm against conquest (which Fazal notes as emerging after 1945) also existed in Europe 
before the Napoleonic Wars, renders the buffer state theory peripheral for understanding 
the dynamics fore-grounded by this study. 
The realist explanation for the late survival of non-standard types of political unit 
in the early modern period does not explicitly utilize anarchy as an explanatory 
mechanism playing a role in producing the outcome I am attempting to explain, due to 
the fact that the overarching condition of political interactions during the 1648-1789 
period was one where the degree of anarchy that existed was constant, and thus had no 
explanatory power (due to this invariance). There was no discernible long-term shift 
towards either greater hierarchy or greater anarchy during this period, as the residual 
feudal (and hierarchical) framework of the Holy Roman Empire was not instantly 
extinguished alongside the Westphalian Peace. To the extent there took place a limited 
displacement of the Reich by the Habsburg Monarchy during the period we examine (and 
a limited shift toward a strengthening of horizontal relations), the survival and resilience 
of comparatively more archaic political units is rendered even more counter-intuitive 
given the advantage that anarchic conditions give to actors able to adapt to changing 
competitive conditions. According to Waltz, the originator of the neorealist perspective 
according to which anarchy is the primary structuring force in international relations, “if 
some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside.”53  
Realist Expectations for Composite State Longevity 
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It is possible to derive a number of expectations for composite state longevity 
from the early modern realist approach. For early modern realism, the most important 
variable is the composite nature of the state, or what might be called ‘regime type.’ This 
realist perspective takes it that composite states are enabled to perform well in early 
modern warfare due to the added resources they gain from the additions to the core 
patrimonial estate. These benefits need not result in an offensive advantage for composite 
states. The expectation is merely that larger composite states are enhanced, due to the 
added resources of the composite domains, in their ability to ward off the threat of 
catastrophic defeat in war. Additionally, the perspective also posits that the latent 
defensive capacities of composite states provide a strong implicit deterrent, stopping 
other states—especially absolutist ones—from launching offensive moves against the 
composite state. This enhanced self-help capacity is especially marked when compared 
with the vulnerable state that the constituent parts of a composite state would have faced 
if taken apart. 
From this, we expect that composite states perform at least as well in early 
modern warfare as absolutist (or otherwise non-composite) states of a similar or smaller 
size, but that this chiefly manifests itself in defensive capabilities protecting the 
composite state from catastrophic military defeat. In other words, early modern realism 
expects a state to stand an enhanced chance of survival as part of a composite entity than 
if it were separate and alone. It is difficult to operationalize this expectation without using 
counterfactuals,54 but in general terms we expect that composite states possess a greater 
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likelihood of surviving to an advanced age when they are larger with more composite 
domains than when they are smaller with fewer composite domains. Furthermore, it can 
be expected that composite states of a size greater than the average of an early modern 
composite province stands a better chance of reaching an advanced age than simple states 
of a size approximating the average of an early modern composite province. Moreover, 
we expect that composite states, when they reach an advanced age, do so due to their 
ability to continually fend off military invasions and conquest attempts from the external 
environment, rather than because of other factors. The absence of conquest attempts is 
expected to be due to implicit deterrence, rather than being traceable to the dynastic 
deterrence mechanism outlined in the previous section.  
 
Intergenerational Leadership Learning 
The final alternative approach for understanding the late-survival of composite 
states is that of leadership learning. This approach operates both within the lifetime of a 
leader and cross-generationally, and it leads to demonstrable adaptive changes in the way 
that leadership is exercised and followers mobilized. In general terms, leadership learning 
can be measured by the desistance of leaders from deploying strategies and tactics shown 
to have been ill-suited to realizing their objectives in the past, and their increasing 
reliance on strategies shown to have succeeded in the past. In this sense, behaviors 
enacted through learning are not necessarily well adapted to the environment in which 
they occur. Furthermore, leadership learning on a deeper level can lead to changes in the 
ends (and not merely the means) of leadership across a lifetime or across multiple 
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generations of a leadership lineage, though such changes are notoriously difficult to 
document due to the fragmentary or ambiguous documentary evidence of the ultimate 
intentions of early modern rulers.  
Though past success does not necessitate future success—and perversely nothing 
fails like success, as Jervis55 has rightly put it—nonetheless we can infer the presence or 
absence of learning through the increasing or decreasing frequency of certain leadership 
strategies across time. Maladaptive learning is just as much an instance of learning as 
adaptive learning and is analytically similar in structure. We here are not concerned to 
evaluate leadership learning according to some moral or absolute criterion of correctness, 
but are merely interested to trace the contribution of the learning undergone by the rulers 
(and lineages of rulers) of some early modern composite states toward the longevity of 
their states. 
The ‘General Crisis’ and the Learning Imperative 
In particular, for early modern leaders in the period 1648-1789, effective 
leadership learning was crucial in keeping at bay the threat of internal rebellion and 
dissolution from within. Internal rebellions were particularly prevalent during the first 
half of the seventeenth century, and an influential current of scholarship takes it that these 
separate instances of political crisis were not independent but interdependent events due 
to the occurrence of multiple crises in close temporal proximity.56 This great confluence 
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of political and social rebellions and upheavals of the seventeenth century has been called 
the ‘General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’ in influential articles by Eric Hobsbawm 
and Hugh Trevor-Roper.57  
The more political dimension of the general crisis manifested itself in rebellions 
and revolts that included the English Civil Wars; the revolt of the Catalans and the 
Portuguese against the Spanish Monarchy (1640); the revolts in Naples and Palermo 
(1647); the Fronde in France (1648-1653); the ‘bloodless’ reaction of the ruling oligarchy 
to monarchical absolutism in the Netherlands (1650); the revolt of the Ukraine (1648-
1654); as well as the Bohemian Revolt which led to the Thirty Years War and convulsed 
the Reich and its surroundings.58 This context of proliferating dissent and rebellion was 
particularly damaging to the composite states of the early modern era due to their 
complex structures incorporating cross-cutting loyalties and ties, and it was undoubtedly 
the ever present possibility of rebellion that most troubled the rulers of composite states 
in the following century and forced on them the need to learn from the past. 
The learned ability of the rulers of composite states to respond successfully to an 
initial phase of internal crisis was, according to this explanation, the critical factor behind 
later leaders’ ability to ensure the resilience of their composite domains. In this regard, 
the European ancien régime (before its dramatic collapse brought about by Napoleonic 
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France), constitutes an excellent instance of a ‘natural experiment,’ where the long-term 
trajectory of leadership learning can be traced from an initial starting point that consists 
of an exogenous assigned random treatment.59 There is a strong case for arguing that the 
‘general crisis’ was indeed an exogenously (and thus randomly) assigned event affecting 
all of Europe equally, justifying a comparison between the varying responses and 
subsequent pathways of different rulers to the crisis. Whatever its origins, and we do not 
attempt within the parameters of this project to establish the origins of the general crisis, 
there is now some agreement that the ‘crisis’ of the seventeenth century was a general 
one. As Aston notes, there is “a basis of agreement…[that] there was an economic and 
political crisis all over western and central Europe in the seventeenth century.”60  
Though the general crisis was close to universally felt, it nonetheless did not 
affect all European societies. Therefore we must first differentiate composite states in 
Western and Central Europe in 1648 into those that did and did not undergo a severe 
domestic crisis of authority during the early seventeenth century. For those regimes not 
undergoing crisis, leadership performance in the eighteenth century can be evaluated by 
asking whether systematic weaknesses of leadership strategy can be attributed to the 
absence of learning opportunities during the previous century, or to the absence of early 
adaptive reforms. For composite states that did undergo a seventeenth century crisis, on 
the other hand, the initial response to rebellion and the consequences of this response on 
the evolving core-periphery relationship within the composite state would be the first 
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stage of the learning process. The second stage would entail the ruler evaluating whether 
the initial response was adequate or inadequate, and then either continuing to implement 
a successful response or constructing another approach to the peripheral domains. The 
response to later authority crises occurring in the eighteenth century by states that did and 
did not undergo an early crisis can be compared, and the adequacy of this response 
evaluated to estimate the role of leadership learning in facilitating the relative stability of 
the composite state as a whole. 
The learning process can be conceptualized in historical context, as follows. In the 
initial phase, composite state rulers who were unable to adequately respond to early crisis 
were unable to resist the centrifugal forces of political rebellion and/or foreign 
intervention affecting part or all of their realms. During this phase, it is highly likely the 
composite states ruled by leaders unable to respond to crisis will have dissolved. 
Nonetheless, some composite state rulers were able to adequately respond to early 
challenges while maintaining the inherently composite nature of their states. The classic 
case in this category is the Holy Roman Empire. Permanent failure of the half-hearted 
absolutist reforms attempted by Ferdinand II was indicated by the modus vivendi of the 
Westphalian Peace. Such ambitious centralizing reforms were not again attempted by 
Holy Roman Emperors until Joseph II and his unsuccessful reform attempts of the late 
eighteenth century, and such efforts would be limited to the Habsburgs’ hereditary 
domains. Other composite state rulers responded to initial political crisis by concentrating 
(or attempting to concentrate) central authority (and in some cases installing an absolutist 
regime). The response in England was in such manner originally the replacement of 
composite monarchy by a unitary absolutist regime (the English Commonwealth), which 
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would nonetheless prove unable to survive for very long. The deleteriousness of 
absolutism was learnt by English monarchs during the English Civil Wars, and 
(excepting the clumsy attempt to move toward absolutism in the religious domain taken 
by James II) would not be tried again. For this reason, the response to the succession 
crisis of Anne (and the Scottish threat to essentially separate from England) was dealt 
with by a proposal for incorporating union that, in a limited way, respected the wishes of 
the Scots and preserved the parliamentary system.  
In Spain, the premature centralizing efforts of Olivares would fail, and Portugal 
successfully seceded from the Iberian Union, but the rest of the Spanish composite state 
survived for a time. Nonetheless, after dynastic failure with the death of the last Habsburg 
king, Charles II, the learning internalized at an earlier stage—namely that premature 
centralization can backfire—was lost. After the War of the Spanish Succession, where the 
Aragonese sided with the Austrian Habsburg against the newly installed Bourbon ruler of 
Spain, the Nueva Planta decrees of Philip V would succeed in effectively eliminating the 
Spanish composite state.  
The Lessons of the General Crisis 
What are some of the commonalities that have been observed between the 
political upheavals that comprised the ‘general crisis,’ and what might be the task of 
leadership in responding to and learning from these challenges? Rather than viewing the 
emergence of centralized and homogeneous authority over a unified territory as a 
preordained outcome, we must look more closely at the strategies that early modern 
composite state rulers developed to control restive rebellions in the era of the general 
crisis. From the historical debate surrounding the general crisis and its manifestations, 
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one important and recurring theme is the critical role of the nobility and assembly in the 
uprisings of the period, and the consequent necessity for royal power to weaken this 
restive force without destroying it completely.  
In a major contribution to the debate on the origins of the English Civil Wars, 
Adamson argues that these disturbances must be understood in the context of an 
aristocratic or ‘baronial’ reaction to what they saw as the encroaching power of the 
monarchy, leading the nobility to attempt a reorientation of the mixed constitution toward 
parliament and away from the king.61 The Fronde rebellions in France (1648-1653) have 
also been read as an attempt on the part of sections of the aristocracy to gain a greater 
share of the benefits of royal government.62 Other examples of the nobility as an 
important factor in the disturbances of the General Crisis might include the role of the 
noble estates in the Bohemian Revolt leading to the Thirty Years War,63 as well as the 
Portuguese revolt against Spanish rule, amongst others. 
In the wake of such aristocratic discontent, a number of responses were possible. 
They all entailed, in one way or another, co-opting the nobility by enmeshing them in ties 
of interdependence with the ruling dynasty at the same time as uncoupling them from 
their estates and the larger society as a means to suppress alliances between them and the 
populace. One of these—the solution exemplified in the English case—involved an 
accommodation between king and parliament where a dominium politicum et regale and 
stalemate between these two forces was routinized after the revolution of 1688 “behind 
																																																								
61 J. S. A. Adamson, “The Baronial Context of the English Civil War,” Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 40 (1990): pp. 93-120; J. S. A. Adamson, The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007). 
62 Geoffrey Treasure, Richelieu and Mazarin (London: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 11. 
63 H. G. Koenigsberger, “The European Civil War,” in The Habsburgs and Europe 1516-1660 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1971). 
	
	 81	
the veil of the…absolute sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament.”64 It was a hereditary 
monarchy with parliament nonetheless possessing an implicit veto power over issues of 
succession. Here parliament was to be tested as the setting that could integrate the 
monarchical core and the composite regions.  
The model adopted by the Holy Roman Empire was also that of an 
accommodation between the emperor and powerful lords, or electors, in a complex 
structure that formally remained an elective monarchy but in practice moved 
substantively toward becoming a hereditary monarchy. During the eighteenth century, 
despite this decentralization in the Reich, moves to cement centralized authority were 
taken in the Habsburg hereditary domains, which included territory outside the empire, 
such as parts of the kingdom of Hungary. But the decentralized structure characteristic of 
the Reich remained, and the Reichstag—similarly to the British parliament—would 
remain in place as an institution fostering integration among the elites of the different 
imperial territories.   
The second, as seen in the ‘absolutist’ French context, was that of limiting the role 
of the assembly while drawing the nobility closer to the ruler in the setting of the court, 
so they could be more effectively co-opted and their restive impulses dampened. The 
consequence of this was social distancing which rendered the royal court more distant 
from the third estate while temporarily magnifying its prestige, (though this distancing 
would finally lead to dangerous levels of popular disaffection). This is the contribution of 
Norbert Elias and his theory of the manner in which the nobility after Louis XIV was 
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ensnared in a courtly competition for prestige, status, and the king’s favor.65 This is the 
model of a co-opted nobility without a role for parliament. But such a model of co-
optation without assemblies was difficult for the rulers of composite monarchies to pull 
off without destroying the composite nature of their state due to the impossibility of 
divesting whole regions of their traditional rights and liberties while allowing regional 
assemblies to survive. 
The role of the parliamentary assembly in acting as a pressure valve expressing 
the grievances of the nobility before they reached dangerous levels, as well as in taming 
regional polarization, is an important part of the explanation for composite state 
longevity. Though such an accommodation cannot be brought about by the ruler alone, 
there is a crucial role for monarchs mindful of the virtues of compositeness who—
individually or cross-generationally—came to realize that the centralizing pressures 
recommending a concentration of military, extractive, and administrative capabilities 
should not be pushed too far in the direction of absolute power. The evolution of an 
understanding on the part of certain rulers and dynastic lineages that restraint in dealing 
with political assemblies—and preserving the status quo of a composite states—was 
necessary to avoid the disintegrative pressures of regional rebellion, is the third 
alternative explanation for composite state longevity after 1648. 
Leadership Learning’s Expectations for Composite State Longevity 
Because of the difficulty in directly accessing the internal processes of leadership 
learning, we must approach it through proxy measures. There are nevertheless excellent 
proxy measures of leadership learning we can utilize to derive expectations and evaluate 
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the explanatory power of this approach. The leadership learning perspective posits that 
some leaders have better access to learning resources to aid them in mastering the art of 
government. One of the most important sources of leadership learning for young dynastic 
heirs was the rigorous tutoring and discipline that royal houses reserved especially for a 
young prince. Such education was assisted not only by tutors hand picked by the monarch 
to initiate the prince into the ways of rule, but also by an entire genre of political 
treatises—the ‘mirrors of princes’—that aimed to instruct the young prince in the nature 
and methods of kingly rule.66 Many important political thinkers of the time wrote works 
intended to come under this genre, such as Machiavelli and Botero. The focus of such 
instruction and also of much political reflection of the period was that of learning lessons 
from history so as not to repeat the mistakes of one’s kingly predecessors. 
Such rigorous education justifies the use of royal dynastic upbringing as a proxy 
measure for leadership learning. Thus we expect hereditary dynastic rulers of the early 
modern period, all else even, to have been better educated in the art of kingship and more 
empowered to learn lessons from the past than non-dynastic rulers, such as the leaders of 
republics and elective monarchies. The leaders of these non-hereditary types of regime 
were not raised from birth to learn the craft of government in the same way that dynastic 
heirs of hereditary monarchies were, and thus the expectation would be that the leaders of 
these types of regime were not as well equipped to maintain the status quo of a composite 
state. Instead, we expect them to be more prone to attempt absolutist reforms, such 
reforms in turn being liable to ignite social opposition and either moves to amalgamation 
or spurring successful secessions. Thus we expect the longevity likelihood of composite 
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states are enhanced when they are also hereditary dynasties, and diminished when 
composite states are elective monarchies or republics. 
Similarly, within the category of dynastic rulers, those raised as heir apparent are 
better empowered in terms of leadership lessons when compared with younger siblings 
who came to take on kingly responsibilities due to death of the eldest son, and those who 
accede to the throne after completing their princely education are better equipped to learn 
from the past than rulers forced to accede in their minority. In the diachronic view, the 
first ruler of a dynasty can be expected to have less access to the collective repository of 
kingship lessons that accumulate over the course of a dynastic line than later rulers of the 
same dynasty. Extrapolating from this, we can expect composite state death as being 
more likely to occur early in the sequence of a dynasty than later, and more likely during 
the reigns of younger siblings not raised to rule than eldest sons who were given access to 
all the institutional memory of a dynasty that it could give. Finally, it is expected 
according to this approach that composite state death—when it occurs—is catalyzed by 
internal rebellions rather than by external threats. 
 
The Balance of Power as a Tool of Dynasticism and Power Politics 
 
We now proceed to discuss the ambiguous role of the balance of power as a 
dynamic incorporating both dynastic and power political elements during the early 
modern period. Because the balance of power plays a role in shaping outcomes in all of 
the cases we examine, and due to its position straddling the different approaches, it is 
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unfruitful to posit balancing as an alternative explanation in its own right. Rather, it must 
be seen as a general environmental condition affecting all cases. 
The balance of power, during the early modern period, was a mechanism that was 
closely tied with both dynastic and military factors. This leads to difficulty in isolating it 
as a separate variable unrelated to either the dynastic or the military approach. For this 
reason, we treat the balance of power in this work as a separate strategic factor, which 
played a role in both dynastic and power political calculations. The ambiguous status of 
the balance of power can be seen when we examine the historical evolution of the 
balance of power as an idea. The balance of power, as it was understood in the early 
modern period—far from completely contradicting earlier medieval norms—was a 
development and translation of the earlier custom of allowing the survival of weaker 
units. The medieval aversion to destroying one’s dynastic enemies found its way into the 
early modern language of powers and forces, despite the desuetude of the strong legalist 
framework of the earlier medieval discourse. The balance of power, then, as it operated 
during the early modern period, worked to protect the maintenance of the dynastic system 
writ large.  
 
The Genealogy of the Early Modern Balance 
Though the balance of power has been widely seen as the dominant motive 
behind the outbreak of war in this period, the outbreak of many significant wars of this 
era were in fact precipitated by dynastic succession crises,67 and the family resemblance 
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between these and the legalistic wars of the Middle Ages points to the function of war as 
a crucial mechanism to restore order after dynastic breakdown, rather than as merely the 
sign of balancing behavior.68 Wilson notes that interpretations of early modern warfare 
see it as framed by the drive to defend one’s rightful possessions, (no matter how dubious 
the claims), and he writes that in this period “war was still regarded as an extension of a 
legal battle in which the resort to violence came only after all efforts at peaceful 
resolution had foundered on the obstruction and culpability of the other side.”69 
Concomitantly, crises of succession brought an opportunity for ambition and conflict, but 
rarely was the legitimacy of a sitting prince challenged during his reign,70 and it was 
successions where there was some deviation from the normal procedure where conflict 
occurred.  
The principle of the balance of power and aversion to hegemony, much discussed 
in relation to the early modern period, remains an important aspect of the conflicts of this 
period. However, the nature of the relationship between the balancing motivation and the 
dynastic motivation must still be adequately explained. We view the concept of the 
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balance of power to be one of the most important outcomes of dynastic co-evolution in 
Europe, and one of the main enabling mechanisms through which such co-evolution 
could continue—a textbook case of negative feedback through which the system of co-
existence between the distinct dynastic niches could maintain itself and survive. Though 
the concept of the balance, at a decisive moment in its development, came to stand for an 
antipathy towards hegemony, the origins of the concept lie in the medieval protection of 
rights and the protection of the weak. This genealogy of the concept is important for us to 
see how the balance continued to function even in early modern times to protect weaker 
dynasties and monarchs from extinction. 
William Stubbs, in an essay written in the latter half of the nineteenth century on 
the characteristic differences between medieval and modern history, points to the way 
that the idea of right and rights dominant in the medieval era was gradually transformed 
in the modern period into the operation of the balance of power. He points to two critical 
examples from the Middle Ages: 
[T]he continued existence of small states throughout the middle ages is a very important 
illustration of the subject before us; another is the extreme dislike…[of] the forcible 
extinction of historical claims to territory…there was no fear of shedding blood, but there 
was great fear of destroying right.71 
 
Clearly, the core element of the balance of power, which he describes as the 
principle that “the weaker should not be crushed by the union of the stronger,”72 is 
already present in the medieval tendency to allow the continuation of dynastic claims. An 
aversion to extinguishing dynastic or hereditary rights survived most notably into the 
early modern period in the form of the imperial constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, 
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an important case where constitutional mechanisms (rather than the balance of power) 
ensured the survival of small units.73 The right of a noble or royal dynasty if not to 
individual survival, then to retain hereditary rights and privileges even when an 
individual or generation might draw the ire of the Emperor, was normatively protected, 
and there was strong societal pressure to restore or rehabilitate their descendants.  
As Evans has pointed out, “the basic unit was always the family, and the family 
did not suffer even if an individual fell from grace…”74 There exists an important 
parallelism here between the rights that noble dynasties possessed in the domestic realm, 
and those that royal dynasties sought to protect in their competitive relations with other 
royal dynasties. This is unsurprising given the roots of the dynastic system in a feudal 
order where distinctions between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ held little 
meaning. The customary protection of the rights of a dynasty to its privileges and its 
possessions even after disruptions made by their members to the social order, relates 
partly to the notion of ‘reconciliation’ (or renunciation of the feud and vendetta) noted by 
Brunner to be a foundational aspect of the feudal understanding of conflict,75 and also 
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partly to the accelerating practice of including amnesty clauses in peace treaties from the 
sixteenth century onwards.76 
Whether this aversion to extinguishing the hereditary rights of the losing party in 
a dynastic conflict was a consequence of disinclination, prudence, or impotence on the 
part of medieval monarchs (it was likely a product of all of these), this impulse, together 
with the weak capacity for centralized coercion of the time, is a necessary part of the 
explanation for the ongoing resilience of smaller principalities well into the early modern 
period.77 This aversion is also the reason why, despite the glorification of conquest by 
early modern theorists such as Machiavelli, raw territorial aggrandizement in Europe 
without dynastic justifications, was rare.78 Political theorists would view this discussion 
through the lens of the ‘sovereignty’ concept. However, a dry abstract account does not 
do justice to the dynastic networks and norms which sustained and gave life to this 
concept—not only in the case of the so-called ‘absolutist’ states but in the smaller 
principalities where the notions of dynastic claim and legal title blended imperceptibly 
with the notion of sovereignty. 
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When it was necessary for a dynasty to be deprived of its hereditary lands, the 
norm of compensation meant that it was generally granted rulership of a domain 
elsewhere.79 This protection of dynastic rights, and the aversion to centralization that 
went with it, was also a prerequisite to the emergence in early modern Europe of an 
international system rather than a universal monarchy. The balance of power was 
originally a force protective of the weaker members of the system (and ameliorating 
predation) than it was a cause of the partition and extinction of such states. Though this 
dynamic has not been widely recognized by IR scholarship, it has been pointed out by 
Jervis, who, using systemic rather than historical analysis, asserts that an explanation for 
the rarity of wars aimed at the complete destruction of an adversary lies in the balance of 
power mechanism and the usefulness that an adversary could prove as an ally in future. 
He writes that: 
The knowledge that allies and enemies are not permanent and the expectation that losers 
will be treated relatively generously reinforce each other. Because the members of the 
winning coalition know that they are not likely to remain together after the war, each has 
to fear accretions to the power of its allies. Because winners know that they are not likely 
to be able to dismember the loser, why should they prolong the war?80 
 
 
The Duality of Dynastic and Balancing Strategies 
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As more recent theoretical treatments of the balance of power have asserted,81 it is 
difficult to make behavioral predictions from theories of the balance of power, as a 
‘balanced’ distribution of power can denote a variety of equilibria, implying 
indeterminacy at the core of the theory. Waltz in this regard views the balance of power 
as a systemic outcome most clearly observable in the aggregate rather than on the level of 
the behavior of individual states. Nonetheless, the systemic and automatic mode of 
balancing becomes questionable when we examine world history, where we see an equal 
prevalence of hegemonic and balancing systems, a fact suggesting that systemic 
imperatives alone cannot be driving balancing behavior where it exists.82  
In the early seventeenth century, we see interventions that cannot be squared in a 
straightforward manner with balancing imperatives, such as the way in which France and 
Spain were trapped in an unwanted war (the War of the Mantuan Succession, 1628-1631) 
due to their commitments to their dynastic allies on the Italian Peninsula. To the extent 
that the dictate of assisting a dynastic ally became less compelling over time, increasingly 
freeing monarchs during the eighteenth century to construct policies that sometimes 
contradicted dynastic compulsions, this itself must have been a shift brought about by 
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non-systemic factors. These points combine to suggest that the balance of power, to the 
extent it is a conscious goal of states, is at least partly shaped by normative factors.  
In the case of the early modern system and the invocation of balancing principles 
by some leaders to rationalize their decisions, it would ideally be possible to determine 
objectively the extent to which actions were driven by pure dynastic and pure power 
political considerations, respectively. After all, in the case of political decisions the 
declarations of actors should not be taken at face value without some form of unmasking 
critique being attempted, and the two dominant framing discourses of this era were 
dynasticism and the balance of power. However, such a task is difficult primarily because 
in this period—a formative one where the concept of the balance of power was still in its 
infancy—the concept of the balance was used in general terms by contemporary actors 
with little specificity.  
According to Herbert Butterfield, it was when France replaced Spain as the 
dominant (and most menacing) power in Europe in the latter part of the reign of Louis 
XIV that the doctrine of the balance developed, as statesmen of the time came to see 
universal monarchy arising from the abstract possibility of unbalanced power as the most 
pressing danger to be avoided. With such an aim, they deployed notions of the balance to 
try to roll back the power of such dominant monarchs.83 Fittingly, according to this 
narrative, the first official use of the term ‘balance’ can be traced to the Treaty of Utrecht 
signed in the aftermath of the War of the Spanish Succession, where in Article II is found 
the passage: 
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[T]o take away all uneasiness and suspicion, concerning such conjunction [between the 
kingdoms of Spain and France] out of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the 
peace and tranquility of Christendom by an equal balance of power (which is the best and 
most solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be lasting on 
all sides)… one and the same person should never become King of both kingdoms.84 
 
However, to acknowledge that the balance of power was an important factor in 
this, as in many other conflicts of this era, does not require elevating the balance of power 
principle as the primary ultima ratio of early modern conflict. Rather, as we can see from 
examining the text of the Treaty of Utrecht, the renunciation of Philip V of Spain of his 
right to the French succession (and through this preservation of the balance) was seen as 
a means to an end—the creation of a lasting peace between Great Britain and Spain—
rather than as an end in itself.  
In this, it was just one of a portfolio of diplomatic tools—such as dynastic 
marriage, compensation, indemnity, honor and prestige, amongst others—for re-
establishing a workable peace after war and preserving working relations between 
dynasties and their leaders.85 Moreover, the declared goal of many peace treaties of the 
early modern period from Westphalia onwards was general peace within Christendom in 
the form of peace between Christian kingdoms.86 And as Lesaffer notes, though “express 
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references to the balance of power were rare, it was considered a necessary precondition 
for the tranquility and security of Europe.”87 
The most significant dangers to European politics, from the perspective of leaders 
of the early modern period, were the political crises occasioned by a breakdown of 
dynastic succession, and the balance of power was seen as an instrument to overcome 
such crises when they broke out into open warfare. Moreover, “the ruling families of the 
continent had become so closely inter-married…that succession in one state could bring 
to power a ruler closely related to the royal family of another,”88 and thus any succession 
crisis could provide the occasion for multiple interventions by interested parties. The 
strategy of dynastic intermarriage, generalized by the beginning of the early modern 
period as the primary means to set royal dynasties apart from their local nobilities and 
thereby strengthen their prestige, was in this way creating the conditions for balancing 
strategies to become more prevalent in the settlement of political conflicts. 
To conclude, the relationship between dynasticism and the balance of power 
during the early modern period can be summarized as one where dynastic considerations 
were generally crucial in the outbreak of hostilities or the formation of casus belli,89 and 
considerations of balancing and equilibrium were more important in the conduct and 
conclusion of hostilities. Balancing considerations ensured that early modern wars were 
rarely decisive or aimed at the complete subjugation of an adversary, and through its 
influence negotiated peace terms were less burdensome for the losers than would 
otherwise have been the case. One of the most important but neglected consequences of 
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the balance of power as it operated during the early modern period was that of facilitating 
the survival and co-evolution of dynastic units for longer than could have been predicted 
by theory. Moreover, the balancing mechanism acted to preserve dynastic kinship ties 
and co-evolutionary restraints that tempered the emergence of a vicious cycle of 
destructive competitiveness.  
 
Case Selection and Overall Research Strategy 
 
Before we turn to the task of empirically examining composite state dissolution 
and survival in the next chapter, we lay out a justification for selecting the cases of early 
and late composite state dissolution we chose to examine in empirical depth. First of all, 
we should answer the question of why we chose to compare variance in terms of early 
versus late death composite states, rather than between late death composite states versus 
late death non-composite states. 
The comparison between early and late death composite states is a critical 
comparison for our research, due to the fact that we conceive of state survival as the 
successful negotiation of a series of near-death crises by the rulers of a state. In order to 
identify the most relevant category of crisis endangering state survival, then, it is 
necessary to examine early death composite states to determine if a common set of 
factors was at play in typical cases of early demise composite states, and what these 
factors were. For this reason, we have chosen to examine the British Isles and Iberian 
Peninsula as two rich historical contexts for the death and survival of composite states. In 
both of these regional contexts, the death of a composite state took place in 
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approximately the first fifty years after the Peace of Westphalia. These are Portugal-
Castile, which was dissolved via secession with the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668, and 
England-Scotland, dissolved via incorporating union in 1707. Given that some composite 
states—specifically Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire—survived until the 
late eighteenth century, and the ancien régime as a whole came to an end during the 
Napoleonic Wars, these two cases can be classed as early death composite states. 
Therefore, we have chosen these two early death composite states for close examination. 
The added advantage of the British Isles and Iberian Peninsula—and the reason these 
cases are indispensable—is because these two regions contain other composite states that 
outlasted each of the early death composite states. Castile-Aragon (including Catalonia) 
was another composite state that outlasted the Iberian Union, and England-Ireland was an 
unusual composite state that outlasted England-Scotland. In the second part of Chapter 
Two, we provide a within-case comparison of the early and late death composite states in 
these two settings, bringing to bear further comparative insights on our research question. 
Our empirical research strategy involves an initial examination of cases of early 
death composite states in Chapter Two, from which we abstract what was perceived by 
early modern rulers to be the most serious existential threat to composite state survival 
from these cases. After positing the most cogent theory for how late survival composite 
states survived this category of threatening event in Chapter Three—the theory of 
dynastic deterrence—we go on to examine the manner in which late survival composite 
states successfully traversed these existential crises and eventually met their demise in 
Chapter Four. After evaluating the ability of the alternative approaches to explain the 
longevity of composite states, we conclude that dynastic deterrence provides the most 
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explanatory purchase over the actual historical process through which late death 
composite states managed to survive existential crisis and eventually dissolve.  
The study of composite state death and survival, to be representative, must 
include both cases of early and late composite state death, and also cases of each of the 
four pathways to composite state death outlined in the introduction. To this end, our 
selection of cases satisfies two different criteria. And as the universe of composite state 
death cases is not large, the selection of cases is relatively straightforward. The two early 
death composite states we have chosen—the Iberian Union and England-Scotland, are 
both representative of two different pathways away from compositeness for distinct 
reasons: the death of the Portugal-Castile composite state was the only case during the 
1648-1789 period90 where a constituent part of a composite state successfully seceded 
from the parent body and thus demands inclusion; and the death of England-Scotland via 
amalgamation is exceptionally well suited for analysis due to the fact that the relative 
isolation of the British Isles leads the relevant causal mechanisms occurring in this case 
to be more distinct and separable out in thought from other confounding factors.  
The two late composite state death cases are also representative of the remaining 
paths away from compositeness: Poland-Lithuania is representative of death by conquest 
as it was the only ancien régime composite state to be dissolved via partition91 (a form of 
																																																								
90 Though the Portuguese revolution of 1640 initiated the process of Portuguese secession, the restoration 
of the Portuguese monarchy did not become official until the 1668 Treaty of Lisbon, wherein the Spanish 
monarch recognized the Portuguese ruling house, the House of Braganza. For this reason, the dissolution of 
the Iberian Union comes under our periodization. Elliott notes that the only other cases of successful 
secession from a composite state were Sweden from the Union of Kalmar in 1523, and the Netherlands 
from Spain in the 1570s. However, both of these cases, besides taking place before the period we are 
examining, also displayed markedly different dynamics involving confessional contention, and thus we do 
not include them in our universe of cases. See Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” p. 68. 
91 Though the third and final partition which obliterated Polish-Lithuanian sovereignty did not take place 
until 1795, the process through which the Commonwealth was partitioned out of existence began in the 
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conquest); and the Holy Roman Empire was the only ancien régime composite state to 
die via disestablishment. Though the two cases of late death composite states both met 
their final demise after 1789, nonetheless they require inclusion for two reasons. Firstly, 
they are the only examples of composite state death along two of the pathways—
conquest and disestablishment—and thus it is essential to study the process through 
which they met their end. Furthermore, events occurring after the 1789 cut-off—
signifying the advent of the French Revolution—are not completely distinct in nature 
from those that preceded it. The coming to power of Napoleon in France throws into 
relief the distinctiveness of dynastic rule when compared with non-dynastic rule, and thus 
the analysis of the Holy Roman Empire and its demise is essential to demonstrating the 
interaction between dynastic and non-dynastic forms of rule. 
Beyond these justifications, we should add that Poland-Lithuania exemplifies the 
late surviving primary composite state, whereas the Reich exemplifies the late surviving 
secondary composite state. Moreover, the expectations we derived from the three 
approaches elaborated in this chapter, highlight distinctions between dynastic and non-
dynastic early modern states. Poland-Lithuania, as the most representative early modern 
elective monarchy, is critical to grasping the differential impact of dynastic kinship ties 
on the survival chances of dynastically embedded versus dynastically disembedded 
composite states.92 The only remaining lacuna is the omission of non-composite states in 
this research. The comparison between composite and non-composite states is important, 
																																																								
1770s and a relatively homogeneous set of causes acted on Poland-Lithuania throughout this period. Thus, 
the Commonwealth is best seen as a case belonging within the parameters of the 1648-1789 period.  
92 The papacy—though an elective monarchy of a kind—was as an ecclesiastic state so distinct in its 
contours that it should be kept separate from the relatively ‘secular’ states examined here. The Reich, and 
perhaps even the English Crown after the Glorious Revolution, were also technically elective monarchies 
but functioned in practice as hereditary monarchies. Thus, in this research we consider them to more or less 
possess the properties of dynastic rather than non-dynastic states. 
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but the only non-composite state that ‘died’ during the 1648-1789 period was absolutist 
France. Not only are we not explicitly focused here with understanding the death and 
survival of early modern non-composite states, but the process of dissolution that befell 
ancien régime France is so complex and idiosyncratic, that we consider the comparison 
of composite and non-composite state death to be a task for the inevitable next stage of 





THE EARLY DEATH OF COMPOSITE STATES 
 
When it is asked why some composite states survived to an advanced age, the 
questioner must also inevitably ask why others dissolved at a younger age. I take it that 
dissolution, or ‘death,’ for a composite state means traversing one of the ‘pathways away 
from compositeness’ outlined in the Introduction, and ‘survival’ means avoiding these 
pathways. There are four pathways through which a composite state can die, and they are: 
amalgamation, secession, conquest, and disestablishment. The causes of relative health 
and death in old age need not be the same as those for early death or expiration by illness 
or accident, but this does not negate the fact that in order to gain a good understanding of 
the factors behind the longevity of composite states, we must gain a preliminary 
understanding of the phenomenon of the dissolution of composite states. 
This is necessary so we can identify the most vulnerable moments in the life 
course of a composite polity—the moments when its continued existence was most in 
doubt. By identifying these moments of greatest vulnerability, we can in turn identify the 
sources of greatest resilience of composite polities, as supportive factors in moments of 
great existential danger can—via a process of deductive reasoning—be inferred to be 
none other than their sources of greatest resilience. After pinpointing the factors posing 
greatest danger for composite states in this chapter, we go on in following chapters to 




In this chapter we provide an account of the most important factors underlying the 
early dissolution of two early modern composite states—England-Scotland and the 
Iberian Union—and then compare the circumstances surrounding their dissolution with 
the reasons for survival of other composite states in the same region, particularly Castile-
Aragon and England-Ireland. The two early death composite states were chosen because 
they are representative instances of two of the pathways away from compositeness: 
England-Scotland was dissolved via amalgamation, and the Iberian Union was dissolved 
via secession. In the process to analyzing these two cases in depth, we test expectations 
derived from the three approaches explaining composite state survival after 1648 outlined 
in Chapter One. These three explanations are as follows.  
Firstly, the approach of dynastic stability argues that the longevity of some 
composite states can best be explained by the existence of strong dynastic kinship ties 
between their ruling houses and those of their main competitors. This is because the 
conquest-motivation was restrained by the existence of dynastic kinship ties—especially 
those of marriage—between ruling dynasties. This approach does not posit that dynastic 
rulers with kinship ties never wage war against each other, but it does argue that the 
closer the kinship ties between a dynastic ruler and the leading members of another 
dynasty, (and if and only if they have dynastic ambitions for their issue), the less inclined 
one of these houses will be to wage a war of conquest against the other, and the less 
inclined they will be to pursue a foreign policy aiming at extinguishing the rightful 
possession of the other house over its hereditary territories. 
Secondly, the military explanation argues that large composite states possessed 
military advantages that gave them an enhanced ability to survive military competition of 
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the early modern period when compared with smaller composite states and non-
composite states of a comparable or smaller size. The two mechanisms operating in the 
military explanation are: a) the greater resources for military competition provided by 
additional composite domains, and b) the implicit deterrence arising from such 
capabilities. According to this explanation, composite state survival was secured by 
preventing conquest attempts during wartime and deterring conquest attempts through 
military strength. 
Finally, a leadership learning explanation was given, according to which the 
rulers of some composite states were able to learn lessons from the seventeenth century 
European ‘general crisis’ (and other challenges of governing the early modern state) 
better than other rulers. According to this approach, the rulers of late-surviving composite 
states were able to avoid early death by avoiding premature amalgamation and thereby 
forestalling rebellions. The rulers of hereditary monarchies (when compared with those of 
elective monarchies and republics) were strongly advantaged in the task of leadership 
learning due to the exceptional instructional resources available to the hereditary heir of 
dynastic states. Elder brothers, rulers acceding after completing their instruction and later 
rulers in a dynastic line are also expected to advantaged in inter-generational learning 
when compared with younger brothers, rulers acceding in their minority and earlier rulers 
in a dynastic line. 
We proceed through a series of purposive comparisons to evaluate the extent to 
which these explanatory frameworks are capable of encompassing the patterns of 
composite state dissolution and survival in the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula. In 
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order for there to be variation in the dependent variable, we must compare cases of early 
composite state death and survival to rule out spurious causation and endogeneity. 
We initially examine two composite states that dissolved early in the post-
Westphalian period to ask whether there are common patterns to these cases that might be 
instructive for understanding systematic differences between these and cases of late-
survival. The two cases we examine in depth are Portuguese secession from the Iberian 
Union in 1668, and the amalgamation of England and Scotland with the Acts of Union of 
1707. In the second part of this chapter, both of these cases will be partially compared 
with other composite states in the same region that outlived these early death cases, 
namely Aragon-Castile until it was administratively amalgamated in 1707, and England-
Ireland which remained in a personal union with England until 1800. These partial 
comparisons aid us in better grasping the core reasons for the diverging fates of early 
modern composite states. Through this set of comparisons, we come to see the vital role 
of premature centralizing reforms in fomenting regional uprisings, as well as the power of 
external intervention (or feared external intervention) in determining the success chances 






Early Composite State Death 
 
The Secession of Portugal from the Iberian Union 
 
We begin our investigation into the factors underlying the early death of 
representative composite polities in post-Westphalian ancien régime Europe by 
examining the death of the Iberian Union between the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, 
which lasted from 1580-1640/1668. We then move to examine the England-Scotland 
personal union, or the ‘Union of the Crowns,’ lasting from 1603-1707. These are 
important cases as the former is the only case of composite state death by secession post-
Westphalia, whereas the latter is not only the most developed case of composite state 
death by amalgamation, but the unified state that resulted is still in existence today. 
Moreover, they are doubly instructive, because in both these cases one part of the 
composite unit would survive and outlive the parts that were dissolved, namely the 
Castile-Aragon personal union, which survived until the Nueva Planta decrees forcibly 
mandating amalgamation in 1707, and the England-Ireland union, which survived until 
the Acts of Union of 1800. These divergent outcomes allow us to ask sharp comparative 
questions about the reasons for the contrasting outcomes observed. 
 
A Composite Union Hastily Conceived 
We start by examining the Iberian Union and its demise with the Portuguese 
Restoration War. Why did the Iberian Union dissolve after a mere sixty years when the 
personal union between Castile and Aragon (which had been in existence since 1516) 
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would continue for approximately another half century afterwards? The Iberian Union, or 
the personal union of the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal (as well as the 
Spanish and Portuguese overseas possessions) under a single monarch, was the first of 
the composite polities on the Iberian Peninsula to disintegrate, doing so via secession of 
Portugal. 
The union of Portugal and the Spanish crown had taken place in a moment of 
weakness, when the young King Sebastian of Portugal and much of the cream of the 
Portuguese nobility were killed in 1578 during an expeditionary raid to expand 
Portuguese military power to Morocco. In the wake of the succession crisis that followed, 
Philip II of Spain acted with speed and decisiveness in sending a Spanish army of 40,000 
men into Portugal in late June of 1580 to secure the Portuguese crown on his behalf. As 
the oldest male descendant of Manuel the Fortunate, (the grandfather of the late King 
Sebastian), Philip had a not insubstantial claim to the Portuguese throne—though there 
was force involved in the assertion of his claim, and other strong claimants to the throne 
existed.  
Philip’s troops faced only scattered resistance in Portugal, and in 1581 Philip was 
crowned Philip I of Portugal. In treating the Portuguese kingdom not as a conquest but 
instead by allowing the Portuguese to retain their distinctive rights and form of 
government (including retention of Portuguese as the language of government and the 
exclusion of Castilians from offices in the government below the level of viceroy), Philip 
guaranteed to Portugal and its overseas territories an independent identity in Philip’s 
monarchy, and in the process gained the acquiescence of the Portuguese elites for his 
accession. This was the same framework for a strictly personal union of crowns as that 
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which came about between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon in 1469 with the marriage 
of Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Aragon, and Isabella, the heiress of Castile.1 There was 
no reason for the Castilian elite not to think that the Iberian Union had a glorious future 
just as did the Castile-Aragon union. However, composite state formation via dynastic 
intermarriage involved a lesser degree of coercion than the manner in which Philip 
claimed the Portuguese Crown. 
 
The Disadvantages of an Absentee Monarch 
The personal union between Castile and Aragon, then, had already been in 
existence for more than a century before Portugal was added to the composite polity. The 
decline of the peripatetic court and its increasingly sedentary nature, with construction of 
a permanent residence—the Escorial—begun by Philip II in 1563, created significant 
problems for the rulers of composite polities. During the years of their union, the 
absentee monarchy (in Aragon) and monopolization of positions in the Castilian court by 
Castilians had created resentments on the part of the Aragonese nobility. But the 
Portuguese could still hope for advantages from their own nascent union, due to the 
military assistance that might be available for Portugal to maintain her increasingly costly 
overseas possessions in East Asia and India, and access to the vast reserves of silver held 
by Castile due to her empire in the Americas.  
To be sure, the Portuguese derived some advantages from the new union with 
Castile, particularly improved government, a low tax burden and increased stability that 
allowed for modest population growth compared with the declines that had been 
																																																								
1 J. H. Elliott, “The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-1640,” in Conquest and 
Coalescence, ed. Mark Greengrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1991). 
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witnessed prior to the union under the Aviz rulers.2 Even in 1616, the proportion of the 
tax revenue towards imperial costs contributed by Portugal was small at 10 per cent, 
whereas Castile was contributing 73 per cent, the Netherlands 9 per cent, Naples 5 per 
cent, and Aragon a mere 1 per cent.3 Thus, even as the weaker party in the union, the new 
political structure was not without its advantages for the Portuguese. As in the case of 
Scottish elites weighing (prior to the 1707 union to become a single juridical kingdom) 
whether to join England in a more complete union, the economic costs and benefits of 
being part of a composite polity extended for the Portuguese to the question of economic 
advantages gained via access to colonial territories abroad, and despite the juridical 
separation and concomitant customs barriers between the separate realms of the Spanish 
monarch, the increased level of openness and cooperation promised a brighter future than 
that outside the union. 
However, despite these benefits—real or imagined—the problems of an absentee 
monarchy and the lack of opportunities at the Court in Madrid for Portuguese nobles 
would, similarly to the Aragonese case, be a source of resentment that would prevent a 
strengthening sense of allegiance to the composite polity on the part of the Portuguese. 
This would in fact be a problem perceived at the highest levels of the Castilian 
leadership, with Philip IV’s favorite, the count of Olivares, who, as the monarch’s chief 
political minister, conveyed to the king these festering problems in an important 
instruction presented in 1624. As Elliott recounts: 
He [Olivares] spoke of a general demoralization in Portuguese society, which he ascribed 
to royal absenteeism, and he recommended that Philip should satisfy legitimate 
																																																								
2 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 




aspirations by moving his court to Lisbon for a lengthy residence. He also recommended 
the appointment of Portuguese to the government in Madrid and the royal household, and 
their employment as viceroys and ambassadors. ‘And I would regard it as expedient to do 
the same with Aragonese, Flemings, and Italians…impressing upon Your Majesty that 
this is the most important action that can be taken to ensure the security, stability, 
conservation and expansion of this Monarchy. This mingling of vassals currently treated 
as if they were foreigners, and their admission to the offices mentioned above, is the only 
way to achieve its unity.’4 
 
This is a prescient view of the troubles besetting the Castile-Portuguese composite 
polity as seen by an influential contemporary actor.  
 
The ‘Union of Arms,’ or the Imperative of Extraction 
As echoed in the above comments by Olivares, one of the widespread perceptions 
of statesmen of this era, such as Olivares and Richelieu, was the need to strengthen the 
authority of the crown vis-à-vis its outlying possessions, thus knitting the monarchical 
center and the outlying kingdoms in closer ties of obligation and loyalty. And not just 
this, but extracting much needed revenue through such a strengthening was a critical part 
of the agenda as seen by such statesmen. Within Castile, the power of the Spanish 
Monarchy was strong, but in its ‘composite’ possessions—which were incorporated on 
the understanding that traditional rights would be safeguarded—its power was weak. But 
such a strengthening of monarchical authority was particularly urgent in an age where 
military expenses were increasing. Even the silver entering Castile from Peru was not 
enough to maintain the defense of the vast empire, and the decisions of the Castilian 
Council of State taken between 1618-1621 meant that Spain would enter the Thirty Years 
War in Germany, as well as renew hostilities with the Dutch, imposing additional costs.5  
																																																								
4 Elliott, “The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal,” p. 58. 
5 Ronald Asch, “Monarchy in Western and Central Europe,” in Oxford Handbook of Early Modern 
European History 1350-1750, ed. Hamish Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 373. 
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Olivares, facing the challenges besetting the Spanish Monarchy at the beginning 
of the reign of Philip IV, “saw on the one side the massed ranks of Spain’s enemies 
moving into action, and on the other a penniless king and a ramshackle Spanish 
Monarchy under the faltering leadership of a bankrupt Castile.”6 For Olivares, then, in the 
face of such constraints and requirements, “diversity was bound to seem a profound 
source of weakness in an age which looked to a greater concentration of power as the 
most effective answer to economic depression and military attack.”7 Thus he would 
attempt a series of abortive reforms in the 1620-1630s aiming to integrate the military 
forces of the different parts of the composite realm as well as the administration and 
nobility of these domains—a programme that would come to be known as the ‘Union of 
Arms.’8 
The Spanish Monarchy, in the words of Elliott, “was to be welded into a whole, 
starting with the Iberian peninsula itself.”9 And yet, however necessary such reforms, 
they just as predictably set off resistance on the part of the nobility who inevitably saw 
their heretofore inviolable privileges as under attack. It would be these over-ambitious 
centralizing reforms that would sow a significant portion of the discontent ultimately 
driving the Portuguese nobility to revolt and break off the personal union with the 
Castilian monarch. The military dimension of the reform agenda proposed a quota system 
whereby all the provinces of the Monarchy would contribute a predetermined number of 
																																																								
6 J. H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 67 
7 J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 191. 
8 The Spanish Monarchy had in its decades of ruling Portugal, gone through several phases of policy. The 
first phase, which encompassed the years of Philip II’s rule over the kingdom, were years of reform, where 
institutions were modernized and administration improved. The second, covering the reign of Philip III 
(1598-1621) were years of ‘benign neglect.’ The third and final phase, initiated by Olivares and lasting 
until the declaration of the Duke of Braganza as King of Portugal, were years of attempted intervention and 
integration. 
9 Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, p. 193. 
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men in case one of them should be attacked. The quotas were assigned as follows: 
Catalonia 16,000; Aragon 10,000; Valencia 6000; Castile and the Indies 44,000; Portugal 
16,000; Naples 16,000; Sicily 6000; Milan 8000; Flanders 12,000; Mediterranean and 
Atlantic islands 6000.10  
 
Failure of Reform and Path to Rebellion 
The economic aspect of the reforms enacted by Olivares brought Portuguese 
merchants and businessmen with Jewish ancestry to Madrid, bringing with them a 
valuable source of funds for the Crown, but these new arrivals were viewed with 
suspicion by the existing elites. The plans to integrate the nobility of the various domains 
were not followed through, and the plan to temporarily relocate the royal court to Lisbon 
was never implemented. This meant that a weakening of loyalty on the part of the 
Portuguese aristocracy towards the Monarchy was not tackled on the all-important 
symbolic level. Though Olivares attempted to gain the loyalty of the Portuguese nobility 
by courting the Braganzas by promoting marriage ties between them and his own house, 
the Guzmáns, such attempts would ultimately be unsuccessful in gaining clients among 
the Portuguese.11  
An initial people’s revolt, which began in the summer of 1637 in Évora due to 
resentment against the annual appropriation of 500,000 cruzados proposed by the new 
governor of Portugal, Princess Margaret of Savoy, was successfully put down, though not 
before spreading throughout southern Portugal, and even beginning to extend north of the 
																																																								
10 Ibid., pp. 247-248. 
11 A. R. Disney, A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 216. 
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Tagus.12 The Portuguese nobility had shown noticeably little enthusiasm in suppressing 
the dissent, and several preachers were found to support the protests.  
These signs of dangerous levels of disaffection among the Portuguese were 
ominous, but they were not clearly seen by the Castilian government. The revolt in the 
Catalans erupted in February and March of 1640, when civilians became hostile to the 
continued presence of the royal army in their province, posted there in preparation for a 
fresh campaign against the French along the border as part of the Franco-Spanish War 
(1635-1659). Soon the Monarchy was facing open rebellion in that province, and 
although Olivares—after initially pursuing a reactionary policy—reversed course and 
took on board a more conciliatory approach, it was too late, as the rebellion now had 
acquired more momentum and was aiming its wrath at the rich and all those in 
authority.13  
It this moment of dire vulnerability for the Monarchy, a group of the Portuguese 
nobility had sensed an opportunity and began to discuss with the Duke of Braganza his 
attitude to a possible uprising. Although he at first took a cautious line, by the time that 
Olivares requested in November of 1640 that the Portuguese nobility accompany Philip 
IV to Aragon to convoke the Aragonese cortes and rally support against the Catalan 
rebels, the conspirators were ready and had the support of the duke. Soon they had 
infiltrated and then taken control of the viceroy’s palace in Lisbon, and the Duke of 
Portugal was formally proclaimed King John IV of an independent Portugal on the 6th of 
December, 1640.14 
																																																								
12 Ibid., p. 217. 
13 J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), p. 783-784. 




The Portuguese Restoration War 
The series of military confrontations between Portugal and the Monarchy that 
followed saw Castile tasked with not only returning Portugal to the Monarchy, but also 
fighting on two other fronts, against France in the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659) and 
parrying the Catalonians as they revolted in the Catalans. The War of Portuguese 
Restoration would last until 1668, when Spain formally agreed to recognize Portuguese 
independence with the Treaty of Lisbon. The phases of the war consisted of an early 
stage where some major engagements demonstrated the Portuguese could not be easily 
returned to submission; a second phase (1646-1660) of military standoffs interspersed by 
small-scale raiding as Spain concentrated on its military commitments elsewhere in 
Europe; and a final phase (1660-1669) during which the Spanish King Philip IV 
unsuccessfully sought a major engagement in order to bring an end to hostilities.15  
With the war having settled into a frontier confrontation and stalemate—though a 
bloody one with the use of foreign troops and mercenaries leading to acts of brutality on 
both sides—the war came to be shaped more by the limitations each side faced in 
conducting full-scale campaigns and assaults. As the Spanish Monarchy was in dire 
financial straits and often unable to pay its troops, this led to the soldiers preying on the 
population on the frontier, causing much misery. But relief was to come for Spain with 
the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), which concluded the Franco-Spanish War and allowed 
Philip IV to focus more directly on his Portuguese problem. 16 
																																																								
15 Stuart Schwartz, (2004), “Portuguese War of Restoration,” in Europe 1450-1789, Volume 5, ed. Jonathan 




This would be a moment of signal concern for the Portuguese, anticipating a 
renewed Castilian assault on their territory. The treaty between Spain and France was 
unsatisfactory to the Portuguese, as it strengthened the ties between these two powers and 
left the status of Portugal in abeyance—due largely to the advantage accruing to France 
of ongoing conflict between Spain and Portugal. The unwillingness of France to sign a 
formal alliance with Portugal forced the Portuguese leaders to rely more on its old 
allies—particularly the English. Though the alliance had lapsed for the duration of the 
Iberian Union, the Anglo-Portuguese treaty (which was restored during the Interregnum 
in 1654) was renewed in 1662 shortly after the restoration of Charles II in England, and 
was then sealed in the same year with the marriage of Charles II to the then King of 
Portugal, Afonso VI’s sister Catarina.  
The treaty with England has been called “a vital breakthrough, without which the 
Restoration could scarcely have been sustained.”17 Though the cost of the alliance and the 
marriage was high—the dowry for Catarina included Bombay, Tangier, and 2,000,000 
cruzados in cash—nonetheless the explicit assurance of English protection against Spain 
and Holland was instrumental in guaranteeing Portugal’s security, and the dynastic 
marriage also signaled acceptance of the Braganzas as a legitimate royal dynasty by one 
of the most powerful royal dynasties of Europe, the Stuarts. 
A series of important late battles, where the Spaniards embarked on a series of 
offensives, culminated in a Portuguese victory at Montes Claros on the 17th of June, 
1665. Soon thereafter, the Portuguese gained what they had long sought, the support of 
																																																								
17 Disney, A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire, Volume 1, p. 227. 
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France, sealed via a formal treaty signed in 1667.18 Though Philip IV had been reluctant 
to drop his Portuguese claims despite the urging of his ally King Charles II, his death in 
1665 removed an important obstacle to the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty. With 
the mediation of England and the support of France, the Treaty of Lisbon—which 
recognized the legitimacy of the Braganza dynasty’s rule over Portugal—was signed on 
the 13th of February, 1668.19 In such manner the Portuguese Restoration War, which had 
constituted in many ways no more than “a series of small- or medium-sized guerrilla wars 
strung together across time and space,”20 finally came to a close. 
 
The Comparison with Catalonia 
In contrast to the successful Portuguese restoration, the almost contemporaneous 
Catalonian revolt was unsuccessful in freeing part of the Crown of Aragon from the 
domination of the Spanish Monarchy. While the people of Catalonia held more severe 
grievances than the Portuguese, the nobility there held less legitimacy, and after Pau 
Claris, the leader of the movement for a Catalonian republic, died in 1641, no-one was 
left who held sufficient leadership abilities or prestige to prevent the revolt devolving into 
internecine feuds and social anarchy.  
The support of the French soon drifted into French domination, and it did not take 
long for the French-controlled government in Catalonia to arouse the antagonism of the 
local nobility. Many of them left Catalonia for the Kingdom of Aragon during the rule of 
																																																								
18 Ibid., p. 230. 
19 Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, Chapter 9. 
20 White also perceptively notes that one of the important reasons for the protracted nature of this, and other 
wars of the early to mid seventeenth century, was because European states did not possess adequate 
resources to conduct massive, lengthy wars. Lorraine White, “War and Government in a Castilian 
Province: Extremadura 1640-1668” (PhD diss., University of East Anglia, 1985).  
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the French, preferring the ‘inefficient tyranny’ of Philip IV to the far more authoritarian 
government of the French King.21 By 1651, the Catalonian revolt was flagging, and the 
French position was dire due to their being beset by their own severe internal rebellion, 
the Fronde. In the absence of adequate French military support for the Catalonians, the 
forces of Philip IV began to gain the upper hand. After a long siege, Barcelona 
surrendered in October of 1652, and after Philip promised some months later to respect 
the Principality’s rights and privileges as they had existed before the start of the rebellion, 
the revolt was effectively over.22 The Spanish Monarchy had managed to avert the 
complete decomposition of its composite domains into their constituent parts, as had been 
threatening during the 1640s.  
Why, then, despite gaining the support of France, were the Catalonians 
unsuccessful in their secessionist project whereas the Portuguese were successful? The 
historical debate surrounding the secession of Portugal has put forward a number of 
critical differences between the Portuguese restoration and the Catalonian revolt, which 
allowed the former to succeed but not the latter.  
Firstly, it has been noted that Portugal had in John the Duke of Braganza and his 
house a legitimate king-in-waiting, whereas the Catalan revolt did not, and moreover the 
republican assembly, the Diputació, had considerable difficulty in gaining widespread 
foreign support in an age when monarchical rule had more prestige than republican rule. 
Secondly, Portugal has been argued to have possessed geographical advantages that 
Catalonia lacked, for instance being relatively further from powerful external patrons, 
such as England and France, so as to avoid coming under their domination while still able 
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to receive their assistance. Portugal also had the remnants of an empire, and if territories 
such as Brazil could be recovered from the Dutch, this empire “held out the promise of a 
rich future, not only for Portugal itself, but also for its friends.”23  
Thirdly, the internal solidarity of Catalonia was not as strong as that of Portugal, 
and it fell prey to divided loyalties and internal conflict both within the nobility and 
between the nobility and the populace, whereas these internal frictions were less 
problematic in the Portuguese case. This may be a consequence of the comparative lack 
of focus of the Catalonian Revolt when compared to the Portuguese situation, the 
memory of Catalonia as an independent principality being more distant than the memory 
of independence for Portugal. These congenital weaknesses of the Catalonian Revolt 
have been described, by J.H. Elliott, as being due to “both an original uncertainty in their 
aims at the start of the revolution, and a continuing failure to create a sense of national 
unity and purpose that transcended traditional social divisions.”24 
The composite polity between Castile and Aragon was also ultimately destined to 
dissolve, though through amalgamation rather than secession. During the War of the 
Spanish Succession, which pitted supporters of Philiip, the Bourbon claimant to the 
Spanish throne, against the Austrian Habsburg claimant, Archduke Charles, the 
Catalonians—having been the victims of a harsh French-backed regime during the earlier 
revolt of the mid-seventeenth century—turned against the Bourbon claimant in favor of 
the Habsburgs. Aragon and Valencia were also supportive of the succession claim of 
Archduke Charles. This was, in its own way, an attempt at secession and a breaking free 
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of the association with Castile, although in this case it was channeled into the somewhat 
ironic support for Austrian rule.  
As Elliott notes of this development, “the allegiances…were at first sight 
paradoxical, for Castile, which had always hated the foreigner, was supporting the claims 
of a Frenchman, while the Crown of Aragon, which had always been so suspicious of 
Habsburg intentions, was championing the claims of a prince of the House of Austria.”25 
Paradoxical or no, this would turn out to be a costly miscalculation for the realms of the 
Crown of Aragon, for upon subduing Aragon and Valencia in 1707 during the war, Philip 
V proceeded to deprive Aragon and Valencia of their ancient liberties and rights as 
punishment for rising against him. He wrote to them in revoking their rights: 
Considering that the Realms of Aragon and Valencia and all those who dwell therein, by 
dint of the rebellion they did raise against Us…have voluntarily resigned all rights, 
privileges, exemptions and liberties which they did enjoy and which We, following in 
this the example set by Our magnanimous predecessors on this august Throne…and 
considering that to the rights which We do enjoy as lawful King of the said Realms of 
Aragon and Valencia are now added the rights of a conqueror…and considering also that 
one of the principal offices and rights that attach to Kingship is that of Law Giver, 
wherein are comprehended both the prerogative of creating new laws and that of 
rescinding old ones…We have deemed it opportune, both for the reasons set out above 
and because it is Our will that all the Realms of Spain shall obey the same laws and 
statutes, and observe the same customs and practices as one another, and that each shall 
be subject to the Laws of Castille…26 
 
Barcelona, after holding out until 1714, would also lose its ancient liberties and 
rights upon succumbing to the forces of Philip V, and the Nueva Planta decrees which 
were subsequently promulgated on the 16th of January, 1716, effectively marked the end 
of the Spanish Monarchy as a composite polity and its birth as a centralized state. 
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The Incorporating Union of England and Scotland 
 
When examining the dissolution of the personal union between England and 
Scotland in 1707 and the reasons it came about, we are faced with quite a contrast from 
that of the dissolution of the Iberian Union, as here we find a case of death by 
amalgamation rather than by secession. In a sense, the English monarchy and 
parliamentarians accomplished, with their moves to amalgamate England and Scotland 
into a single kingdom, the reforms attempted by the Count-Duke of Olivares to further 
integrate the domains of the Spanish Monarchy, but with a significantly greater degree of 
success. Moreover, incorporating union was brought about by the English Crown 
together with parliament while resorting to merely the threat of economic (and not 
military) sanctions against the Scots if overtures for negotiations were rejected.  
This was not an amalgamating, or in the terminology of the British discussion, 
‘incorporating union’ in the face of a full-blown secessionist movement, but rather a 
union intended to forestall the possibility of a full-blown secessionist movement. We 
shall first review important moments in the relation between England and Scotland 
between 1603 and 1707 relevant to understanding the origins of the incorporating union. 
Next, we ask what the proximate causes of the union were and ask how these events 
relate to the three sets of explanatory factors for composite state death we have put 
forward. 
 
Early Attempts at Union 
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During the seventeenth century, the history of the personal union—the Union of 
Crowns—as it existed between England and Scotland since 1603, had seen at least two 
serious attempts at amalgamation aiming for a merger not only on the level of foreign 
policy but also on the level of law and culture. These attempts had been made firstly by 
James I early in his reign, and secondly by Oliver Cromwell, the leader (or Lord 
Protector) of the Commonwealth of England, during the English Civil Wars. There had 
also been an attempt, by Charles I in 1637, to impose uniform beliefs and practices on 
Scotland in the form of a new prayer book.27 Though this was a move for amalgamation 
taken only in the religious domain, due to the fact that it set off a patriotic Scottish revolt 
which was more than a purely religious revolt, its cultural hegemonism can be seen to 
have had strong overtones of an amalgamative policy over all realms..28  
The first formal attempt at forming an incorporating union had been made by 
James I (VI in Scotland) soon after acceding to the English throne. He made a proposal, 
soon after the installment of his Court in London, to enact a ‘threefold marriage’ whereby 
the Scottish legal system would be assimilated to that of the English, and the two 
Churches and economies would also be joined in a system of common hierarchies, 
customs unions, and commercial regulations. These plans of James I were discussed 
between 1604-1607, but the parliaments of these two kingdoms were hostile, and the 
plans went no further.29 Debates in parliament revealed intense levels of prejudice against 
the Scots, and the Scots also were strongly antagonistic to the idea of an incorporating 
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union, to the extent that the Crown proposals prompted the Scottish Privy Council to roll 
back existing efforts to establish a customs union between the two kingdoms.30  
Smout views this as the moment when the Crown realized an incorporating union 
would be necessary to solve the problems of the executive, but also realized the two other 
parties essential for such a union to come about—the English and Scottish Parliaments—
would need much stronger incentives to be convinced of the wisdom of such a union.31 
The eventual Union of 1707 was, however, strongly affected by the failure of these early 
proposals. A union of Church and legal systems would not again be attempted, with the 
ultimately successful union being one solely between parliaments. 
 
The Interregnum 
During the English Civil Wars, the Commonwealth faced threats to its existence 
from Ireland and Scotland, and would go on to conquer both of these realms and impose 
incorporating union coercively for the duration of its existence until 1659. In Ireland, 
Catholic secessionists and Protestant royalists co-existed, whereas in Scotland, (though 
Charles I had been deeply unpopular), the regicide was rejected as illegitimate, and on the 
5th of February, 1649, a few days after the execution of Charles I, the Scottish 
Covenanters—who had constituted the de facto government of Scotland since the onset 
of the civil wars, proclaimed the executed king’s son Charles II as King of Great Britain, 
a move intended to reassert the identity of the house of Stuart in the union.32 This move 
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would provoke indignation in England, where Charles II was only taken to be King of 
Scots, not of Great Britain.  
Cromwell, viewing the threat to the Commonwealth posed by Scotland to be 
serious, assembled an expeditionary force, and—due in part to internal dissention and the 
lack of cohesion on the part of the Scottish forces—occupied southern Scotland after the 
Battle of Dunbar, on the 3rd of September 1650.33 After 1654, Cromwell would formally 
impose an incorporating union over the Scots, which was ultimately based on the 
coercive force of the English army and differed radically from the union desired by the 
Covenanters in their initial revolt against Charles I in 1638. Though it had an element of 
indigenous support and a degree of consent was sought in the terms according to which 
Scotland was to be incorporated into the Commonwealth, it was fundamentally coercive 
and not consensual in nature.34 With the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Scotland 
also regained its status as an independent kingdom, and this was greeted by a majority of 
the Scottish people with considerable enthusiasm.35 
The restoration reinstated the constitutional position that had existed in Scotland 
during the reign of Charles I—namely the personal union—and Charles II did not attempt 
any serious plans for a closer union between Scotland and England.36 The period of 
forced amalgamation—with the large numbers of English soldiers garrisoned in 
Scotland—had proven deeply unsatisfactory for the Scots, and thus Charles II deemed it 
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wise that Scotland be governed and administered largely from Edinburgh.37 The memory 
of these years of the Cromwellian union left deep scars. As Goldie notes, “it led to a fear 
of being forcibly absorbed by English institutions, but also to a fear that English 
aggression was the price to pay if Scotland chose to go its own way.”38  
By reinforcing a strong sense of separate Scottish identity, the legacy of the 
Interregnum was to destroy the possibility for a future comprehensive union on the legal 
and cultural planes. Nonetheless, however problematically, it had also set a precedent for 
incorporating union merely by demonstrating its possibility, and the Crown had not been 
dissuaded of the ultimate desirability of incorporative union—only warned of the dangers 
of bringing it about through forcible means. As some scholars have noted, “the 
Cromwellian ‘conquest’ in some respects facilitated the later union of the Crowns…by 
sweeping away the independent hereditary jurisdictions of the great nobility, and 
encouraging a climate in which the Scots would be able to reassess the case for union.”39 
The period of the interregnum would be the gravest threat that the England-Scotland 
composite state would face, and the composite aspect of the polity was only restored by 
the defeat of the Commonwealth with the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660.  
 
The Economic Situation in Scotland Preceding Union 
The incorporating union of 1707 was preceded by a number of important 
developments in the relationship between Crown and the English and Scottish 
parliaments, and indeed in Scottish society itself. One of the most consequential was the 
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abolition of the Lords of the Articles with reforms made in 1689-90 after the Glorious 
Revolution. These reforms considerably lessened the power the monarchy had to control 
the Scottish Parliament, and made Scotland very difficult for London to govern.40  
And preceding the succession crisis during the reign of Queen Anne, there had 
been years of economic difficulties in Scotland, which had been exacerbated by the tragic 
disaster of the attempt of the Company of Scotland to found a colony in Darien. Located 
in present day Panama, Darien was then the property of the King of Spain, and the affair 
was a fiasco that contradicted Crown policy of the time as William III had built his 
foreign policy around combating the influence of France, which necessitated an alliance 
with Spain.41 On top of being a fiasco, Darien was a tragedy generating significant anger 
against local politicians in Scotland as well as resentment against the English 
government, due to the significant loss of life and private savings that ensued. The 
undercapitalized and badly managed colony soon collapsed due to its own weaknesses 
and Spanish military efforts, with no assistance being rendered by the government of 
William III to the stricken settlement.42  
It would be a mistake to conclude that almost a century of political association 
was moving the two kingdoms inexorably closer to an incorporating union. In fact, in the 
face of such economic and political developments, the existing personal union was 
coming under severe strain. As Ferguson has noted, “[a]ll thinking Scots…had by the end 
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of William’s troubled reign agreed that the existing bond between the two kingdoms was 
unsatisfactory and that it was slowly strangling the weaker nation.”43 From the 
perspective of the English, the Scots were becoming increasingly unruly and 
ungovernable, and the opinion of William was that these problems of governing Scotland 
could only be solved by closer union and not disengagement, and he urged the 
importance of an incorporating union to his successor in one of his last political acts.44 
 
The Role of the Augustan Succession Crisis 
Such circumstances as existed in the late seventeenth century would not have 
struck many contemporary observers as propitious conditions for an incorporating union. 
Indeed when the Crown under Queen Anne initiated discussions for a renegotiated union 
in 1702, these preliminary talks were scuppered by the English Parliament, who viewed 
the Scots as ‘fools and rogues.’ These talks had been undertaken in the anticipation that 
the Scottish Parliament would attempt to extract further concessions to accept the English 
Parliament’s decision to confirm the Protestant succession and fix the succession on the 
Electress Sophia of Hanover and her issue.45 Ironically, it would take a further 
deterioration of relations between the two kingdoms in the context of the succession 
crisis to convince the English Parliament of the urgent necessity for an incorporating 
union. 
In the lead up to the conversion of the English Parliament to the cause of a union, 
there had been further moves by the Scottish government to change the terms of the 
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personal union established upon the accession of King James VI to the English throne. A 
succession crisis was anticipated in England due to the death in 1700 of William—the 
only child of Queen Anne to survive infancy—leaving only the Catholic issue of the 
exiled James II by his second wife, the Catholic Mary of Modena, to inherit the English 
Crown. This was an abhorrent prospect to the Protestant country, and the Act of 
Settlement passed in 1701 by Parliament stipulated that, in addition to disqualifying 
anyone Catholic or married to one from inheriting the throne,46 the royal succession 
would pass to the Hanoverian candidates. Moreover there was an international dimension 
to the Augustan succession crisis, as Louis XIV had, in response to the Act of Settlement 
(and following the death of James II in 1701), recognized the Jacobite candidate—James 
the Catholic son of James II—as ‘James III’ and rightful heir to the English throne. There 
were thus fears, rightfully, that the War of the Spanish Succession might morph into a 
war over the British succession.47  
The new Scottish Parliament that assembled in 1703 and 1704 was predictably 
keen to assert its independence of England, especially in the wake of the Darien disaster 
and economic distress. Its remit was more or less to define the constitutional position of 
Scotland on the royal succession after the death of Queen Anne.48 Under the leadership of 
its most famous member, Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, this parliament passed two Acts: 
“the Act of Security and Succession, which in effect debarred a Hanoverian from the 
throne unless the Scottish government was severed from ‘English or any foreign 
influence’, and the Act anent Peace and War, which demanded the consent of the Scottish 
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Parliament in waging war and drawing up peace treaties.”49 Coming soon in the wake of 
the Act of Settlement, the Acts of Scottish parliament—though they did not reach a 
decisive conclusion on the succession question—in effect opened the possibility of 
dissolving the personal union of England and Scotland as they expressed a refusal on the 
part of the Scots to be bound to the succession provisions of the English Parliament.50 
The Augustan succession crisis and Scottish moves threatening a de-alignment of 
the line of succession of the King of Scots from that of the King of England, were to 
prove the decisive catalyst prompting the English parliament to hasten to bring about an 
incorporating union. The main fears of the English were at this time to do with the 
possibility of the re-emergence of an independent Scottish foreign policy, and its 
damaging implications. The alliance between Scotland and France had been a cornerstone 
of Scottish foreign policy since 1295 until the beginning of the Jacobean era in Scotland 
in 1567, and there were fears that this ‘Auld Alliance’ could be revived if Scottish foreign 
policy were to take an independent course, thereby rendering them friendly to French 
interests and hostile to those of England.51  
 
The English and Scottish Parliaments Approve Union  
The specter of hostile relations emerging between the two kingdoms, a possibility 
deeply inimical to English security, was unacceptable to the English Parliament, and after 
the rebellious sessions of the Scottish Parliament in 1703-1704, some among the English 
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were interpreting these moves as a threat of war.52 This was the moment when the 
English became convinced that, with the stark choice suggesting itself of war or union, 
union was the more desirable course. The response to the Scots by the English Parliament 
was the Alien Act of 1705, which imposed a series of punitive economic measures on the 
Scots unless they agreed to an incorporative union. The Act deemed that:  
[A]ll Scotsmen, except such as were settled in England, Ireland, or the Plantations, or 
were employed in the army and navy, should be declared aliens, until the establishment 
of a perfect and entire union, or the settlement of the succession to the Scottish crown, in 
the same manner as decreed by English statute. They resolved…to prohibit the 
importation of Scottish cattle and sheep, and the export of English and Irish wool to 
Scotland. They accepted that the early of Torrington, to empower the Commissioners of 
the Admiralty to fit out cruisers to seize all Scottish ships trading with her majesty’s 
enemies.53 
 
Despite the Alien Act arousing intense distaste amongst the Scots, a key vote in 
favor of Union with England was passed by the Scottish Parliament in September of 
1705. This was despite a decidedly uncooperative mood among Scottish parliamentarians 
in the parliaments of 1703-1704. The reasons for this volte-face have been the subject of 
significant historical speculation.54  
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As we have already seen, the general sense in Scotland was that the Scots were 
being slowly strangled economically by the English through laws enacted after the 
Restoration, such as the Navigation Acts, which prevented Scotland from trading directly 
with English colonies and placed it in the same disadvantaged position as England’s 
enemies. If it would be necessary for the personal union to be dangled as a bargaining 
chip in order for the Scots’ displeasure vis-à-vis the status quo to be registered, then so be 
it. Nonetheless, these resentments did not quite equate to a strong will to independence 
from England, as the Scots were aware of the weakness of their circumstances.  
The Act of Security passed by the Scottish Parliament in 1703 has been called a 
‘calculated bluff’ as the possibility of separation from England it opened up was 
problematic for the Scots were it actually to be gained. As Robertson has written, for the 
non-Jacobite Scotsman, “the bluff was two-fold: first, that a Protestant succession other 
than the Hanoverian could be found, and second, that after having had the Scottish king 
in London for 100 years the English would be prepared to accept a restored and separate 
Scottish monarchy.”55  
However, the deliberate vagueness built into the Acts of Scottish Parliament was 
enough to set the English thinking of worst-case scenarios. On the English side, the fears 
were not completely unfounded. The French king Louis XIV had made serious efforts, 
through his emissary Hooke, to revive the Auld Alliance with Scotland, and even beyond 
France it is not impossible that “Scotland might have found some powerful princes 
willing to have accepted her crown, and encouraged her to stand upon her own feet.”56 
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For his part, Louis XIV, who had treated the exiled Stuart court of James II with the 
utmost courtesy since their arrival in France in 1689, was wanting for allies in Europe 
after the Glorious Revolution, and was hoping that installing the Stuart contender to the 
throne in Scotland would destabilize politics in the British Isles. As Corp notes, “Louis’s 
best hope was that civil war in the British Isles not only would weaken William there, but 
might also ultimately undermine his position in the Dutch Republic.”57  
Though the Williamite War in Ireland (1688-1691) was a defeat for Jacobitism, as 
the Irish under James II (with French support) had been defeated by William’s forces, the 
danger of separatism still remained. The Jacobite cause was not unpopular, even after the 
inconsistencies of James II’s reign and the humiliating events of the Glorious Revolution. 
As one author has written of the appeal of Jacobitism, “[a] truculent Dutchman and the 
prospect that he would be succeeded by a boorish German—these were the chief assets of 
the Stuart cause in England.”58 Already having seen the destabilizing influence that 
Scotland alone could wield, the English—already at war on the continent in the War of 
the Spanish Succession—felt themselves to be strategically vulnerable and were 
disinclined to wage a war with Scotland that could create a French ally right at the 
northern border.59 A war of secession between Scotland and England as envisaged by the 
English, with the French supporting the Jacobite contender as ruler of Scotland, would 
not only have threatened England’s security but would also have opened the fissures of 
political cohesion once again at a time when England’s resources were already spread 
thin. 
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The Pivotal Role of the English Parliament 
By the early years of Anne’s reign the attitude of English leaders—both the crown 
and the parliament—had become convinced of the need for amalgamative union and 
dissolution of the composite state that had been in existence (with interruptions) since 
1603. In some other country, the crown might have been able to accomplish 
incorporating union through its own force of will, but in Augustan England where 
parliament had recently prevailed twice in fierce struggles against the monarchy (during 
the English Civil Wars and the Glorious Revolution), the support of parliament was a 
sine qua non of such moves. Moreover, the failed experience of coercive union during the 
Interregnum and the continued independent-mindedness of the Scots, had alerted the 
crown and parliament to the difficulties of attempting amalgamation by force. This 
understanding of the inherent difficulties of forcible amalgamation was something the 
English would likely only have learned through arduous experience, just as the 
realization of the futility of forced amalgamation was grasped collectively by early 
modern European leaders only over the course of the seventeenth century, as attempts to 
crush the wave of revolts and rebellions of the mid-century by coercive centralization 
measures largely failed.  
The monarchs of the Stuart dynasty, though they began to consider themselves 
English soon after taking the English throne, nonetheless retained a link with Scotland 
that took them back to their ancestral kingdom during times of difficulty. Examples of 
this include the Scots remaining loyal to Charles II (rather than to Oliver Cromwell) after 
the execution of Charles I—an important factor behind Charles II fleeing to Scotland to 
	
	 133	
continue his fight against the leaders of the Commonwealth. As a consequence of 
Scottish support for absolute monarchy and his own residual connection with Scotland, 
Charles II would give considerable autonomy to Scottish Parliament during his reign.60 
James II and the cause of the Stuarts would also continue to find substantial support 
amongst the Scots well after the Glorious Revolution.  
It was no doubt this longstanding connection with the crown that aided the Scots 
in gaining concessions from William after the Glorious Revolution, and also when 
negotiating the arrangements for Union.61 The guaranteed independence of the Scottish 
Presbyterian Church and maintenance of Scots law after Union, as well as the 
preservation of the trading rights of the Royal Burghs were significant concessions made 
to Scottish interests, which were undoubtedly vital in convincing the Scottish Parliament 
to accept incorporating Union.62 The corrupt payments made to Scottish parliamentarians 
also undoubtedly played a part.63 
Thus, when asking what undercurrents were at play in the early 1700s, we can see 
that Scotland was perceived as a source of great danger for England due to the manner in 
which deteriorating relations between the two kingdoms would exacerbate the already 
somewhat weak legitimacy of the protestant succession and potentially open the door to a 
full-blown succession crisis or ignite the spark of regional war. The heightened threat 
perception on the English side, fearful of a restive Scotland, and the compromises its 
negotiators made to placate Scottish interests, implicitly show the determination lying 
behind the English resolve to drive forward an amalgamation between the two kingdoms. 
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Without the catalyst of the already troubled succession questions faced by the English 
monarchy, the threat posed by the historical ties between Scotland and the Jacobite Stuart 
pretenders to the English throne, and the ties between Scotland and France predating the 
‘Union of Crowns,’ it is doubtful that great urgency would have been felt by the English 
to push strongly towards amalgamation. However, even without an English-led push for 
amalgamation, it is doubtful the English would long have acquiesced if the Scots had 
rejected the Hanoverian succession. Indeed Smout believes that amalgamative union 
would have taken place sooner or later, even if the negotiations leading up to the 
successful Union of 1707 had failed. As he notes: 
It is…rather difficult to imagine that it [amalgamative union] would not have come about 
at all…the international position of Scotland in the early eighteenth century was too 
isolated, her internal weaknesses and divisions were too acute and wide-ranging, and the 
determination of England to protect herself from these weaknesses by absorbing her 
neighbor was too strong, to offer much rational hope north of the Border that Scotland’s 
cherished independence could be long preserved.64 
 
This seems a considered view in light of the evidence we have examined. The role 
of the Scottish Parliament in initiating the events leading up to Union, while 
considerable, are secondary to the transformative impact played by the English 
Parliament deciding to pursue amalgamative union. Though some attempts had been 
made by the Scots to initiate amalgamative union during the reign of William, these 
never got off the ground due to the unwillingness of English Parliament to countenance 
such moves until after the provocation of the Scottish Parliament. Once the English 
Parliament had been convinced of its necessity, incorporating union was accomplished 
soon thereafter. We proceed now to analyze the causes of composite state dissolution in 
more analytic depth, through a comparative examination of the dissolution of the Iberian 
																																																								
64 Smout, “The Road to Union,” p. 193. 
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Union and the Union of the Crowns against the backdrop of developments in their 
respective regions. 
 
Composite States on the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles, Compared 
 
We now compare the dissolution of the Iberian Union and the Union of the 
Crowns in the context of the political dynamics of stasis and change affecting composite 
states on the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. This broader comparative perspective 
is necessary to determine whether common factors underpin the dissolution of both these 
composite states. Composite state death is best understood when contrasted with 
composite state survival, especially where each of these processes co-exist 
simultaneously in the same political region. 
 
The Meaning of Amalgamation, Compositeness, and Secession 
Before moving on to identify the most important variables for understanding the 
early death of composite states, we must point to the importance of grasping the meaning 
of amalgamation, compositeness, and secession more substantively. Amalgamation 
means death of a composite state through integration, compositeness means continuation 
of the status quo of a composite state, and secession means death of a composite state 
through disintegration. However, the seeming simplicity of these terms in fact masks 
significant historical and contextual variation. To grasp these nuances, we examine the 
contextual meaning of these concepts in two historical contexts; in the British Isles by 
contrasting amalgamation (the Acts of Union) and maintained compositeness (England-
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Ireland); and on the Iberian Peninsula by contrasting secession (Portugal from the Iberian 
Union) and maintained compositeness (Spain-Aragon).  
In these two historical contexts, amalgamation, compositeness, and secession 
meant something distinct. Here we note three variables especially useful for untangling 
the complexities of these two sets of cases: birth conditions and length of historical 
acquaintance of a composite union; degree of equality between composite entities 
(measured by the extent of autonomy given to the regional assembly); and the strength of 
the alliances of a candidate for incorporation and/or secession. 
Birth Conditions and Historical Acquaintance 
The historical age of a composite association is important because it shows the 
degree to which two independent political entities have become accustomed to co-
existing with each other in a composite union. At the time of Portuguese moves toward 
independence in 1640, the union between Catalonia (as part of the Kingdom of Aragon) 
and the Spanish Monarchy had already endured for over one hundred years from the 
accession of Ferdinand II to the throne of Aragon in 1479. The Kingdom of Ireland had 
come into existence in 1541 with an Act of Irish Parliament (the Crown of Ireland Act) 
that declared Henry VIII as King of Ireland. Thus England-Ireland had already been in 
existence for over half a century when England and Scotland were united under James I 
in 1603.  
Castile-Aragon and England-Ireland preexisted the Iberian Union and the Union 
of the Crowns by significant lengths of time, and in Castile-Aragon the passage of time 
and mutual acquaintance had lessened restive tendencies, partly due to the magnanimous 
response by the Spanish Monarchy to an unsuccessful revolt by the Aragonese in 1591-
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2.65 This reduced tension is epitomized by the fact that the Catalonian revolt did not spill 
over into other parts of the Kingdom of Aragon—Aragon and Valencia were reluctant to 
throw their strength behind the Catalonians—and the historical relationship between 
Castile and Aragon undoubtedly played a part. A long-shared history can lessen restive 
tendencies not only through greater acquaintance, but sometimes also through the 
historical memory of past mercies granted.  
The birth conditions of a composite state also played an important, and perhaps 
even decisive role in shaping the later fortunes of a composite state. The only composite 
state formed essentially through a quasi-colonial process, England-Ireland, would not be 
amalgamated with the monarchical center except under the most threatening of 
circumstances as existed during the turbulent years of the French Revolutionary Wars. 
The role of coercion involved in the formation of the Iberian Union perhaps left it 
particularly vulnerable to separatist sentiments, though separatist sentiments were not 
entirely absent even in cases of a more consent based union. Similarly, for England-
Ireland, time and the ameliorating force of historical acquaintance did not lessen restive 
tendencies unlike with Castile-Aragon, as the latter had been formed through a more 
consensual process, namely the dynastic marriage. In Castile-Aragon, a personal union 
had come into existence from a dynastic marriage between the King of Aragon and the 
Queen of Castile, and the England-Scotland composite state came into existence when 
the Scottish king was essentially borrowed by England to be her king during a succession 
crisis. In each of these cases, a degree of reciprocity and/or consensus (even if only on the 
symbolic domain) was involved in the creation of the composite state, whereas in 
																																																								
65 After the revolt ended unsuccessfully, Aragonese liberties were largely allowed to continue un-changed. 
Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, pp. 628-643. 
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England-Ireland a kingdom was created coercively and de novo as a means of deepening 
the authority of the King of England in Ireland, with no dynastic ties whatsoever 
connecting these two polities.  
Inequality within the Composite State and its Consequences 
In addition to the absence of dynastic ties, a high level of inequality between the 
components of a composite polity can work against the moderating influence of historical 
acquaintance. The Crown of Aragon was an independent kingdom before the personal 
union with Castile, whereas Ireland was already nominally subject to the feudal authority 
of the English king at the time of union in 1541. In becoming a nominal kingdom, Ireland 
had been transformed from a feudal lordship under the overlordship of the King of 
England (who was styled as the Lord of Ireland).66 Under the terms governing the union 
between Ireland and England—the Crown of Ireland Act and the Poynings’ Act—the 
Kingdom of Ireland was nominally equal in status to England, but in reality its status was 
that of a subordinate province.67 The Irish Parliament was clearly limited in the extent to 
which it could autonomously generate legislation, and was vulnerable to ongoing 
intervention from the English crown and parliament, leaving the Kingdom of Ireland 
substantively less than a fully independent polity.  
																																																								
66 This was done for three overlapping sets of reasons: the desire to strengthen the obedience of the Irish; 
the imperative to consolidate the king of England as the only legitimate king of Ireland; and as a step to 
delegitimize the claims of the papacy to supremacy in terms of feudal authority in the wake of the 
reformation in Tudor England. For more on this point, see Toby Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641-
1760 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), Chapter 1; T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin, and F. J Byrne, eds., A New 
History of Ireland, Volume III: Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
pp. 47-48. 
67 This subordinate status is exemplified by the fact that nobody but the king of England could be king of 
Ireland, the Irish executive could only call a parliament after obtaining license from the king, and all 
proposed legislation was required to be approved by the king of England and his English council, certified 
under the great seal of England. M. Perceval-Maxwell, “Ireland and the Monarchy in the Early Stuart 
Multiple Kingdom,” The Historical Journal 34, no. 2 (1991): pp. 280-281. 
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In other words, the union of Aragon-Castile came about more or less as the 
coming together of equal entities, whereas the England-Ireland union was the 
transformation of an already unequal feudal relationship into a nominally equal but 
substantively unequal relationship characterized by military reconquest of the Irish.68 
Here, confessional division between Catholics and Protestants was a complicating factor 
in the case of Ireland not present in Aragon.  
Ongoing resistance by the Irish to these English policies of discrimination 
resulted in two failed uprisings—the Irish Rebellion of 1641 and the Williamite War in 
Ireland of 1689-1691—which in turn led to further punitive policies by London, 
dispossessing greater numbers of Catholic landowners, such that by the end of the 
Williamite Wars the Catholics’ share of land had plunged to 14 per cent of profitable 
acreage.69 The latter abortive Williamite War was, in many ways, a de facto struggle for 
independence, as the dispossessed Irish felt that their interests would be better 
safeguarded by the Catholic James II, though his premature flight before seeing through 
the struggle ensured that his betrayal would long be remembered by the Irish.70  
Under such circumstances, if one asks why there were not, alongside the 
assimilation of Scotland into a unified polity in 1707, concurrent moves to amalgamate 
the Kingdom of Ireland, the answer must be that as a semi-colonial and semi-dependent 
territory of England, Ireland did not yet have a sufficient level of equality and respect to 
be considered a candidate for amalgamation. Moreover, support in Ireland for the 
																																																								
68 This reconquest of Ireland entailed economic and cultural subjugation under a policy of Anglicization 
and inflows of Protestant settlers from England and Scotland. 
69 Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, p. 4. 
70 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
	
	 140	
Jacobite succession, given the prevalence of Catholicism there, meant that upgrading the 
autonomy of the Irish Parliament was not an acceptable option.71  
In contrast to the Irish situation, the cultural affinity between England and 
Scotland, as measured by their joint rule by a Scottish dynasty, and the relative absence 
of harsh colonial policies as had been inflicted on the Irish,72 meant that there were few 
insurmountable impediments to amalgamation being chosen as the solution to Scottish 
moves to secede. Scotland also lacked an extraterritorial focus of authority in competition 
with the King, unlike the Pope who claimed spiritual authority over the Irish, a fact that 
promised to complicate any proposed amalgamation.73 
The England-Ireland composite state was not yet a true composite polity 
connecting two independent kingdoms or principalities under a common ruler, and thus 
amalgamation—where differences in status between the inhabitants of the various realms 
would be erased—was inconceivable for either of the parties involved. Amalgamation 
was the favored means to deal with equal and not dependent territories, as the latter were 
to be kept at a distance where they could be denied enjoyment of the advantages and 
privileges of the dominant polity. In contrast to England-Ireland, the Aragonese Cortes 
was a wholly equal partner to its Castilian counterpart from the perspective of law and 
thus the continuation of the composite polity meant the preservation of its ancient rights 
and privileges, whereas the continuation of the composite polity between England and 
																																																								
71 Rather, the governance of Ireland was managed such that the Irish Parliament was either held in 
abeyance—being convened just five times during the seventeenth century before 1692—or its membership 
was manipulated such that Catholics were excluded. Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, Chapter 4. 
72 As Perceval-Maxwell notes, “Ireland acquired a most unusual characteristic in western Europe of being 
both an imperial monarchy and a colony at the same time.” Perceval-Maxwell, “Ireland and the Monarchy 
in the Early Stuart Multiple Kingdom,” p. 283. 
73 Jim Smyth, “The Communities of Ireland and the British State, 1660-1707,” in The British Problem, c. 
1534-1707, ed. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 256. 
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Ireland meant the continued dispossession of the Irish Parliament to legislate for itself, 
and for Ireland as a whole dispossession of its rights. 
In contrast to the Portuguese and Scottish Parliaments, the Irish Parliament was 
not a threat to the political center, as it was controlled by Protestants sympathetic to the 
English Crown. Coercive union during the Interregnum was also recognized to have had 
negative repercussions. In sum, Ireland in the latter half of the seventeenth century did 
not pose a sufficient political threat to England for the English monarch to be pressured 
into developing a radical political response, nor was amalgamative union a strategy that 
was considered given the severely unequal rights possessed by Protestants and Catholics 
in Ireland, which would have rendered union problematic. 
By comparing the survival of the Castile-Aragon composite state to that of 
England-Ireland, we have seen that the meaning of compositeness was different in the 
two cases. Castile-Aragon was an egalitarian composite state in the sense of a personal 
monarchic union between two independent kingdoms joined via a royal marriage, where 
the laws and liberties of each were protected. Ireland, having been a dependent yet 
separate polity since the Norman invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century, was 
redesignated from a lordship to a kingdom by a bill in Irish Parliament in 1541. Though 
the redesignation of Ireland as a kingdom legally created a composite state between it and 
England, the shift renewed and consolidated a state of dependence on the part of the Irish, 
and thus here ongoing compositeness meant the continuation of a state of quasi-colonial 
subjugation. Though a perceived external threat was the strongest driver of amalgamation 
overriding other factors, when the threat was not exigent, the degree of political equality 
between composite units played an important role in whether or not amalgamation was 
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pursued. When the disparity in political status between composite entities was too great, 
such as was the case in England-Ireland, monarchs generally demurred from pursuing 
amalgamation and preferred maintaining composite ties. 
The Role of External Threats and Alliances in Effectuating Change 
The survival of England-Ireland until 1800, when Ireland as an independent 
kingdom was abolished in the wake of the Irish Rebellion of 1798, mirrored the events 
surrounding the union between Scotland and England in 1707. Both ‘deaths’ of these 
composite states occurred in the face of a movement to loosen the weaker state from the 
bonds of a dynastic and/or political union with a stronger political entity. As seen earlier, 
the Acts of Union were framed in the context of Scottish moves to uncouple their Crown 
from the English Crown during the Scottish Parliament of 1703. The threat of Scotland 
reviving a separate monarchy, pursuing an independent foreign policy, and perhaps even 
reviving the Auld Alliance with France (Ludovician France had been discreetly lobbying 
the Scots in support of the Jacobite cause), was the critical circumstance that called for 
urgent changes to the structure of the composite state. The fact that composite states are 
generally composed of contiguous domains exacerbates the threat posed by the secession 
of a restive territory, as the secessionist state would pose a particularly dangerous threat 
to the remaining entity due to its close geographical proximity. 
Ireland, in contrast with Scotland, could not count on the support of an 
extraterritorial power. Ireland’s old ally Spain had rolled back its ambitions in Ireland 
following the end of the Anglo-Spanish War and the 1604 Treaty of London. Moreover, 
by the late sixteenth century, the inexorable decline of Spain’s global military empire had 
begun, and Spain thus posed little military threat to England. The absence of a credible 
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external ally rendered a union between these two kingdoms less urgent.74 Besides Spain, 
the other continental power with a strong interest in destabilizing the political situation in 
Ireland was Bourbon France. However, the specter of Bourbon France meddling in the 
affairs of Ireland was significantly diminished after the sound defeat of the Jacobite 
forces (which included a contingent sent by France in support of the deposed James II) at 
the Battle of Aughrim in July of 1691, and the voluntary exile of a large number of Irish 
Jacobite forces to the Continent after the war.75  
The eventual incorporation of the Kingdom of Ireland into the United Kingdom in 
1800, while puzzling if only because the sociological differences between these two 
kingdoms remained unchanged, can be explained by significant regional changes that 
took place in the intervening period. The French Revolution and the transformation of 
France from a monarchy to an expansionary republic keen to render aid to republican 
forces in adjacent countries led it to see its interests align with a separatist group, the 
Society of United Irishmen.76 French support for such republican forces in Ireland 
culminated in an attempted invasion of Ireland in December of 1796, which failed due to 
coordination difficulties and deleterious weather conditions separating the French 
expeditionary fleet.  
The central role of the international situation in driving the necessity of 
amalgamative union as a response to the separatist Irish Rebellion 1798 is well 
demonstrated by the writings of notable pamphleteers favoring of the path of union. 
																																																								
74 It should be remembered that England was allied with France for some years.  
75 Sean Connolly, Divided Kingdom, Ireland 1630-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 182-
191. 
76 This group was initially founded with liberal aims of parliamentary reform, but it soon evolved—in the 
wake of the American and French revolutions—to aiming for the goal of ending English monarchical rule 
over Ireland and replacing it with an Irish Republic. 
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Edward Cooke, who wrote one of the first of these and a major statement of the pro-
union case, noted that: 
[I]n her affected plans of policy for the liberties of the British Empire, she [France] 
maintains the principle of separation, as essential to freedom, she considers the Union of 
England and Scotland as an usurpation of the former; and leaving England to her fate, 
would make Scotland and Ireland separate Republics…but as we wish to check the 
ambition of that desperate, and unprincipled power, and if that end can only be effected 
by maintaining and augmenting the power of the British Empire, we should be favorable 
to the principle of Union...77 
 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister of England at the time of the amalgamative 
union, William Pitt, when arguing in favor of union, pointed to the strategic imperative of 
union as the first and foremost consideration before any economic advantages that might 
accrue.78 Thus, as the historian Sean Connolly notes of the overall contours of the debate 
for and against amalgamative union, “supporters emphasized the mortal threat posed by 
revolutionary France, and the consequent need for the closest possible coordination of 
defense and security.”79 
The approach of early modern realism, cannot be decisively tested by application 
to cases of early death composite states, as the key expectations of the approach pertain to 
composite state longevity. Nonetheless, insofar as the approach is relevant to these cases 
of early death, we would expect that simple states should not to attempt to secede from a 
composite entity (due to the security advantage that would be sacrificed). This 
expectation is prima facie contradicted in the case of the Iberian Union, as Portugal here 
																																																								
77 Edward Cooke, Arguments for and Against An Union, Between Great Britain and Ireland, Considered 
(London: J. Wright, 1798), pp.9-10. 
78 In the House of Commons in April of 1800, he stated that “we must consider it [amalgamative union] as 
a measure of great national policy, the object of which is effectually to counteract the restless machinations 
of an inveterate enemy, who has uniformly and anxiously endeavored to effect a separation between two 
countries, whose connexion is as necessary for the safety of the one, as it is for the prosperity of the other.” 
Speech in the House of Commons on April 21, 1800, in William Pitt, The Speeches of the Right 
Honourable William Pitt, in the House of Commons, Volume IV (Paternoster-Row: Longman, 1806), p. 70. 
79 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, p. 486.	
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is seen to choose a state of heightened vulnerability (as an independent entity) in place of 
greater security as part of the Union. The realist perspective finds it difficult to square 
that the greater threat felt by Portugal would be from Castile (its composite partner) than 
from potential hegemonic external states such as Bourbon France, which possessed 
greater war-making capabilities than the Spanish Monarchy. However, from another 
perspective, the centralizing moves of Olivares could have been felt as a core threat to 
state survival, as amalgamation can be seen as a form of peacetime conquest refracted 
within the boundaries of the composite state. Though early modern realism does not 
adjudicate between which of these threats (those from the composite core versus those 
from the outside) will be perceived by the early modern state to be more dangerous, it is 
puzzling that Scotland did not militarily resist English moves which actually led to 
incorporating union while Portugal responded with full-blown rebellion to the proposed 
Union of Arms reforms. 
The military engagements that characterized the Portuguese Restoration War were 
desultory. However, the fact that a composite entity (Castile and its remaining composite 
domains) could not prevent the secession of Portugal with its inferior capabilities, does 
not strongly buttress early modern realism, though the alliance resources provided to 
Portugal by England and (at times) France makes a final determination difficult. 
Furthermore realism expects composite states to die through warfare, especially between 
independent states. The manner in which these composite states met their end—one of 
them through incorporating union and another through what essentially amounted to a 
civil war—does not fully conform to realist expectations of state death.  
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Nonetheless, the key role in reform and amalgamation efforts played by the 
perceived threat of a breakaway entity allying with an external enemy does provide 
general support to the realist emphasis on military interactions. Moreover, it tells us that 
the threats the monarchical center of a composite state took most seriously, were military 
in nature, and external in origin. The fact that composite state death in all the cases 
examined on the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula were precipitated by a credible 
fear of external intervention, leads to the tentative conclusion that the most serious 
existential crises a composite state will face in its lifespan, is military invasion and/or 
intervention of an external power. A more concrete evaluation of the adequacy of early 
modern realism to explain composite state longevity must wait until Chapter Four, and its 
application to cases of composite state survival. When studying the process of composite 
state survival in that chapter, we utilize the insight gained here, and pay particularly close 
attention to the near-death experiences of those composite states vis-à-vis external 
threats, as the greatest sources of resilience will by implication be discovered by 
understanding these critical junctures. 
 
The Dialectic of Separatism and Amalgamation 
In both the case of Scotland in the early 1700s, and Ireland nearly a century later, 
moves to loosen the ties of a composite state were seen as threats to the security of the 
central composite entity due to the possibility of the weaker separatist polity aligning 
with an extraterritorial enemy—in both cases an expansionary France. In both of these 
cases, integration through unification and abolition of the looser personal monarchic 
union came to be seen as the necessary prophylactic. The survival of the England-Ireland 
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composite state for almost a century after the dissolution of the union between England 
and Scotland, though it may seem puzzling, is comprehensible in these terms. It was the 
absence of a threatening external enemy with whom the separatist polity could align, 
geographic location insulating it from continental military affairs, and a degree of 
sociological distance between the two societies, that served to retard any earlier moves 
towards closer integration.80 
Though the emergence of an external enemy was a critical background condition 
(akin to Waltz’s ‘permissive cause’) making amalgamation possible, the immediate 
catalyst (or ‘efficient cause’) for the enactment of an amalgamative union in both the 
Scottish and Irish cases was the emergence of serious moves to separate these polities 
from the monarchic rule of the center. As has been seen in both these cases, a separatist 
movement in each kingdom combined with the threat of the separated polity allying with 
a foreign enemy to energize moves to amalgamate the composite state. The ‘Union of 
Arms’ reforms also involved the external factor, as they were catalyzed by Olivares’ fear 
of the impotence of Castile’s revenue raising capabilities when faced with the threat 
posed by its enemies. 
There is a similarity in this regard between the two cases in the British Isles and 
the ultimate amalgamation of the Crown of Aragon into Spain in 1707 after it had sided 
with the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne (and against Castile) during the War of 
the Spanish Succession, Archduke Charles of Austria. Later codified via the Nueva 
																																																								
80 After the systemic changes brought by the French Revolution, the backwardness of the Irish suddenly 
came to be seen by the English as advantageous, in particular as an opportunity to develop Ireland and 
move it closer to England through union rather than as a drag on the English economy and union as a net 
loss. This was akin to a gestalt shift, a framing shift, in which backwardness and distance was reframed as 
advantageous and an opportunity for England rather than disadvantageous and requiring the Irish to be kept 
at a distance. But the catalyst for this gestalt shift was the threat from France reaching an intolerable level. 
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Planta decrees,81 the abolition of the Crown of Aragon also mirrored the process through 
which Scotland and Ireland were amalgamated. The role of separatist movements and 
rebellions in creating political conditions in which amalgamation becomes likely, shows 
that insurrection and separatism foments an action-reaction dynamic and makes difficult 
a return to pre-rebellion conditions in which a looser political union existed. Once the 
stakes increase and conflict drives communities further towards polarization, the looser 
relationship of a composite state becomes much more difficult to maintain. 
The demise of the Iberian Union between Castile and Portugal through secession, 
as well as that of the composite union between Castile and Aragon, can be fruitfully 
compared to the two cases of composite polity ‘death’ via amalgamation in the British 
Isles because similar mechanisms were present in all of these cases, namely cultural 
distance, rebellion, and an expansionary foreign power. However, the two composite 
states joined to England (as well as Castile-Aragon) ended through amalgamation while 
the Iberian Union ended through secession. Can we thereby infer that, had Portugal been 
unsuccessful in its attempt to secede from the Union, the Iberian Union would also have 
likely ended in amalgamation?  
Though there seems an intimate connection between secession and 
amalgamation—with each of these forces often feeding into the other—it should be 
remembered that an amalgamative union along the lines of England and Scotland in 1707 
was near unprecedented at the time of its occurrence, and was in fact an influential 
precedent for subsequent unions. It was the parliamentary nature of the incorporating 
																																																								
81 The Nueva Planta decrees of 1707-1716 marked the effective end of the Crown of Aragon as an 
independent entity. As Elliott notes of these pivotal reforms, they mark, in effect, “the transformation of 
Spain from a collection of semi-autonomous provinces into a centralized State.” Elliott, Imperial Spain 
1469-1716, p. 855. 
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union between England and Scotland in particular, balanced with the limited autonomy 
granted Scotland to retain its system of law, that forged a new example of union—one 
different in kind from the United Provinces and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that 
had been created in previous centuries, which exemplified a more confederal style of 
political union.82  
The seventeenth century was marked by a number of unsuccessful attempts made 
by monarchs to militarily unify the separate polities over which they ruled. Both Charles 
I and Oliver Cromwell ultimately failed in their attempts to consolidate the composite 
state surrounding England.83 Moreover, Spain’s Philip IV’s favorite, Olivares, pointedly 
failed in further integrating the kingdoms and provinces of the Iberian Peninsula 
(contrary to the ambition of the Union of Arms reforms),84 and for his efforts succeeded 
only in setting off the revolt of Catalonia and the Portuguese insurrection.  
 
The Historical Specificity of Amalgamative Union as Strategy 
Amalgamative union on the parliamentary level was an option that only gradually 
entered the European political imagination during the latter half of the seventeenth 
century. It did so partly through the crucible of failed attempts at coerced political 
unification of the seventeenth century, and partly also through the example of Ludovician 
France and its comparatively successful attempts at centralization.85 The government of 
																																																								
82 John Robertson, “Empire and Union: Two concepts of the early modern European order,” in A Union for 
Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 3-36. 
83 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” pp.. 64-65. 
84 For more on the abortive Union of Arms policy, see Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, Chapter 7. 
85 As Lynn notes, the concept of territorial borders was evolving from out of the earlier framework of 
frontiers during the latter half of the seventeenth century. And during the War of the Reunions, (1679-
1684), Louis XIV began to develop a military strategy which involved annexing territories in order to 
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Louis XIV had implemented a “conscious policy of political, administrative and cultural 
Gallicisation.”86 These elements were starting to give to the French state a degree of unity 
which other polities lacked, (though it was still penetrated by feudal rights and 
obligations typical of ancien régime polities), and such unity together with its great 
military power put pressure on the more composite and loosely associated monarchies 
surrounding it to respond in some manner to these administrative developments.  
In this regard, the amalgamation of Scotland and England via the Acts of Union 
might even be considered an attempt to, in a distant way, respond to the reform efforts in 
France by integrating these two territories while simultaneously learning from the failures 
of integrationist projects of the previous century. Through these acts a single unified 
Kingdom of Great Britain came into being where previously there had been two 
kingdoms, and despite a single unified parliament at Westminster superseding the 
Scottish legislature in Edinburgh, nonetheless the Scots “managed to preserve its church, 
its basic education system, its corpus of laws, its courts and their structure.”87 The union 
of England and Scotland was more limited in its aims for integration than that aspired to 
by earlier generations of reformers such as Olivares and Cromwell, who had dreamed of 
creating integrated states where customs barriers would be eliminated and local laws and 
privileges would be abolished in favor of uniform national laws, and who had attempted 
to accomplish these ends through coerced measures.88 Though the formation of the Union 
																																																								
facilitate the creation of “more defensible and better delineated frontiers…” John A. Lynn, The Wars of 
Louis XIV 1667-1714 (Essex: Pearson, 1999), p. 162. 
86 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” p. 65. 
87 John Arrieta Alberdi, “Forms of Union: Britain and Spain, a Comparative Analysis,” Revista 
Internacional de Estudios Vascos, Cuad 5 (2009): p. 51. 
88 Elliott notes that this was the aim of Olivares, but Cromwell was also clearly motivated by such aims. 
Obviously the military response to separatist rebellion in Portuguese and Catalonia led by Olivares is 
evidence enough of his intent to coerce unity in the face of dissent. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares, p. 74. 
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of 1707 was not altogether free of coercion, nonetheless the process of its ratification 
involved a greater degree of consent on the part of the weaker polity than was sought 
during the establishment of the Commonwealth of England under Cromwell and other 
integrationist attempts. 
The strategy of amalgamative union as a response to separatist rebellion, then, 
was not available to all rulers irrespective of their historical location, but was rather one 
that emerged during the latter half of the seventeenth century in response to exigent 
political circumstances. Based on this, it is anachronistic to automatically assume that 
Portugal would have been amalgamated with Castile if its rebellion had failed, especially 
given that the autonomy of Catalonia was preserved after its failed rebellion. This said, in 
the longue durée it is likely that, given the amalgamation of Castile and Aragon after the 
War of the Spanish Succession under the Spanish Crown with the Nueva Planta decrees, 
Portugal would also have suffered a similar fate sooner or later during the eighteenth 
century, even if it could had successfully avoided this fate for the duration of the 
seventeenth. 
 
The Role of Leadership Learning 
An additional explanatory factor should be introduced to account for the creation 
of a new state structure where the monarchy and parliament would be given strong 
powers, without either of these power centers becoming servile to the other as had 
																																																								
The Irish dimension of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms has, in this respect, been called by Pocock “a war 
of conquest and colonization,” and though a unified republic was successfully established, it should be 
remembered that this republic was followed by the Restoration, and subsequent to that by a rebellion and 
land redistribution policies which systematically dispossessed the Irish populace. J. G. A. Pocock, “The 
War of the Three Kingdoms,” in The British Problem, c. 1534-1707, ed. Brendan Bradshaw and John 
Morrill (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 191.  
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previously been the case in composite states. Here it is necessary to understand how the 
strategy of amalgamative parliamentary union came into existence. 
We noted previously that amalgamative union as a strategic response to a cross-
border rebellion was a political option developed in the context of specific historical 
conditions present in late seventeenth century Western Europe. Incorporating union 
enacted with a degree of consent on the part of weaker constituents was not a widely 
accepted solution to political coordination at the time it was enacted by England and 
Scotland in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Rather, incorporative union, where 
it took place, was generally attempted via grossly coercive means, and often involved the 
suppression of the parliamentary principle (in the polities to be amalgamated) by the 
force of monarchical power. The most pertinent examples here are the Commonwealth of 
England and Olivares’ Union of Arms reforms, both of which aimed to establish a more 
unified state (via monarchical force) in place of an existing composite state. However, the 
integrated state envisaged by Olivares was never established, and the Commonwealth of 
England did not outlast the fall of the English Republic in 1659.  
The parliamentary incorporating union forged by England and Scotland was 
shaped by the contemporary milieu and the need to respond to an expansionist France 
under Louis XIV which had in 1672 come within a hair’s breadth of conquering the 
United Provinces and creating something resembling a Universal Monarchy, recalling the 
continental rule of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V a century earlier. With the flight 
of James II to France following the Glorious Revolution and the ongoing efforts of Louis 
to use the cause of Jacobitism to weaken the ties between the realms ruled by the English 
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Crown, William III had become convinced of the need to integrate England and Scotland 
still further than the monarchic union that existed at the time.89 
During their deliberations, the Scots were faced with a number of undesirable or 
unattainable possibilities. The model of coerced union, where the subsidiary polities are 
subsumed by the dominant polity, was unpalatable to the Scots and provided a strong 
negative example in the early 1700s when Scottish pamphleteers and elites were debating 
their course in response to the Hanoverian Succession. On the one hand, the confederal 
union as a union of more or less equal and individually sovereign states—embodied in a 
case such as the United Provinces—provided a model of political union preserving 
separate assemblies and a loose constitutional structure. However desirable, influential 
Scottish pamphleteers such as Andrew Fletcher were aware that the fact of inequality 
between the three kingdoms of the British Isles made the creation of a viable 
confederation difficult without reconstituting the internal structure of each of these 
kingdoms.90  
Other alternatives to the Hanoverian succession were also unrealistic, given the 
hostility of English elites to the Scots’ attempt to uncouple the Scottish from the English 
crown. It was widely understood that a Jacobite king would trigger a religious war 
between the Presbyterians and their enemies, between England and Scotland, and even if 
Jacobitism won through in the civil war that ensued, this would mean the resumption of 
servitude to a king more English than Scottish.91  
																																																								
89 Robertson, “Empire and Union,” p. 32. 
90 This point is expressed particularly eloquently in Fletcher’s final major contribution to the debate 
between confederation and incorporating union. See Andrew Fletcher, Account of a Conversation 
Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of Mankind (Edinburgh, 1704). 
Also see Robertson, “An Elusive Sovereignty,”. 
91 Smout, “The Road to Union,” p. 185. 
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It would be in the context of a choice between these undesirable or unattainable 
options that the Scottish and English Parliaments would transcend the aporia—akin to the 
difficulty of navigating Scylla and Charybdis—between a parliamentary union that 
veered toward a republic, as in the case of the English Commonwealth and United 
Provinces, and amalgamative union that suppressed the independence of the periphery, as 
in the reform proposals of Olivares. The solution forged in the Acts of Union represented 
the perfection of the model first extolled by Gilbert Burnet, the Bishop of Salisbury, in 
his sermon given at the coronation of William III and Mary II. In this sermon, he depicted 
the then emerging English model, which avoided the extremes of republicanism and 
absolutism, as follows:  
[A] Rigour in Commanding, and a Cruelty in Punishing, must find Patterns elsewhere, 
then in Gods Governing the World, or in Christs Governing the Church. Happy we, who 
are delivered from both Extreams; who neither lie under the Terror of a Despotick Power, 
nor are cast loose to the wildness of ungovern'd Multitudes; who neither groan under the 
Tyranny of Inquisitors, nor the Madness of Lawless Men; and whose Laws are neither 
writ on Sand, nor with Blood; neither easie to be defaced; nor cruel in their Execution.92 
 
In the case of the Acts of Union between England and Scotland, the weakness of 
the other cases of confederate union (due to their lack of a strong executive) was 
acknowledged, and this union did not attempt to supplant or weaken the monarchic 
principle, but rather sought a strong monarchy through paradoxically strengthening the 
parliamentary principle itself and endowing it with the authority to legitimize the process 
of dynastic succession.93 
																																																								
92 Gilbert Burnet, A Sermon Preached at the Coronation of William III and Mary II (London: Printed for J. 
Starkey and Ric. Chiswell at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1689), pp. 9-10. 
93 There is no contradiction between asserting that parliament sought to strengthen monarchical power by 
creating a closer tie between monarch and parliament, and acknowledging that this arrangement would 
have unintended consequences in the long term.	
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However, not only was leadership learning evident on the level of parliamentary 
assemblies, but it was evident also in the monarchical center. Although the case of 
incorporating union of England and Scotland does not support cross-generational 
leadership learning as a factor ensuring the survival of composite polities, nonetheless 
there can be seen here to have taken place learning of a kind, as there was a definite 
evolutionary development in the strategies proposed by the monarchical center with 
regards to amalgamation. We have seen that amalgamation was a priority for the Stuarts 
since the time of James I, but there is evident a shift in the degree of coercion thought 
necessary to accomplish it. It is suggestive that Oliver Cromwell, a republican non-
dynastic leader, was most beholden to coercive means in attempting amalgamation (even 
more in some ways than Charles I), whereas the Stuart rulers gradually ameliorated their 
reliance on coercive means as the dynastic line progressed. From this perspective, it is 
explicable that the culmination of amalgamation efforts took place under the reign of 
Queen Anne, the last Stuart ruler. 
The evolution of amalgamation attempts in the British Isles, then, provides 
limited backing to the existence of cross-generational leadership learning within a 
dynastic line, although in this context such leadership learning did not lead rulers to 
maintain the composite status quo as an answer to the problem of maintaining domestic 
order posed by the seventeenth century. The opposite of cross-generational leadership 
learning is that of cross-generational memory loss, an occurrence that manifested itself in 
early modern Europe with the inauguration of a new dynasty to the royal seat. In this 
regard, the Nueva Planta decrees and amalgamation of the Castile-Aragon composite 
state, though an intuitive response to treason on the part of a composite province, was not 
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a strategy that could have been expected if leadership learning had taken place in the 
Iberian context. This is due to the fact that the history of the seventeenth century in the 
Iberian Peninsula shows the failure of centralization efforts to achieve their intended 
goals. Against this backdrop, it was fortuitous that this amalgamation did not set off a 
crippling rebellion—a near miss perhaps due to the fatigue induced by the War of 
Spanish Succession. The inauguration of the Spanish Bourbon dynasty in November of 
1700 was perhaps a moment where a large part of the accumulated cross-generational 
learning of the Spanish Habsburg dynasty was lost. 
 
Grand Comparisons 
When examining the two pairs of composite states—two on the Iberian Peninsula 
and two in the British Isles—where one of each pair suffered an early demise and the 
other survived for a longer period, we can identify some common factors behind the 
cases of early decline.  
The most influential factor driving composite state dissolution is a credible 
foreign threat, particularly the danger that a separatist constituent of the composite state 
might ally with a foreign enemy. In the case of Scotland, English fears of a reemergence 
of the alliance between Scotland and France played a decisive role in convincing English 
elites of the need to push forward with an incorporating union with Scotland to forestall 
this possibility. In the case of the Crown of Aragon and the Kingdom of Ireland, the 
threat of an alliance with a foreign power overshadowed the bonds of the composite 
union, leading in both cases to the center initiating an incorporating union, with varying 
degrees of autonomy for the amalgamated polity.  
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The failure of a separatist entity to successfully establish a robust alliance with a 
foreign power was a critical factor hampering separatist attempts and rendering it 
vulnerable to the whims of the monarchic center. Conversely, in the case of the Iberian 
Union, it was the strong and robust ties Portugal could establish with external allies that 
gave succor to the separatists and facilitated successful secession. For Portugal, it was the 
assistance of multiple external allies—the Dutch and French but especially the English—
which proved critical to withstanding Castilian offensives over the course of 28 years of 
the war of restoration and to successfully achieving their goal of independence from the 
Union.  
One measure of the robust cross-border alliances that Portugal was able to 
establish upon declaring John as the King of Portugal, was the dynastic marriage which 
John was able to engineer between his daughter, the Infanta Catherine, and King Charles 
II of England. As soon as the Braganza dynasty, which led the Portuguese separatist 
forces, gained dynastic legitimacy by marrying their heiress to the King of one of the 
major powers of Western Europe, the cause of Portuguese independence from Spain was 
given an immeasurable boost. In contrast, the weakness or absence of anti-kings in 
Scotland, Ireland, and Aragon was a serious impediment to separatist efforts in each of 
these polities, especially because the legitimacy and political alliances afforded by 
dynastic ties was not available to them. In Ireland and Aragon an anti-king was altogether 
absent, and in the Scottish case neither the exiled James II nor his son, James (the ‘Old 
Pretender’), had married dynastic spouses who could bring the kind of external military 
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assistance that was afforded to John of Portugal.94 The other key weakness of the Jacobite 
anti-kings was that they were absent from the territories they claimed to rule, whereas 
John was physically present at the moment of political restoration. 
The role of domestic uprisings in catalyzing the dissolution of the composite 
states in question is clearly indicated insofar as the demise of the Iberian Union and the 
Union of the Crowns were both precipitated by insurrections and/or separatist demands. 
In the case of Aragon and Ireland also, it was insurrections or quasi-insurrections in the 
peripheral constituent polity, together with the threat of cross-border ties with external 
enemies, that propelled the political center to implement an incorporating union. 
Though the role of external allies in facilitating or obstructing successful 
secession is of central importance, composite state dissolution in these cases came about 
from secession and/or incorporation of a constituent part of the composite polity rather 
than conquest by an external state. This fact suggests that these composite states were 
insulated from the forces of conquest in some way. We return to this point in the 
following chapter when we link the longevity of some composite states to their ability to 
deter conquest attempts through dynastic ties. In the case of Portuguese separatism, 
military collaboration with another constituent part of the composite state, for instance 
with Aragon, might have brought about secession even faster, but thoroughgoing cross-
polity collaboration did not take place, and assistance from allies outside of the composite 
state was of greater importance in facilitating independence for Portugal. This indicates 
that the mechanisms of cross-segment alliances as argued by Daniel Nexon to have been 
																																																								
94 James II was married to Mary, an heiress of the northwestern Italian Duchy of Modena, and his son 
James Francis Edward, was married to Maria Clementina Sobieska, the granddaughter of the Polish-
Lithuanian king, John III Sobieski. The Duchy of Modena was small, and Poland-Lithuania was an elective 
monarchy. Neither of these allies were useful when pursuing the Jacobite claims. 
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operative during the reformation, were not salient in the dissolution of the composite 
states examined here.95  
A final and no less important point emerging from these cases is the role played 
by dynastic ties in each of the two early cases of composite state dissolution. In the case 
of Portugal and the Portuguese Restoration War, it was the dynastic marriage tie between 
the Portuguese ruling dynasty and the English Stuarts which consolidated the renewed 
alliance between these two countries, (broken during the years of the Iberian Union, 
when Portugal was forced to side with Spain), and guaranteed English support for 
Portugal against Spain without which successful secession from Castile would hardly 
have been possible.96 The importance of the dynastic marriage in consolidating the 
alliance between Portugal and England is attested in an important work on the diplomatic 
relations between these two countries: 
The [English] commissioners objected to Charles binding himself to defend Portugal as if 
it were England, but Sande [or Francisco De Mello E Torres, Conde Da Ponte, Marques 
De Sande and Portuguese ambassador to England] insisted on this, declaring that 
otherwise he would not make a treaty, since this condition was the chief reason for the 
marriage, and he appealed to the King, who ordered the demand to be conceded, which 
was done…97 
 
The comparison with the unsuccessful secession attempt of Catalonia clearly 
shows the importance of the dynastic factor in the restoration of Portuguese 
																																																								
95 Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2009), Chapter 4. This is likely because the dynamics of religious contention were largely disarmed by the 
settlements of the Westphalian Peace. 
96 Davidson well described the terms of the marriage union between Catherine of Braganza and Charles II 
as being protection for Portugal against Spain and the Netherlands. In that work, the support of Louis XIV 
for the union between Charles and Catherine, which was important for his policy of taking all steps 
necessary to weaken Spanish Habsburg power, is also noted, and this goes to show that dynastic marriage 
unions—insofar as they were focal points of political machinations—were critically important events for 
diplomatic competition and intrigue. Lillias Campbell Davidson, Catherine of Bragança: Infanta of 
Portugal & Queen-Consort of England (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 46. 
97 Edgar Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England, and Holland from 1640 to 
1668 (Watford: Voss & Michael, Ltd, 1925), pp. 147-8. 
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independence. Though the English side was drawn to the alliance with Portugal at least in 
part through self-interest and the promise of gains from trade with the overseas 
Portuguese Empire, nonetheless the political benefits accruing to the Portuguese 
secessionists—both of military aid and dynastic recognition—were very real and more 
than offset the dependent economic position into which Portugal would gradually sink 
vis-à-vis England.98 In this case, dynastic ties were critically important for the successful 
secession of Portugal and the dissolution of the Iberian Union.  
In the case of the Scotland and England also, dynastic factors were critical in 
absentia, as it was the threat made by Scotland to the unity of the dynastic holdings of the 
English monarch that prompted intense efforts of both the English Crown and Parliament 
to reverse the Scottish Parliament’s recalcitrance on the issue of the Hanoverian 
succession. It was also the severity of the threat posed by Scottish moves to uncouple its 
Crown from that of England, which convinced English parliamentarians of the necessity 
of an incorporating union, a conviction which had until that time been held only by the 
English sovereign and not the parliament. The severity of the threat to dynastic integrity 
posed by the Scottish Parliament can be seen when we contrast it with the threat posed by 
the Jacobite Irish Parliament of 1689, which supported the deposed Stuart King James II 
at the outset of the Williamite Wars (also a grave threat to the English monarchy), but 
which was weakened by the fact that the Irish Parliament exercised little real authority.99 
Therefore parliamentary and civil opposition in Ireland during the Williamite Wars was 
																																																								
98 This is attested by the deep despair with which Philip IV received news of the renewed alliance between 
England and Portugal. R. A. Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1981), Chapter 4. 
99 This weakness was due to Poynings’ law, which dictated that every bill be approved in advance by the 
king and his English council. J.G. Simms, “The Jacobite Parliament of 1689,” in his War and Politics in 
Ireland 1649-1730 (London: Hambledon Press, 1986), pp. 65-90. 
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of little consequence to the English Crown when compared with the parliamentary 
opposition of Scotland to the Hanoverian succession, which had the actual power to 
decouple the two crowns united in the same person since 1603. The ensuing moves by the 
English Parliament to bring about an incorporating union—a much more drastic response 
than took place in the wake of the Williamite Wars—can be seen in this light as a more 
urgent response to a more pressing danger. 
However, it must be remembered that in none of these composite states did a 
center-periphery model exist where a peripheral entity possessed its own separate ruling 
dynasty. This is due to the fact that all of the composite states examined in this chapter 
were primary composite states, a significant difference when comparing these cases of 
early demise with the structure of the Holy Roman Empire—a secondary composite 
state—that did retain quasi-independent dynastic rule in the peripheral components. We 
later see that, though these peripheral dynasties could prove problematic when their 
ambition outgrew their subordinate status, nonetheless it was dynastic kinship ties 
between the center and periphery that on occasion lent stability to the composite state that 
would elude the cases we examined in this chapter. This was the case insofar as kinship 
ties and patron-client relations between center and periphery rendered amalgamation 
(which required abolition of the peripheral dynasty) virtually impossible. The existence 
of dynastic ties between two dynasties meant that conquest and the abolition of one of 





THE THEORY OF DYNASTIC DETERRENCE 
 
Interaction of Causal Factors in Early-Death Composite States 
 
Before we outline the critical role of dynastic deterrence as the mechanism 
underlying the late survival of some composite states, we must reiterate the way in which 
the explanatory approaches tabled in Chapter One interact in historical context. We can 
now see the manner in which the three explanatory factors—dynastic ties, military 
threats, and leadership learning—interacted closely to shape the vicissitudes of early 
dissolution in two representative contexts: the dissolution of the seventeenth century 
England-Scotland Union of the Crowns in 1707 through amalgamation; and the formal 
dissolution of the Iberian Union in 1668 via secession.  
We saw that maintaining control of composite domains in the face of the 
combination of an external threat and a rebellion was a compelling motive for monarchs 
to either create a more unified polity (Scotland), or attempt to preserve the composite 
state while instituting centralizing reforms (the Iberian Union).1 Moreover, the dynastic 
dimension was critical for Portugal in successfully suing for independence, as it was only 
after Charles II ascended the throne with the English Restoration and married the late 
John IV’s daughter Catherine in 1661, that English military assistance would become 
significant and signal acceptance of the Portuguese Braganzas by other European royal 
																																																								
1 It should be remembered that the Portuguese War of Restoration itself came about due to attempts by 
Philip IV’s favorite—the Count Duke Olivares—to impose a more integrated structure on the constituent 
parts of the Iberian Union with his Union of Arms reforms, a move that was vigorously opposed by both 
the Portuguese and the Catalonians. 
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dynasties.2 In both of the cases of early demise, the factor of dynastic control interacted 
with military power in important ways, with the military capability gained from dynastic 
allies being sufficient to secure secession in one case, and the absence of significant 
military assistance from dynastic allies leaving Scotland vulnerable to amalgamation by 
England. 
In the early demise cases, we saw two pathways to dissolution: dissolution by 
amalgamation initiated by the political center, and dissolution by successful secession of 
a peripheral component of the composite state. The threat of internal rebellion constituted 
one of the most serious threats to monarchical rule throughout the early modern period, 
but particularly in the seventeenth century—a period believed to have been characterized 
by ‘general crisis’ due to the frequency and ferocity of internal rebellion and war. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, in order to understand in proper perspective which factors 
were efficacious in enabling the late survival of some composite polities, we must 
compare two broad sets of factors: factors that underlay the early death of some 
composite states, and those that aided late-surviving composite states to weather the most 
severe existential crises they faced. Understanding the causes underlying the early death 
of some composite polities points us to the dangers that composite states in general must 
transcend to reach an advanced age. And looking at how late surviving composite states 
successfully traversed similar existential moments of crisis allows us to isolate the 
protective factors enabling these polities to avoid early death. 
Having now examined some early dissolution composite polities, we should ask 
whether the ties of dynastic marriage and kinship we posit as an important factor in 
																																																								
2 A. R. Disney, A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 229. 
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aiding late survival were present or absent in these cases. In fact, the dialectic between 
rebellion and dynastic recognition can help us to separate the cases we have examined 
into two categories. In the first category, we find—as in Scotland—a nascent attempt at 
separatism was unsuccessful as there was no strong consensus on the anti-king to claim 
the Scottish crown, dispersing the energies of separatism and allowing the political center 
to stage a parrying move and enact incorporating union before consensus around an anti-
king could emerge and deepen the crisis. This is abortive separatism without an accepted 
monarchic claimant. The second category, which includes Portugal, is one where there 
was an accepted anti-king (John Braganza) who was able to gain recognition from 
another significant dynastic ruler—the Stuart king Charles II—both in the form of a 
marriage tie (between Charles II and John IV’s daughter Catherine) and a formal pledge 
of military assistance. 
Focusing on the role of dynastic recognition and assistance allows us to view 
early death composite states in a new light. Though the occurrence of an internal 
rebellion in one or more composite state domains and the perception of an external threat 
by the center together constitute a key conjuncture preceding composite state death, these 
rebellions interact with the variable of dynastic recognition—here synonymous with the 
presence of a dynastic kinship tie—in such a way that the failure of a rebellion (which at 
least leaves open the possibility of composite state survival) can be predicted from the 
absence of strong dynastic ties between a restive domain and a neighboring dynastic 
house.3  
																																																								
3 In this regard, the international system has not changed significantly from early modern times, as the 
success of a separatist movement even in contemporary times is premised on its ability to gain recognition 
for its claim as a legitimate government from at least one of the systemic great powers. 
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Dynastic recognition was found to be vital in aiding a secession attempt due to the 
concrete military assistance rendered to the breakaway polity. This can give it enough 
strength to successfully resist the monarchical center, as in the case of Portugal. A 
composite state is subject to certain dissolution when a secessionist rebellion in a 
constituent domain succeeds. If a rebellion fails, the defeated domain is at the mercy of 
the monarchical center, which can then decide whether the restive domain is 
amalgamated or preserved. And it is difficult for a rebellion to succeed without strong 
dynastic ties between the rebels and powerful dynastic supporters.  
If the presence of strong dynastic ties (involving dynastic recognition and military 
support) between a restive domain and an external dynasty is enough to facilitate the 
success of a rebellion, and the absence of an accepted anti-king in a restive domain 
dooms a rebellion to failure, the importance of dynastic ties is indicated in a general 
manner. However, these early death cases do not tell us much about the relevant 
dynamics when the monarchic center was directly threatened by military action from 
outside of the composite state (not via the proxy of the composite domain). In these 
cases, the dynastic approach would expect that dynastic ties between a monarchic center 
and neighboring states (as well as those between the monarchic center and the composite 
domain where they exist) would be of greater salience than dynastic ties between a 
peripheral domain and a neighboring state. Furthermore, dynastic ties are not always 
sufficient to ensure the success of a rebellion. In the case of Frederick V, the Elector 
Palatine (who by agreeing to election as King of Bohemia came to lead the Bohemian 
Revolt), dynastic ties with James I of England (via his spouse Elizabeth who was the 
eldest daughter of James) were not sufficient to guarantee him support from England. 
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As such, secessionist rebellions were not always the most significant threats faced 
by a composite state. There seems a significant gap between the cases of early death and 
late survival composite states, as there did not take place in either Poland-Lithuania or the 
Holy Roman Empire secessionist rebellions similar to those that occurred in the Iberian 
Union, at least during the post-Westphalian era. In the case of the Holy Roman Empire, 
the closest we see to such a dynamic occurred during the War of the Austrian Succession 
(examined in Chapter Four) when the Bavarians under the Wittelsbach Elector Charles 
Albert made a push to claim the imperial throne, in violation of its customary 
monopolization by the Habsburgs. We shall see there that due to the complex structure of 
the Reich as a ‘secondary’ composite state, where the composite domains possessed a 
greater degree of autonomy due to their possessing their own ruling houses, this rebellion 
melded aspects of a civil war and international conflict. 
In the constitutional structure of the late surviving Holy Roman Empire, we see 
the absence of a preponderant power in the relations between the center and periphery, 
which prevented both successful secession and amalgamation into a unified polity.4 In the 
Empire, the Catholic sphere was balanced in an uneasy equilibrium against the Protestant 
																																																								
4 In other cases of early death composite states not included here, we also see an intermediate survival of 
the composite state after an initial rebellion if neither the forces of rebellion nor the forces of conservation 
in a composite polity were able to gain preponderance in their struggle. In our framework, this occurs when 
a component state of the composite polity is led by an anti-king and the separatist forces are successful in 
obtaining military support from an external power for their cause, but unsuccessful in gaining dynastic 
recognition from other monarchs. In this case the rebellion can smolder on for some time before it is 
ultimately defeated. Austria-Hungary resembles this intermediate pattern, where neither the monarchical 
center (the Habsburg court) nor the anti-king (the Transylvanian Princes) was able to gain a decisive 
advantage. Here the Transylvanian princes could draw on military support from the Sublime Porte though 
they could not gain recognition from another Christian monarchical ruler for their claims. It is telling that in 
the Hungarian case the composite structure of the polity survived for the longest period after the initial 
challenge—just over one hundred years from when Bethlen was elected in August of 1620 until the passage 
of the Pragmatic Sanction by the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg in 1724. In comparison the England-Scotland 
and Austria-Bohemia composite states lasted barely a decade after the first articulation of dissent, and the 
Iberian Union technically lasted for twenty-eight years from the acclamation of John IV as anti-king of 
Portugal in 1640 until the acknowledgment of the Braganzas as Portugal’s ruling dynasty by Spain’s 
Charles II in February of 1668. 
	
	 167	
electorates and duchies. In the most consequential institution of the Empire—the 
Electoral College—the Catholic prince-electors had force of numbers to be able to 
determine the result of the Imperial elections, a fact that allowed the Austrian Habsburgs 
to maintain a virtual monopoly over the Imperial crown throughout the post-Westphalian 
period. Even the sole exception to this pattern, Charles Albert the Wittelsbach Elector of 
Bavaria—who was elected Emperor as Charles VII (and the only non-Habsburg to be 
elected Emperor after 1452)—did not break the religious pattern insofar as he also was 
Roman Catholic. Nonetheless, though Catholics controlled the Electoral College 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they never held a preponderant 
political position in the Empire and thus were unable to displace the Protestant forces 
entirely. The principle of “cuius regio, eius religio” (or “whose realm, his religion”), 
which epitomized the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia, 
represented the uneasy via media due to the inability of either Catholics or Protestants to 
gain a preponderance over the other.  
Though neither the imperial center nor any of the composite domains could gain 
dominance, the modus vivendi for coexistence was one where Catholics maintained a 
precarious hegemony over the Electoral College and the Imperial crown. However, the 
absence of preponderance in a composite polity was not itself sufficient for a composite 
state to survive, as a sudden or gradual shift in the balance of power could doom a 
component polity.5 In the Holy Roman Empire, there were moments during the 
eighteenth century when both the Catholic forces under the Habsburgs and the Protestants 
																																																								
5 This is a dynamic seen in another case not included in our study—Austria-Hungary—which saw the 
Habsburgs under Leopold I eventually gain preponderance over the Hungarian magnates after the defeat of 
the Ottomans at the Battle of Vienna. At this point Hungary was assimilated into the Habsburg domains via 
the imposition of hereditary Habsburg succession. 
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under the de facto leadership of the Prussian kings seemed to be teetering on the edge of 
defeat by successive coalitions of Imperial states and outside powers. Yet the Empire as a 
whole managed to cling on and survive. Defensive resilience is certainly an important 
part of the explanation for the ability of the powerful states of the Reich to withstand 
offensive campaigns by opposing coalitions at moments of maximum weakness—such as 
during the War of the Austrian Succession. Facilitating defensive resilience during the 
War of the Austrian Succession was the support that Maria Theresa was able to garner 
from the Hungarian magnates, which allowed the Habsburgs to weather the Prussian 
challenge in the Empire. However, upon close examination of the empirical record, we 
see that decisive defeat of one or the other side was forestalled as much by the 
disinclination to push home a decisive advantage as by any other factor. 
This suggests that, besides the absence of a radical power imbalance between the 
constituent domains of the composite polity, another factor is necessary for us to explain 
the outcome of composite state late survival.6 We now put forward another explanation 
we consider sufficient to explain composite state late survival: dynastic deterrence and its 
amelioration of the conquest impulse in ancien régime Europe via the mechanism of 
intermarriage and kinship ties between ruling dynasties. This explanation is a derivation 
from the approach of dynasticism elaborated in Chapter One, and can be understood as 
the main pathway through which a weak norm of conquest desistance was sustained 
between dynasties with strong kinship ties. We examine the mechanisms behind this 
																																																								
6 On the subject of preponderant power in the Holy Roman Empire, it should be noted that some of the 
constituent political entities of the Empire—for instance the duchies, bishoprics, and free imperial cities—
were very weak militarily, and it is therefore noteworthy that they survived until the demise of the Empire. 
The security of many of these entities, at least with regard to predation by forces within the Empire, was 
guaranteed by the Emperor. However, in terms of the durability of the overall constitutional structure, the 
critical factor was the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant territories, and here neither of these 
forces held a preponderant power advantage over the other.    
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explanation in more detail before proceeding to test the ability of this theory to 
adequately comprehend the late survival of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the 
Holy Roman Empire. 
 
The Unintended Consequences of Dynastic Marriage 
 
The theory of dynastic deterrence, which we argue provides a powerful 
explanation for the late survival of ancien régime composite states, is premised on the 
core insight that proximate kinship ties between European ruling dynasties have deterrent 
effects on the desire to conquer. More specifically, the theory argues that hereditary 
monarchs with dynastic aims will exercise restraint and avoid waging wars of conquest 
on dynasts with whom they share a close kinship tie, though such ties do not restrain 
them from waging wars of limited territorial gains. The extent to which a monarch 
prioritizes dynastic aims can be inferred in part from measures such as their marriage 
status and the number of their offspring. But it can also be gauged through an analysis of 
biographies, primary historical materials, and so on, in order to arrive at a holistic 
judgment about the extent to which a given ruler was committed to the goal of dynastic 
advancement. Though it is not easy to find statements by European monarchs clearly 
expressing the inner logic of dynastic deterrence in their own words, this is likely due to 
the fact that the concept of dynastic deterrence was unknown at the time. We postulate 
that wars of conquest were eschewed by early modern dynastic rulers because of the 
expectation that conquering the polity of another monarch would severely damage the 
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reputation of their dynasty and harm the marriage prospects of their children, thus greatly 
damaging the main means of dynastic consolidation and advancement. 
The standard early modern understanding of the purpose of dynastic marriage, 
held over from the Middle Ages, was that it would promote peace and increase power 
through alliances gained. The association between dynastic marriage and the 
consolidation of alliances was close and well established, as we have seen in the earlier 
theoretical chapter. King James I, in his instructional treatise, Basilikon Doron (originally 
written for his eldest son, Henry Frederick), notes that the alliance made possible with the 
nation of one’s wife is one of the principal benefits of the well-chosen marriage.7 Though 
Erasmus was no supporter of dynastic marriage, in making his arguments he nonetheless 
pointed to “the common opinion [which] is that such marriages are like iron chains of 
concord between states…”8 The logic and mechanism underlying such a peace secured 
via dynastic marriages was not clearly elaborated at the time. But nonetheless the belief 
persisted that marriage ties between two dynasties would secure peace between them. 
The notion that marriage between two groups (or between the ruling families of two 
groups) fostered harmony and peace between them, was noted by Botero in his Reason of 
State, where he gives two examples of inter-group marriages (between Alexander the 
Great and the Persian Roxana, as well as between the Capuans and Romans) when 
outlining strategies for a ruler to ease inter-societal conflict in a newly acquired 
kingdom.9  
																																																								
7 James I, “Basilikon Doron,” in The Political Works of James I, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), p. 35. 
8 Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 97. 
9 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 97. 
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It is noteworthy that the Duke of Sully, who wrote one of the first peace proposals 
for Europe in the early seventeenth century, placed ‘a union between all these princes’ as 
the centerpiece of his vision, and the first concrete measures he recommended toward the 
creation of such a union, were “proposals made to the kings of England and Sweden, and 
the dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, for alliances by marriage…”10 The status of his writings 
as actual efforts made by the diplomats of Henry IV, or conversely an imaginary scheme 
for European peace written by one of Henry’s close advisors, is unclear.11 Nonetheless, 
this work shows the integral connection that early modern observers saw between 
dynastic marriage and alliances as well as peace.  
During the early modern period, as Mattingly notes, “force was employed not to 
advance a rational interest but to support a legal claim,” and legal claims were structured 
primarily by dynastic marriage and inheritance patterns.12 Moreover, as brute conquest 
was not generally seen as sufficient for a monarch to supplant the sovereignty of another 
monarch, military force was generally utilized in the service of limited territorial 
engagements, or to buttress the hereditary claims of a ruler to succession in another 
kingdom.13 The fact that brute military force was disdained due to the widespread 
acceptance of just war theory, meant that conquest attempts were rare and only made 
																																																								
10 Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Sully’s Grand Design of Henry IV (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
Limited, 1921), p. 46. 
11 F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 24-
25. 
12 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p.125. 
13 Peter Stirk, The Politics of Military Occupation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 12; 
see also Evan Luard, The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1992). 
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when a monarch disregarded these norms governing conquest (such as in the cases of 
Frederick II and Charles X).14 
As we see below, it was extremely rare for an early modern sovereign to invade 
the land of another sitting monarch with the intention of conquering that domain in toto, 
and a critical part of the supportive mechanism suppressing the conquest impulse was the 
thickening network of dynastic marriage ties which embedded monarchs in a relational 
web that reinforced norms of dynastic legitimacy. The critical deductive move that early 
modern commentators could not make, was one that would obscure from them the very 
real empirical consequences of dynastic marriages. This incomprehension was what led 
Erasmus to conclude that dynastic marriages did not ensure peace between monarchs 
related by marriage, as many examples can be found of monarchs invading the territory 
of a neighboring monarch with whom they shared some dynastic ties.15 One of the few 
early modern authors to come close to comprehending the role of dynastic marriages in 
suppressing conquest attempts was Richelieu, though he was able to point merely to the 
good will and mutual respect imparted by dynastic marriages, and which led them to be 
in his view indispensable in peace negotiations. As he writes: 
[T]hey [dynastic marriages] must not be neglected, for they not infrequently provide one 
of the most important keys to a given negotiation. They always possess at least the one 
advantage that for a time they foster the continued respect each party has for the other, 
and even that much success justifies them.16 
 
																																																								
14 Thomas Baty, “The Relations of Invaders to Insurgents,” Yale Law Journal 36, no.7 (1927): p. 967. 
Conquest attempts made to force the settlement of a disputed case of dynastic succession do not fall under 
the rubric of brute conquest, as it is underpinned by a dynastic claim. 
15 Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, p. 97. However, the important point is that these 
invasions were predominantly invasions aimed at attaining limited territorial gains. 
16 Richelieu, The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, trans. Henry Bertram Hill (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 100. 
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Nonetheless, though dynastic marriages neither prevented invasion nor secured 
peace, they did deter wholesale conquest attempts from taking place except in 
circumstances outside the parameters of the theory. As a consequence, early modern 
warfare was restricted largely to limited wars of acquisition centered on attempts to 
expand territorial boundaries. In addition to the core mechanism of deterrence, 
challenging the dynastic legitimacy of another sovereign (when a thick network of 
kinship relations existed with neighboring dynasties) inevitably meant that one’s own 
legitimacy would be weakened as most monarchs held dynastic claims in reserve on their 
neighbors.17 The ensuing cascade of legitimacy challenges was what James I wished to 
avoid in denying material assistance to his son-in-law, Frederick V during the Bohemian 
Revolt.  
It is also noteworthy that dynastic marriage negated to an extent the need for 
conquest as an acquisitive strategy, due to its acting as an effective alternative means to 
increase territorial holdings without recourse to war. As the famous saying by the 
Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus, captures well, “Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria 
nube” (‘Let others wage war: thou, happy Austria, marry’),18 conquest and inheritance as 
acquisitive strategies were seen as alternatives for the early modern mind.19 And in fact, 
																																																								
17 Osiander notes the need to preserve stability as being another important auxiliary reason for why jurists 
of the early modern period were loath to acknowledge the right of conquest. If the right of conquest was 
acknowledged in one case, “treaties to be concluded could not be lasting, given that all princes had 
demands on their neighbors…” and princes would increasingly be emboldened to attempt to press their 
claims through force. Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), pp. 50-51. 
18 Sidney Whitman, The Realm of the Habsburgs (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1893), p. 258. 
19 As Fichtner puts it, “[a]s instruments for the perpetuation and enhancement of status, the conservation of 
wealth, and the maintenance of privilege and power, dynastic marriage and the family system associated 
with it played a natural role in the ruling of empires.” (p. 264) Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Dynastic Marriage in 
Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft,” The American Historical Review 81, no.2 (1976): 
pp. 243-265. It should also be borne in mind that in early modern times, another strategy of territorial 
acquisition, namely purchase, was also widely known and practiced—especially in the colonial world. Cf. 
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when successful, inheritance and acquisition through dynastic marriage provided not only 
a less contentious means to acquire territory than conquest,20 but the territorial gains 
possible through inheritance—if we think for example of the acquisition by the Austrian 
Habsburgs of the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary through inheritance with the death 
of Louis II—were also far in excess of the gains possible through conquest.  
This led to a generalized disinclination to relinquish one’s own dynastic claims or 
extinguish those of others through brute force. In an age when sovereignty was thought to 
be akin to property, such forcible confiscation of territory was seen as a kind of theft. As 
Stubbs notes of the dynastic weltanschauung in a classic sentence, “there was no fear of 
shedding blood, but there was great fear of destroying right.”21  
 
Mechanisms of Dynastic Deterrence 
 
Dynastic Marriage 
The most important type of kinship tie with the demonstrable effect of 
strengthening dynastic deterrence is dynastic inter-marriage. As we have seen in the case 
of Bohemia—where the Bohemian King Frederick’s marriage to James’ daughter 
																																																								
Joseph Blocher, “Selling State Borders,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 162, no.2 (2014): pp. 
241-305. 
20 As we have seen in a discussion in Chapter Two, early modern period Europe, insofar as it was still 
heavily influenced by the legal language of Christendom and the Middle Ages, was disinclined to recognize 
brute conquest nor sanction war waged with only with power on one’s side without a rightful legal claim. 
See William Stubbs, Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1887), p. 238-245. If there were strong legalistic arguments taking issue with the uninhibited 
conquest of the Americas by the Spanish, as articulated by Francisco de Vitoria, then how much more 
onerous would have been the unstated moral injunctions against European rulers waging wars of conquest 
on their fellow Christian monarchs? On this point, see Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger, 
eds., International Relations in Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 
4.  
21 Stubbs, Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History, p. 244. 
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Elizabeth Stuart did not prompt James to give significant English support to Frederick—a 
marriage tie between two dynasties did not automatically lead to an alliance and/or 
material aid. However, this does not mean these ties did not negatively exercise a 
significant constraining influence on the behavior of dynastic monarchs. In particular, we 
see from the empirical record of warfare in ancien régime Europe between the signing of 
the Westphalian Peace and the start of the Napoleonic Wars, that dynastic monarchs did 
not wage wars of conquest on the European continent against fellow monarchs with 
whom they shared a marriage tie.22  
Part of the causal role of dynastic marriages in ameliorating the impulse to 
conquer, was due to its having given rise to the dynastic practice of refusal to legitimize 
occupations and conquest. Though conquest was understood to be legally valid, the 
desistance from it in practice (we also call it the ‘conquest taboo’) was activated at 
moments such as during wartime to arouse resistance to conquest attempts, as evidenced 
by the resistance to the invasion and occupation of Poland-Lithuania by Charles X. 
Moreover, though at several junctures wars fought for limited gains threatened to devolve 
into unmitigated wars of conquest, dynastic relations played a role in preventing the 
escalation to total war. We see the inhibiting role of dynastic ties at work during the War 
of the Austrian Succession, where Charles Albert was dissuaded from making a final 
push to take Vienna likely due to his kinship tie with Maria Theresa via his spouse. 
It is this hitherto unnoticed background condition of early modern dynastic 
politics that also explains why late-surviving composite states such as the Polish-
																																																								
22 The wars of the French Revolution were led on the French side by republican and not dynastic leaders 
and largely involved the non-dynastic ruler Napoleon waging wars of conquest against the dynastically 
ruled ancien régime polities. 
	
	 176	
Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Holy Roman Empire were spared from death by 
external conquest by neighboring monarchs while ruled by de facto hereditary 
dynasties.23 The absence of conquest attempts (in the modern era the primary manner in 
which states have died) by monarchs on the domains of marriage-bound fellow monarchs 
is a noteworthy regularity during the early modern period (1648-1789) similar in 
structure to the postulated ‘democratic peace’ during modern times. The puzzling 
aversion of dynastic rulers to conquering the sovereignty of their counterparts, was first 
captured by Andrew Lossky in the following classic passage: 
Dynastic ties certainly did not avert wars, although they did exert a certain influence on 
war aims. No matter what schemes a sovereign might lay to harm his relative, no matter 
how unceremoniously he would chase him from his lands in time of war, he hardly ever 
sought to compass his total ruin and the destruction of his State. It was expected that at 
the end of a war, the same dramatis personae, or their lawful heirs, some of them rather 
crestfallen, would still be there to make peace.24 
 
The early modern period in European politics was one where, despite the 
unprecedented frequency and regularity of military conflict between monarchs, wars with 
very few exceptions were overwhelmingly fought to win limited territorial gains rather 
than to overthrow the sovereign ruler of another polity and claim it as one’s own. This 
was an uncanny anticipation of the stability-instability paradox25 familiar to us from the 
																																																								
23 The Habsburg capital, Vienna, was close to being invaded by Charles Albert in 1741, but was 
inexplicably spared when the Franco-Bavarian forces chose instead to march into Bohemia. As we see 
below, the role of marriage ties between Charles via his spouse, Maria Amalia, (who was an Archduchess 
of Austria by birth), and the Austrian Habsburgs, was an important factor in the decision to spare Vienna. 
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was invaded twice by Sweden—first in 1655 by Charles X of 
Sweden, and again in 1701 by Charles XII—and neither of these invaders were related by marriage to the 
reigning king of Poland-Lithuania. 
24 Andrew Lossky, “International Relations in Europe,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VI, 
ed. J. S. Bromley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 168-169. 
25 For the classic discussion of the stability-instability paradox, see Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power 
and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (Scranton: Chandler, 1965), pp. 
185-201. Snyder’s initial insights were further refined by Jervis in Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the 
Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 19-23. 
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cold-war era, as stability in the form of a general aversion to wars of conquest coexisted 
with the almost constant use of military means to gain limited territorial advantage.  
 
Dynastic Reputational Concerns  
Secondly, a monarch was restrained from destroying relations with neighboring 
ruling dynasties due to obligations to their unmarried offspring. When a monarch has 
issue, the theory expects them to be constrained in their behavior toward neighboring 
dynasties by the need to ensure the most prestigious marriage possible for their children. 
The fundamental principle of dynastic aggrandizement upon which dynasticism of the 
early modern period was based, asserted that a dynasty not merely maintain its present 
status but also improve its position vis-à-vis other dynasties in the European family of 
nations.26 The long-term maintenance and increase of the prestige of a dynasty in a 
hereditary monarchy depended very much on the quality of the dynastic marriages a 
monarch could secure for their offspring, as early modern dynastic aggrandizement 
depended to a large degree on marrying one’s own children to the children of similarly 
powerful dynasties with the intent to aggrandize one’s dynasty via inheritance and status 
gains. If a dynastic monarch waged aggressive wars of conquest against fellow dynasts, 
their offspring would become less desirable as candidates for dynastic matches due to the 
hostility and ill will engendered by the actions of the parent.27  
																																																								
26 Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 15. 
27 Here we must proceed by extrapolation. The marriage of Charles XI to his betrothed, the Danish Princess 
Ulrika Eleonora, was seriously endangered when Sweden under his rule participated in the harsh Scanian 
War (1675-1679) against Denmark. The planned marriage was officially postponed, and was widely 
thought to have become untenable due to the bitterness of the conflict. If this was the effect of a war not 
involving an attempted conquest, we can surmise that a war of conquest would have aroused even more 
opposition to marriage proposals between the scions of the victorious and defeated dynasties. On the 
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This constraint holds even when not all of the offspring of a monarch were slated 
for unions with the offspring of ruling dynasties, as it was generally expected that the heir 
to the throne should enter a foreign union even if it was permissible for younger siblings 
to enter unions with the scions of domestic nobility. Primogeniture and its acceptance 
during the Middle Ages, (culminating with the Laws of Toro of 1505), meant the status 
of the eldest male heir and the other siblings diverged, as it was only the eldest son who 
was eligible to succeed the title and offices of the dynastic head. The other children 
received a share of the inheritance through dowries, appanages and careers in the military 
or church, but the prestige of the family increasingly converged on the figure of the eldest 
son and the dynastic main branch.28 From here, it was only a short step for ruling 
dynasties to distinguish themselves from even the highest of the local nobility by 
exclusively seeking royal marriages for their heirs.29 The pressure for ruling dynasties to 
marry offspring to royal candidates may have increased over time, strengthening the 
constraining influence produced by dynastic deterrence. 
 
Dynastic Kinship Ties and Interdependence 
																																																								
marriage of Charles XI and Ulrika Eleonora, see R. M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (New York: 
Weybright and Talley, 1968), pp. 19-20. 
28 Liesbeth Geevers and Mirella Marini, “Aristocracy, Dynasty and Identity in Early Modern Europe,” in 
Dynastic Identity in Early Modern Europe, ed. Liesbeth Geevers and Mirella Marini (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2015), pp. 13-14. The way in which early modern dynasties thought about the differences between children 
is well captured in the following passage: “A firstborn son was an heir to be prized. A second son was a 
spare in case something should go wrong. A third son could be a gift to the church and a powerful force in 
holy orders for the family. More sons than that were dangerous to the succession…daughters can…be seen 
as treasured members of the family, guarantors of potential alliances, and agents of influence in foreign 
courts.” (p. 62) Christian Raffensperger, Reimagining Europe (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2012). 
29 For instance, the French Bourbons ceased to marry their offspring with the offspring of the local nobility, 
“in order to assert the dignity of the dynasty and…distance the Bourbons from even the greatest of their 
subjects.” Hamish Scott, “The Line of Descent of Nobles is from the Blood of Kings: Reflections on 
Dynastic Identity,” in Dynastic Identity in Early Modern Europe, ed. Liesbeth Geevers and Mirella Marini 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), p. 217. 
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An alternative mechanism of dynastic interdependence via kinship ties also 
exercised a much weaker and yet not insignificant role in ameliorating the conquest 
impulse for dynastic dyads even where direct marriage ties were absent. The network of 
kinship ties connecting all of the major European royal dynasties gradually increased in 
density over the course of the Middle Ages and until the early modern period, which 
represented the zenith of the European dynastic system and ancien régime. In Table 1, 
drawn from the work of Armin Wolf, we see that the ratio of dynasties to kingdoms 
decreases from 85% in 1100 to 31% in 1610. In other words, the number of dynasties 
ruling European kingdoms decreased from 11 in 1100 to 5 in 1610. This is a significant 
decrease, and clearly implies that the kinship network encompassing these ruling 
dynasties correspondingly increased in density during the same period.30 This progressive 
increase in density of the dynastic kinship network coincided with a notable decrease in 
the duration and magnitude of great power wars from 1650 till 1750, as depicted by Jack 
Levy.31 Empirically we see a correlation between an increase in the density of the 
European dynastic kinship network and a corresponding decrease in the duration and 
magnitude of great power war. Though these two measures of great power war do not 
directly correspond with a decline in the conquest impulse, there exists an elective 
affinity between these measures and conquest.  
The mechanism underlying the empirical decline in war duration and magnitude 
even in the absence of a direct marriage tie is analytically similar to the theory of trade 
																																																								
30 Amin Wolf, “The Family of Dynasties in Medieval Europe: Dynasties, Kingdoms and ‘Tochterstämme’,” 
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 12 (1991): p. 192. 
31 Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System 1495-1975 (Lexington KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1983), p. 133. 
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expectations and peace outlined by Copeland.32 According to this approach, 
interdependence can foster peace, but such conditions of peace only obtain when states 
expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future. If highly interdependent 
states expect that trade will become increasingly restricted—that is, if their expectations 
for future trade are declining or low—realist self-help expectations kick-in and the most 
interdependent states will not hesitate to initiate war to gain access to the raw materials 
necessary for preservation of the economic wealth that supports long term security.33  
As Copeland notes, “high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-
inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade.”34 When such a mechanism is 
superimposed onto high-density kinship networks, we can deduce that as long as 
expectations of ongoing patterns of intermarriage between dynasties are high, inter-
dynastic conflict will tend to be ameliorated or suppressed.35 Though limited wars were 
intrinsic to dynastic competition and functioned as a channel through which hierarchies 
of dynastic prestige could be established, nonetheless, the most damaging form of 
conflict—wars of conquest—were largely avoided in the early modern period. As we 
have seen, the need for offspring to be desirable in the dynastic marriage market meant 
that gaining a reputation for truculence was a damaging prospect for an early modern 
monarch as such a reputation inevitably harmed the marriage prospects of their offspring.  
																																																								
32 Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): pp. 5-41. 
33 In other words, high levels of interdependence do not correlate directly with peace, but can be either 
peace-inducing or war-inducing depending on the predominant expectations of future trade. 
34 Ibid., p. 7. 
35 The corollary, of course, is that when the expectation of patterns of dynastic intermarriage into the future 







Dynastic Deterrence Unpacked 
 
Let us examine in more depth the specific manner in which dynastic intermarriage 
functioned to suppress conquest attempts in early modern Europe. Here we unpack the 
mechanisms through parallels with IR theory. The traditional view of the purpose of 
dynastic marriage in ancien régime Europe, was that it was meant as a vehicle for the 
accomplishment of a number of diplomatic aims, in particular the creation of alliances 
between two states, the settlement of peace treaties, and also the protection and 
acquisition of territorial possessions through the manipulation of inheritance laws. 
Dynastic marriages also, in some cases, secured for the queen a small degree of influence 
over the domestic politics of another court, such as in the maligned case of Marie-
Antoinette and her perceived pernicious influence in leading a pro-Austrian faction in the 
French court.36 Alliances were created and consolidated primarily through dynastic 
marriages due to the mutual obligations and gift giving which accompanied each marital 
union between dynasties.37 There is historical support for dynastic marriages functioning 
to realize these goals, but they were clearly imperfect vehicles.  
Some of these goals are expressed, though in a somewhat vague manner, by 
Cárdenas, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, prior to the double marriage between the 
																																																								
36 On this point, see Thomas Kaiser, “Who’s Afraid of Marie-Antoinette? Diplomacy, Austrophobia and 
the Queen,” French History 14, no.3 (2000): pp. 241-271. 
37 We have seen the marriage between Charles II of England and Catherine of Braganza had as its aim the 
consolidation of an alliance between England and Portugal. The union between Louis XIV of France and 
Maria Theresa of Spain in 1660—celebrated concurrent to the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees which 
ended the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-1659—is one of the best known examples of a dynastic marriage 
concluded to cement a peace treaty. Obviously the Habsburgs’ ability to consolidate and expand their 
territorial holdings through their many dynastic marriages exhibits the manner in which marriage and 
territorial and sovereign acquisition were integrally linked. 
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Spanish Habsburgs and French Bourbons in the second decade of the seventeenth 
century. Of the principal advantages of these dynastic marriages, he notes that: 
[T]he first is to ensure and fortify the Catholic religion in all Europe, giving a new breath 
of life to Catholics, along with other benefits. The second is to marry your daughter to a 
great king. Given the present state of the world, this is more important than anything that 
has occurred over the last two hundred years. The third is to allow Your Majesty to adjust 
the affairs of your Monarchy while remaining the arbiter of the world, and draw to him 
the monarchy that has been his adversary and made itself the leader of the Protestants.38  
 
Before outlining the vitally important empirical pattern which dynastic marriages 
generated, and the mechanisms through which it did so, we should of course add that 
dynastic marriage was not always successful in achieving its intended aims. For instance, 
dynastic marriage was not always sufficient to guarantee an alliance (or mutual military 
support) between two dynastic polities. As we have noted in the case of England and 
Bohemia, the dynastic marriage between the Elector Palatine Frederick and Elizabeth 
Stuart (daughter of James I) was not sufficient for James I to provide effective military 
support to Frederick during the Bohemian Revolt led by the latter in his role as King of 
Bohemia. In the case of peace treaties also, we find that dynastic marriage unions were 
not always successful in securing a lasting peace between two dynasties. For instance, the 
marriage between Louis XIV and Maria Theresa of Spain which accompanied the Treaty 
of the Pyrenees ending the Franco-Spanish War of 1635-1659, did not usher in a 
permanent peace between France, and Louis XIV would invade the Spanish Netherlands 
a mere eight years later to capture what he claimed was rightfully his stemming from his 
marriage. The limited ability of dynastic marriages to ensure peace was known to 
contemporary observers, and as a guarantor of alliances and peace, a dynastic union was 
only an imperfect vehicle to realize its intended aims. 
																																																								
38 Quoted in J. H. Elliott, “The Political Context of the 1612-1615 Franco-Spanish Treaty,” in Dynastic 
Marriages 1612/1615, ed. Margaret McGowan (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 12-13. 
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Though the theory of dynastic deterrence does not deny outright the relationship 
between dynastic marriage and alliances, clearly the former was an imperfect vehicle for 
the realization of the latter. Moreover, as a vehicle for peace (defined as the absence of 
war), dynastic marriage was of little assistance. However, on top of these intended 
consequences (imperfectly realized), we argue that the self-perpetuating network of 
dynastic marriages had an important unintended consequence that was only dimly 
understood by the participants themselves.39 The unintended consequence was negative 
in nature and consisted of a network of dynastic marriages which restrained the conquest 
impulse between dynasties provided they were tied together by marriage40 and embedded 
in a mutually intermarrying dynastic circle.  
 
Dynastic and Nuclear Deterrence Compared 
The mechanism underlying the suppression of the conquest motivation can best 
be understood through the lens of the theory of nuclear deterrence.41 According to this 
theory, nuclear war can never be won and thus should never be fought. The reason 
nuclear war can never be won, is because mutual second-strike capability gives each side 
the instantaneous ability to destroy that which is most valuable to the other—their major 
population centers—a massive cost which means nuclear war would be akin to 
destruction of the enemy and suicide for the state, namely ‘mutually assured destruction.’ 
																																																								
39 The relative lack of awareness by many historical actors of the underlying structural consequences of 
their own actions is familiar to us from frameworks such as Marxism and rational choice analysis, and thus 
does not invalidate the theory of dynastic deterrence. 
40 But the mechanism also obtains in the case of kinship relations. The closer and thicker the network of 
kinship ties between two dynasties, the more dynastic deterrence mechanisms were in operation.  
41 The following discussion draws heavily on the following classical works on nuclear strategy: Thomas 
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of 
the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). 
	
	 185	
The side that loses a nuclear war has the capacity to inflict as much destruction on the 
winning side as the winning side can inflict on the losing side. This consequence attains 
regardless of the state of affairs of conventional warfare, and of the material gains that a 
state may be able to realize during the war. As the well-known quote from Bernard 
Brodie asserts:  
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now 
on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.42  
 
The possibility of merely fighting a nuclear war and suffering inestimably high 
costs to the most valuable assets of the state win or lose43 is a powerful deterrent in 
restraining leaders from deploying nuclear weapons, and overrides any possible 
incentives and gains that could result from nuclear war. According to the theory of 
nuclear deterrence, the role of cities is crucial, as in modern times major population 
centers play a critical role in underpinning the economic life of states, so much so that 
threatening to destroy them instantaneously with nuclear weapons equates to effectively 
destroying the main source of value a state possesses. The high value of cities and the 
unacceptably high cost of losing them renders a country’s cities functionally equivalent to 
a group of hostages which—while kept alive—can be used to coerce the other state to 
cooperate in refraining from launching a nuclear strike. Analytically deterrence theory 
weighs losses and gains, and judges the losses from nuclear war massively outweigh any 
possible gains, thus rendering it an irrational strategy.   
The structural similarities between nuclear and dynastic deterrence are close, and 
the consequences of each—that there has been no nuclear war as yet in the nuclear age, 
																																																								
42 Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World 
Order, ed. Bernard Brodie. (New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), p. 62. 
43 In the language of nuclear strategy, the ability to destroy the most valued assets of another state is termed 
‘denial by punishment.’ 
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and that there were no wars in early modern Europe where a monarch aimed to conquer 
the state of another monarch in toto where the conditions of dynastic deterrence held—
are also analogous. In early modern Europe, the custom of dynastic intermarriage created 
a structure equivalent to an exchange of hostages where the dynastic bride and her 
entourage constituted a group of valuable hostages whose very presence in the court of a 
possible adversary functioned as an effective deterrent against any conquest attempt 
being made on the state receiving the bride.44 The parental family of the dynastic bride 
also constituted a set of hostages in a partial sense, as any attempt by a monarch to 
conquer and destroy the birth family of his bride would result in the destruction of his 
own marriage and extended family. When two ruling dynasties have only exchanged one 
bride between them, the correspondence between nuclear and dynastic deterrence is 
partial, as the hostages held by the two parties are not equivalent. Nonetheless, a single 
dynastic marriage functions in a manner analogous to a deterrence mechanism due to the 
fact that destruction of one dynasty by another is akin to self-destruction because it will 
necessitate the possibility of filicide or parricide by one or the other dynasty. And filicide 
and parricide have been considered to be especially heinous forms of homicide across 
history, let alone for Christian morality. 
																																																								
44 This also explains the curious phenomenon of why rival dynasties would intermarry, and often 
intermarry using the practice of the double marriage. Rival dynasties intermarrying is counterintuitive in a 
sense, as it might be expected that rival dynasties would attempt to partition themselves from each other, 
rather than open each other to mutual dynastic claims through intermarriage. When two rival dynasties 
intermarry, and given the not unlikely prospect of a return to conflict even between two intermarried 
dynasties, there must be assumed to be advantages for both parties arising from dynastic marriages even 
after a return to enmity. In this regard, the structure of double marriages is well suited as a means for rival 
dynasties to stake rival claims on the inheritance of the other safely, as reciprocity provides each dynasty 
with a hostage rather than only one. Such advantages, and the prestige of royal marriages, rendered them 
far preferable to morganatic marriages for ruling dynasties. 
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The structure of mutual deterrence typical of nuclear strategy is mirrored even 
more exactly in cases where a pair of dynastic brides was exchanged by two dynasties. 
This was sometimes done more or less simultaneously, as in the double marriage of Louis 
XIII of France and Prince Philip of Spain in 1612/1615 where hostages were exchanged 
at once.45 At other times the exchange took place over several generations—such as 
during the seventeenth century when the French Bourbons and Spanish Habsburgs 
exchanged brides over two generations, with Louis XIII and Louis XIV taking wives 
from the Spanish Habsburgs, and Philip IV and Charles II taking wives from the French 
ruling family (though Charles II wed a daughter of the Orleans cadet branch of the 
Bourbon dynasty due to Louis XIV having no legitimate female offspring). Though we 
can infer that the effectiveness of dynastic deterrence was stronger in such cases as this 
where daughters were simultaneously exchanged between two dynasties, sufficient 
evidence of greater strength does not exist46 as cases of partial exchange and successive 
exchange were also efficacious in bringing about the general pattern of dynastic 
deterrence. The pattern of restraint from conquest held in all dynastic dyads where the 
two dynasties shared a marriage tie, and where the monarchs in question had legitimate 
offspring. 
																																																								
45 Two other consequential double marriages took place in successive generations of Habsburgs. The first 
was the double marriage whereby the respective sons and daughters of the Habsburg Maximilian I, and the 
Trastámara Ferdinand II, wed according to an agreement brokered in 1495-96. This momentous double 
marriage would set the stage for consolidated Habsburg control of the Spanish Empire and the Holy Roman 
Empire under Charles V. In the next generation, the sons and daughters of the Habsburg Philip I King of 
Castile, and the Jagiellon Vladislaus II, King of Hungary, would lead expand the Habsburg patrimony 
under Ferdinand I to unify the Imperial crown and the powerful kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary. For 
more on the first of these double marriages, see Bethany Aran, “Voyages from Burgundy to Castile: 
Cultural conflict and dynastic transitions, 1502-06,” in Early Modern Dynastic Marriages and Cultural 
Transfer, ed. Joan-Lluís Palos and Magdalena Sánchez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), pp. 91-114. 
46 Inference is necessary here as no wars of conquest arose in the period we examine either in the 




Why Dynastic Brides Made Valuable Hostages 
We should also ask why the dynastic bride was considered to be of such value. 
Here we note the double importance of dynastic brides, both for her consanguineous 
(birth) and affine (adopted) families. From the perspective of dynastic politics, the bride 
is valuable to her consanguineous family insofar as she is their principal means to erect a 
dynastic claim to her adopted country through her children. Thus the dynastic bride is 
more valuable for her consanguineous family before she gives birth to an heir, after 
which point the heir comes to take on primary importance over the mother. However, 
dynastic brides also were secondarily valuable in three additional ways. First, she was 
valuable as a diplomatic agent directly advocating for policies favorable to her 
consanguineous family in her adopted court.47 Secondly, as a mother she was valuable as 
a vehicle for the transmission of an orientation friendly to the maternal family in her 
children. And thirdly, the bride was also occasionally influential as a regent in her own 
right, one of the most famous examples being Mariana of Austria for most of the life of 
her severely physically and intellectually impaired son, Charles II. As Raffensperger 
notes, “the goal of dynastic marriage was not only to seal an alliance, but to establish a 
base of power inside another kingdom.”48 For all these reasons, a bride living in a foreign 
court was of immense value to her consanguineous family. Conversely, the bride is 
																																																								
47 Frequently, a bride would also be a valuable source of surveillance in her adopted court, expected to send 
back reports of developments to her birth family from time to time. However, at times daughters were 
expected to intercede in the political affairs of their adopted court. As Kaiser writes of the case of Marie-
Antoinette, “Maria Theresa did on occasion ask her daughter to intercede on Austria’s behalf, once writing 
to Mercy that the fate of the entire alliance depended on such interventions…[but eventually] Vienna 
concluded that she could most effectively intervene by influencing the choice of ministers and other high 
officials.” Kaiser, “Who’s Afraid of Marie-Antoinette?,” p. 254. 
48 Raffensperger, Reimagining Europe, p. 62. 
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valuable for her affine family as the future mother of their own dynastic heir, but 
nonetheless poses a problem for her adopted family due to the ambiguous nature of her 
dynastic loyalty.49 Given this ambiguity, the status of brides in their adopted court might 
seem fraught, and more dynastic brides might be expected to have become victims of 
court intrigue and even purges. An important explanation for why they rarely fell victim 
to such victimization was not only the marital bond, but also the greater value of foreign 
brides as living hostages trapped in their adopted courts. Insofar as brides generally held 
immense value for their consanguineous families and their dynastic ambitions, brides’ 
value for their affine family was far greater alive than dead. 
It is revealing that, in early modern Europe dynasties tended to intermarry most 
frequently with other dynasties in the same proximate region as the territory over which 
they ruled. As Schönpflug has noted, “the marriage circles of the majority of royal 
houses…had a strong regional focus, and voisinage was a frequent argument in marriage 
negotiations and treaties.”50 This pattern can be conjectured to have arisen due to the 
efficacy of dynastic marriage in not only serving as a vehicle for dynastic 
aggrandizement, but also as a tool for deterrence. Obviously, deterrence was most 
necessary (and also most effective) between polities that bordered each other 
geographically, due to the frequently antagonistic nature of relations between 
neighboring dynasties and the proximity of threat involved. Dynastic marriages with 
neighboring dynasties both opened the possibility of acquiring contiguous territories via 
inheritance, and also enabled protection via deterrence against threatening neighbors. 
																																																								
49 Moreover, if the bride was unable to conceive, she quickly became an impediment to the dynastic 
ambitions of the affine family, and another wife would often be taken. 
50 Daniel Schönpflug, “One European Family? A Quantitative Approach to Royal Marriage Circles 1700-
1918,” in Royal Kinship Anglo-German Family Networks 1815-1918, ed. Karina Urbach (Munich: K.G. 




Exceptions to the Conquest Taboo 
 
Atypical Dynastic Rulers: Charles XII & Frederick II 
We now turn to anomalous cases and examine in more detail why rulers who 
sought to conquer in early modern Europe departed from the expectations of dynastic 
deterrence. Between the Westphalian settlement and the beginning of the French 
Revolution, the only wars in Europe where monarchs explicitly aimed at conquering a 
sovereign entity in toto were the Second Northern War (where Charles X invaded and 
occupied the Poland-Lithuania),51 the Great Northern War, (where the young Charles XII 
invaded the Poland-Lithuania and Russia in the midst of a war),52 and the Seven Years’ 
War, (where Frederick the Great in 1756 overran and occupied Saxony for a time).53 
These exceptional cases where conquest attempts took place are instructive, and help to 
better understand the mechanisms that supported conquest-desistance. 
																																																								
51 Robert Frost, After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655-1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
52 Derek McKay, and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815, (London: Longman, 1983), 
pp. 81-4. 
53 The Glorious Revolution of 1688, as it was a maritime invasion of England by Dutch forces led by the 
Stadtholder William of Orange, also possessed some of the characteristics of an invasion aimed at 
capturing the sovereignty of another state. However, insofar as it was framed as a revolution led by English 
nobles and was driven by William’s desire to shift England’s foreign policy to an anti-French stance, it 
does not fully conform to the category of ‘conquest.’ Ferdinand’s military campaign during the Bohemian 
Revolt also displays aspects of the conquest-motive, although here Ferdinand was himself elected King of 
Bohemia prior to the rebellion of the Bohemian estates, so this case was just as much (if not more so) the 
suppression of a rebellion as it was a ‘conquest.’ As we shall see, the conquest attempts made by Charles 
XII and Frederick the Great, though they fall under the category of wars of conquest, were nonetheless 
waged by dynastic rulers who were unconstrained to a remarkable extent by dynastic aims due to 
idiosyncrasies of their character and upbringing. The unsuccessful attempt at conquest made by the 
Sublime Porte against the Austrian Habsburgs (and their allies) culminating with the Siege of Vienna in 
1683, was a conflict between a monarch of the sphere of the former Christendom and the Islamic world, 
and was therefore a situation where the mechanism of dynastic deterrence was not operative. 
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The constraint on the conquest motivation does not hold in cases when the 
monarch is either unmarried, does not have legitimate offspring or is unmotivated by 
dynastic goals. The conquest taboo naturally does not hold in the case of republican 
rulers, such as Napoleon Bonaparte. In this context, it is instructive that both Charles XII 
and Frederick II (two early modern monarchs who attempted to conquer) were unusual in 
terms of both their own marital status, lack of offspring and lack of dynastic ambition. 
Both men were childless, freeing them, when constructing their strategic designs, from 
concerns of the marriage needs of their offspring. But additionally the marital status of 
both men was unusual insofar as Charles XII was unmarried and had little interest in a 
dynastic union (preferring to dream of a union based on true love)54 and moreover he 
expressed during his campaigns of the Great Northern War the feeling that he was 
“married ‘to the army’ for the duration of the war.”55 Frederick the Great, on the other 
hand, was married but was quite likely homosexual,56 and he held an intense and lasting 
antipathy toward his spouse, Elisabeth Christine of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel-Bevern. In 
these cases, dynastic instincts were deeply recessed or non-existent. We now examine 
some of the mechanisms that led to such monarchs having a profoundly a-dynastic 
outlook. 
 
Raison d'état over Dynastic Goals 
Both Charles XII and Frederick the Great were notable in their degree of 
identification with their state, rather than prioritizing the interest of the dynasty to which 
																																																								
54 Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, p. 91. 
55 Ibid., p. 209. 
56 Tim Blanning, Frederick the Great (London: Allen Lane, 2015), p. 51. 
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they belonged. The eighteenth century was the era when there first emerged European 
monarchic rulers who could conceptualize their goals primarily in terms of raison d'état, 
rather than being oriented solely to dynastic goals.  
Charles XII, in his maturity, was to a very great extent concerned with 
consolidation of the military power of Sweden, almost to the exclusion of dynastic 
considerations. In a letter written while in exile to his sister, Ulrika Eleonora, he writes 
that all the efforts of Sweden’s rulers should aim for increasing Sweden’s prestige in 
Europe. In it, he voices his belief that “such respect won’t come till we are stronger in the 
military sense and display our willingness to use the sword in our own defense.”57 About 
marriage, he writes: “I have neither the time nor the opportunity for marriage. Even when 
I come home, there are too many things to be done to permit me to think of a speedy 
marriage.”58  
Similarly, in Frederick II we see a ruler who prioritized the state over the dynasty. 
In part owing to the growing popularity of the ‘balance of power’ as a framework for 
foreign policy, this approach must also have followed from his estrangement from his 
father (and thus with dynastic considerations). As he writes in his political testament of 
1752, “the interest of the State is the only consideration that should decide the counsel of 
a Prince.”59 This is in marked contrast with the political testament of his father, Frederick 
William, who (despite his militarism) was still clearly thinking in dynastic terms when he 
exhorted his son and successor “not to start any unjust wars and not to be an 
																																																								
57 Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, p. 375. 
58 Ibid., p. 376. 
59 Frederick II, “Political Testament 1752,” in The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the 




aggressor…”60 The framework of just wars, as we have seen, is a quintessential dynastic 
trope, whereas raison d’état does not consider the relations between dynasties to be an 
important factor in guiding foreign policy decisions.61 
 
Militaristic Court Culture 
Exposing a future monarch to a heavily militarized court culture during youth 
could lead to them favoring highly bellicose strategies in their adulthood. Both of these 
exceptional monarchs had been born into court environments exceptional among the 
royal courts of early modern Europe for their intense militarism and repudiation of the 
dynastic ethos. As Markus Völkel notes of the origins of this militarized Hohenzollern 
court in the early eighteenth century: 
Anyone familiar with Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm in his youth…could not but have 
expected an anti-court policy on his succession, but few could have foreseen its 
radicalism. After the new King Friedrich Wilhelm I had resolutely transformed the old 
administration into a cabinet government entirely dependent on himself, while retaining 
the former regime’s best members, he turned his attention to his father’s court. No other 
Baroque court underwent such extensive changes. Few courtiers were spared dismissal 
and total loss of salary; those who were permitted to remain served for a paltry salary, 
performing entirely different duties.62 
 
It was this militarized court that Frederick the Great would inherit upon his 
accession, and which he would build into an even more streamlined martial system. 
Similarly, the Swedish court in which Charles XII came of age was highly militarized to 
																																																								
60 Frederick William, “Political Testament,” in The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. C.A. Macartney, (New York: Walker and Company, 1970), p. 
320. 
61 The contrast with a highly dynastically oriented monarch, such as Maria Theresa, is marked. In her own 
political testament, she writes, of the motivation behind the many organizational reforms she undertook, 
that these were done for the sake of “consolidating the Monarchy and preserving it for my successors.” 
This is a quintessentially dynastic outlook, in stark contrast to the statism of Charles XII and Frederick II. 
Cf. Maria Theresa, “Political Testament,” in The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. C.A. Macartney (New York: Walker and Company, 1970), p. 131. 
62 Markus Völkel, “The Hohenzollern Court 1535-1740,” in The Princely Courts of Europe 1500-1750, ed. 
John Adamson (London: Seven Dials, 2000), p. 225. 
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an extent unusual for the era. As Persson observes, “the military ethos of the Swedish 
court was perhaps its most dominant characteristic.”63 Most of the male courtiers would 
customarily go on to a career in the army after serving at court for a time, and a part of 
the court always followed the Swedish monarch on his frequent campaigns during a 
period when Sweden was almost continuously at war.64 Both Charles XII and Frederick II 
were exceptional in terms of being unconstrained by a dynastic worldview, and their 
highly realpolitik weltanschauung was conditioned by an upbringing in a militaristic 
court and ingrained acceptance of raison d'état. They did not think in dynastic terms, 
were only loosely embedded in constraining dynastic kinship ties and thus had little to 
lose from aiming to conquer. 
 
Elective Monarchies as a Limit Case 
We should also note two other exceptions to the dynastic conquest taboo in early 
modern Europe. Firstly, we should note that elective monarchies were not fully subject to 
the mechanism of dynastic restraint, due to the fact that the mechanism of election is 
analytically distinct from that of hereditary succession, and in its pure form an elective 
monarchy tends to inhibit the concentration of monarchical power within ruling 
dynasties.  
In the absence of hereditary succession—and the inapplicability of offspring as an 
effective restraint—the only effectual aspect of dynastic deterrence is the dynastic 
marriage tie itself. However, as monarchs who had acceded to the throne through election 
																																																								
63 Fabian Persson, “The Courts of the Vasas and Palatines,” in The Princely Courts of Europe 1500-1750, 
ed. John Adamson (London: Seven Dials, 2000), p. 290. 
64 Persson, “The Courts of the Vasas and Palatines,” p. 291. 
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held less prestige in the hierarchy of European rulers than those who had acceded through 
birth (especially when not of royal blood), elective rulers often had difficultly in securing 
marital unions with heiresses of the most powerful dynasties.65  
Given that dynastic deterrence only operates where ruling dynasties share direct 
marriage ties and are oriented to the successful preservation of their dynastic prestige, the 
marriages of elective monarchs often failed to provide an effective mechanism through 
which dynastic deterrence could operate. The saving grace, for elective monarchies of the 
early modern period—especially in the case of the Holy Roman Empire but also the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at times—was that they often functioned as de facto 
hereditary monarchies rather than as pure examples of the elective type.66 Indeed, as we 
																																																								
65 This was because royal dynasties in the early modern period generally eschewed unions with lesser 
ranking dynasties for their daughters. As Schönpflug notes, the sovereign dynasties of Europe “aspired to 
marry into houses of comparable or higher rank.” This was true in the case of Stanisław II August, the last 
elective monarch of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was originally from a noble but not royal 
family, and even after ascending the throne he never married. Bethlen Gábor, the elective king of Hungary, 
could not secure a desired marital union with a Habsburg archduchess, presumably as his lineage and 
elective status did not furnish him with sufficient prestige for such a union. See Schönpflug, “One 
European Family?,” p. 27. 
66 This was due to a number of reasons. Elective rulers often attempted to install their offspring as their 
heirs, giving play to the impulse to monopolize resources within the family unit, but this inevitably 
circumvented the elective mechanism. Nonetheless the frequency with which such attempts at 
monopolization were accepted was due in large part to the fact that, during the early modern period, 
hereditary succession was considered a source of stability for a state, and moreover being ruled by a ruler 
from a powerful (preferably royal) dynasty was viewed as an asset, rather than a shortcoming. As an 
example of this reasoning, we might look to debates in England about the merits and demerits of elective 
monarchies, which played themselves out during the instability of the seventeenth century. As Nenner 
recounts of the main basis for hostility to accepting England as an elective monarchy: 
“If we are to make sense of this passionate resistance to the possibility of an elective crown, we need to 
understand that for many a rule of election was a guaranteed route to chaos…they imagined a political 
world which at the death of every king would carry the recurrent threat of an 
interregnum…Brady…advanced the sharper and more frightening image of ‘anarchy and confusion.’” 
Howard Nenner, The Right to be King: The Succession to the Crown of England, 1603-1714, (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), p. 125. 
Moreover, the requirement for candidates in elective monarchies such as the Holy Roman Empire to be of 
royal kin, and the scarcity of qualified male candidates, meant that in practice the sons of the previous king 
possessed a very strong advantage (akin to an incumbent advantage) when contesting imperial elections. 
For instance, the marriage circles of the Empire were regulated by Fürstenprivatrecht, or the ‘private law 
of princes,’ which forbade marriages between ruling families and houses not represented in the Reich. Cf. 
Schönpflug, “One European Family?,” p. 28. In the Empire, this translated into a tendency for imperial 
elections to follow the lines of hereditary succession, especially after the fifteenth century. As Wilson 
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see in Chapter Four, as long as elective monarchies were functioning as hereditary 
monarchies in practice, the mechanism of dynastic deterrence was almost as effective in 
constraining the conquest impulse as it was in hereditary monarchies. 
 
Acceptability of Conquest Across the Civilizational Divide 
We should also note another partial exception to the dynastic conquest taboo, 
namely that the military interactions of rulers across civilizational divides—such as those 
between Western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire or between Western 
Christendom and the Russian Empire—were often characterized by conquest. As Nef 
notes, “it was only in the east of Europe that older conceptions of military campaigning 
[involving the conquest motivation] persisted.”67 The most famous example, in the period 
we are examining, was the Ottoman attack and siege of Habsburg Vienna in 1683, which 
would have been rendered immoral if there had existed dynastic ties between them. But 
in the absence of such dynastic ties, Vienna was seen by Kara Mustafa, the Ottoman 
Grand Vizier, as a wealthy but weak capital ripe for conquest by the soldiers of the 
Sublime Porte.68  
The acceptability of conquest across civilizations was due partly to the absence in 
these relations of an overarching web of normative rules governing behavior equivalent 
to the imperative of dynastic coexistence that regulated relations between Christian 
																																																								
notes, “nobles and the population generally preferred sons to follow fathers as this was interpreted as a sign 
of divine grace…of the 24 German kings between 800 and 1254, 22 came from four families, with sons 
following fathers 12 times.” Peter H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2016), p. 302. 
67 Nef, War and Human Progress, p. 156. 
68 John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna (New York: Pegasus Books, 2006), p. 23. 
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monarchs.69 To take an example, in classical Islamic thought, it was taken that no 
permanent peace may be established between an Islamic and non-Islamic ruler, and on 
the side of Christian theology, it was taken that the seizure of the lands of Muslims was 
justified in situations where they violated the natural law.70 Needless to say, these 
theological justifications were often taken by Christian monarchs as permission to wage 
wars of conquest on the lands of the infidel, and vice versa.  
A further reason for the persistence of wars of conquest across civilizational 
divides, which allows us to see the underlying operation of dynastic deterrence even in 
these cases, is that dynastic marriages across religious lines seldom took place, and thus 
the network of dynastic marriage ties did not exist to facilitate the emergence of a 
conquest taboo regulating these interactions. Furthermore, Schönpflug relates that 
dynastic unions between Catholic and Orthodox royal houses was rare, and these 
confessions straddled the contentious border between the emerging Russian Empire and 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where the conquest taboo was not strongly 
established.71  
 
The Decline of Offensive Dynastic Wars 
 
The decline in the duration and magnitude of wars into the early modern era 
mirrors the concomitant decline of offensive wars driven by competing dynastic claims, a 
phenomenon driven by the thickening network of dynastic marriages and kinship that 
																																																								
69 Naturally, the imperative of dynastic coexistence was particularly strong between Christian rulers of the 
same confession, and decreased in strength between rulers of different confessional allegiances. 
70 Edward Keene, International Political Thought: A historical introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 
94. 
71 Schönpflug, “One European Family?,” p. 30. 
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connected the ruling dynasties of Europe. In earlier times, when the kinship network 
between dynasties was not so dense, and where ruling dynasties were more diverse, 
dynastic marriages were often used offensively as a means for dynasties to gain a 
foothold in the line of succession or inheritance of another dynasty so they could use this 
as a pretext to stake a legal claim at a later date.72 
However, two important transformations took place in the transition to early 
modern Europe, which led to a diminution of the intensity of dynastic wars. The first of 
these transformations, as we have seen, was the gradual decrease in the number of 
distinct dynasties ruling European kingdoms over time.73 The second transformation, 
which followed on logically from the first, is the gradual increase in frequency of 
dynastic marriage between these ruling dynasties. As the number of ruling dynasties 
declined, (and assuming a preference between ruling dynasties for royal matches), the 
resulting increased frequency of marriages between dynasties increased the density of the 
kinship network, creating a dense thicket of interlocking dynastic claims and counter-
claims which could be deployed to claim the territory of the other.  
We can observe the tightening network of dynastic kinship ties in the pattern of 
repeated intermarriage between core European ruling dynasties also during the ancien 
régime. Examining marriage data from 1600-1800, we find that the Spanish Habsburgs 
and French Bourbons pursued a strategy of repeated intermarriage during the seventeenth 
century with two monarchs in each country taking dynastic wives from the other (in the 
																																																								
72 For this reason, dynastic marriages in the Middle Ages acted to destabilize relations between monarchs, 
as evidenced by the Hundred Years’ War waged between the Valois and Plantagenet dynasties during the 
fifteenth century for control of succession to the French throne. 
73 In 1300 there were eleven dynasties ruling the sixteen kingdoms of Europe, whereas in the fifteenth 
century eight dynasties ruled these kingdoms, and by the year 1610 there were only five dynasties that 
together ruled all of these kingdoms. These dynasties were Capet-Bourbon, Stuart, Habsburg, Vasa, and 
Oldenburg. Wolf, “The Family of Dynasties in Medieval Europe,” p. 188. 
	
	 199	
case of Spain, one of these was with the Bourbon Orléans cadet line). In the same 
century, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs repeatedly intermarried, with two monarchs 
each taking wives from the other. The Austrian Habsburgs additionally married 
repeatedly into the Wittelsbach dynasty. During the eighteenth century, the two monarchs 
from the Spanish Bourbons took wives from the House of Bourbon-Parma, whereas the 
Austrian Habsburgs took wives from both the powerful ruling houses of electorates in the 
Empire, and twice with the Spanish/Parma branches of the Bourbon dynasty. 
In such a circumstance, why was it that dynastic conflict counter-intuitively 
became less rather than more severe during this period? The counter-intuitive result was 
due to the dense network of interlocking relations and claims itself, and the expanding 
nexus of retaliatory dynastic claims and counter-claims that could be triggered by the 
pursuit of any succession claim. The greater number of royal dynasties in the Middle 
Ages, and the relatively sparse marital relations between them, meant that the cost of 
dynastic revisionism (military aggression aimed at making a dynastic claim in another 
kingdom) was relatively low. However, as the web of European dynastic relations 
became increasingly interconnected through repeated dynastic marriages, the cost of 
dynastic revisionism increases, as all monarchies became more vulnerable to an 
escalating cycle of retaliatory succession claims from multiple directions.  
If monarch a has a (however tenuous) dynastic claim to the throne of another 
kingdom without the senior member b of the ruling dynasty in that kingdom holding a 
reciprocal claim, the cost for monarch a of invading kingdom b to claim that crown is 
low as their own dynastic title is not at stake. However, if both a and b have reciprocal 
claims to each other’s crowns, then the systemic cost of initiating dynastic aggression 
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increases due to the multidirectional (not unidirectional) claims involved and the threat 
that each faces. Just as state support for a revolution in another country can have the 
effect of rendering the state more vulnerable to similar claims due to the contagious 
nature of revolutions, it must have been understood by early modern rulers that waging 
offensive wars of succession could cause blowback and increase the vulnerability to 
succession claims on their own inheritances.  
The decreasing number of ruling dynasties together with the increasing density of 
kinship ties between them is the long-term historical pattern that explains the decrease in 
offensive dynastic wars by the outset of the early modern period. As Parker explains, “in 
the sixteenth century wars tended to be fought for dynastic rights…whereas in the 
seventeenth they more often concerned the control of adjacent territory.”74 Whereas at the 
close of the Middle Ages war was still fought to secure dynastic succession of whole 
kingdoms—such as with Philip II’s military attempts to make good his dynastic rights to 
the English throne via his marriage to Mary I—the dynastic claims of the seventeenth 
century were either limited in scope, or defensive with the aim of preventing a competing 
dynastic claim. During the early modern period, as the cost of dynastic revisionism 
increased, dynastic rulers became more status quo oriented in the pursuit of their dynastic 
objectives, and fought status quo wars to prevent dynastic revisionism from emerging. 
If we examine the archetypical wars of the late Middle Ages, we find wars such as 
the Castilian War of Succession (1474-1479) fought mainly between Portugal and Castile 
for succession to the throne of Castile. This war involved a Portuguese invasion of 
Castile to press the claim of Afonso V and his Castilian wife, Joanna, against the rival 
																																																								
74 Geoffrey Parker, “Dynastic War,” in The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 162. 
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claim of Isabella and her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon.75 The Habsburg-Valois Wars 
(intertwined with the Italian Wars 1494-1559), were instigated by the Valois Charles VIII 
when he invaded Italy in 1494 in order to convert a distant dynastic claim to Naples, 
which he successfully captured, but not before arousing formidable opposition from the 
Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I and Ferdinand of Aragon, as well as in Italy.76 These 
late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century wars were offensive succession wars, 
insofar as both were initiated with invasions by rulers of one kingdom to enforce dynastic 
claims to another, though some of these quickly morphed into broader regional conflicts 
involving multiple protagonists and subsidiary conflicts. The nature of these conflicts was 
primarily offensive, being prompted by the desire to press a dynastic succession claim in 
another polity. 
By the time of the reign of Louis XIV in the late seventeenth century, dynastic 
wars were not so much offensive or regional, but rather limited and defensive in nature. 
In the War of Devolution, as we have seen, Louis claimed parts of the Spanish 
Netherlands for his wife, Maria Theresa of Spain, but the claims were limited in nature. It 
was, as Lynn recounts: “a walkover by mighty France against feeble Spain [and]..saw 
some skirmishes but no great field battle; instead it was a war of seizures and sieges.”77 
																																																								
75 Chris Cook and Philp Broadhead, The Longman Handbook of Early Modern Europe 1453-1763 (Essex: 
Pearson, 2001), pp. 117-118; J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002), 
Chapter 1. This war was part civil war and part succession war, with Castile fighting for Castile to ally 
itself with Portuguese concerns, and Aragon aiming to orient Castile to the Mediterranean concerns of the 
Aragonese. 
76 For more on the Habsburg-Valois Wars, see Jeremy Black, “Habsburg-Valois Wars,” in Europe 1452-
1789, Volume 3, ed. Jonathan Dewald (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004). 
77 John A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714 (Essex: Pearson, 1999), pp. 107-108. 
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Given the relative strength of Louis’ army at the time, it is surprising that he did not 
annex more territory than he did.78  
The War of Spanish Succession, one of the classic dynastic struggles of the early 
modern period and Louis XIV’s swansong on the international stage, also exemplifies the 
status quo nature of the dynastic wars of the period. The origins of the War of Spanish 
Succession were in the contested will of the childless Charles II of Spain wherein he 
fixed the succession of Spain on his grand-nephew, the Bourbon Philip, Duke of Anjou 
(also the grandson of Louis XIV).79 In the event, Louis’ acceptance of the will of Charles 
(in contravention of the secret partition treaty he had already signed with William) and 
his unwillingness to exclude his grandson Philip from the French line of succession was 
the fateful decision that precipitated war. However, the proximate spark for the fighting 
to begin was the blocking move of Emperor Leopold I intended to protect what he saw to 
be his legitimate dynastic inheritance of Milan. Eventually the Grand Alliance, formed by 
the rulers of Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Dutch Republic, fought Bourbon 
France and Spain to prevent any chance of a union of the crowns of France and Spain.80  
																																																								
78 Louis’ Wars of the Reunions also involved claims based on the treaties of Westphalia and Nijmegen, 
(though these claims were not dynastic in nature), and involved annexations of a number of towns and 
cities along France’s eastern border from the Spanish Monarchy and Holy Roman Empire, most notably 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg. The reunions were limited in nature, and entailed the annexation of cities 
rather than entire dynastically held domains. For more on this, see Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-
1714, chapter 5. 
79 The will, which superseded a previous secret agreement between William III and Louis to partition Spain 
upon Charles’ death, posed a difficult conundrum for Louis. He realized that the succession of his grandson 
to the throne of Spain would likely lead to war with the Holy Roman Empire under Leopold as well as 
England, (as the Austrian Habsburgs also claimed rights to the Spanish throne), but upholding the secret 
partition treaty would also risk war, only with Spain, whose people desired the will of Charles II to be 
executed and for Philip to the crowned. Mark Thomson, “Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the 
Spanish Succession,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4 (1954): pp. 111-134. 
80 Luard, The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815, p. 152. The vital fear 
motivating the leaders of the Grand Alliance was that the dynastic status quo of Western Europe would be 




The nature of dynastic warfare had transformed between the early sixteenth 
century and the eighteenth century, with dynastic claims in the interim becoming both 
preventive, and limited in nature. Importantly, by the time of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, according to Nef, the nature of the warfare of the era had become limited in 
nature, and “commanders of victorious armies had ceased to aim at the annihilation of 
defeated army…they expected the enemy’s troops to get away.”81 Despite some caveats, 
Lynn has also accepted the occurrence of a shift toward controlled war during the early 
modern period. Though he notes the frequency of international conflict in Europe did not 
decrease, nonetheless he does acknowledge that regimes increasingly “fought not to 
destroy one another but simply for limited territorial or economic gain.”82  
The reason this long-term shift in the nature of dynastic war has been ignored is 
partly because it was hidden. It was hidden by the upsurge in confessional conflict that 
arose in the mid-sixteenth century due to the reformation and continued until the 
Westphalian settlement, a brief period of intense and destructive conflict that obscured 
the longue durée internal transformation of dynastic wars.83 
We can see the ameliorative effect of the thickening network of European 
dynastic intermarriages when we compare the record of dynastic wars of the intervals 
1494-1648 and 1648-1789. We fix these intervals both due to their relative parity, and the 
fact that their extremities are bookended by important conflicts representing important 
																																																								
81 John Nef, War and Human Progress (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 156. 
82 Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714, pp. 362-363. 
83 Nonetheless, it should be remembered that even the archetypical case of confessional conflict, the Thirty 
Years’ War, was sparked by dynastic issues, namely the deposition of Emperor Ferdinand II by the 
Bohemian estates as King of Bohemia and the Emperor’s military efforts to regain his Bohemian title. 
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turning points in the history of European warfare.84 When comparing these two periods, 
we find a notable diminution in the number of attempted and successful offensive 
dynastic wars between the two historical periods.  
Historical Period  
1494-1648 1648-1789 
Charles VIII (France), Naples 1494 Charles X (Sweden), Poland 1655 
Louis XII (France), Milan 1499 Charles XII (Sweden), Poland 1701 
League of Cambrai, Venice 1508 Frederick II (Prussia), Saxony 1756 
Francis I (France), Turin 1536  
James IV (Scotland), England 1513  
Phillip II (Spain), England 1588  










Swedish Empire, Pomerania 1630  
Table 2: Invasions of Sovereign Territories during the Late Middle Ages & Early Modern eras 
During the period 1494-1648, we see no fewer than eight attempted conquests of 
self-ruling polities. However, in the latter period of 1648-1789, we only see three 
attempted conquests of self-ruling polities, with Charles XII’s invasion of Poland-
Lithuania taking place in the midst of an unpredictable war.85 The decrease in attempted 
																																																								
84 The first period, which combines late medieval dynastic conflicts as well as religious conflicts, is opened 
by the Habsburg-Valois Wars (1494-1559) which were fought to assert or defend classical dynastic goals, 
and encompass the era of religious conflicts initiated by the Schmalkaldic Wars (1546-7, 1552) and ended 
by the Thirty Years’ War. The second period begins after the conclusion of the Westphalian settlement, and 
ends with the outset of the French Revolutionary Wars.  
85 It should be noted that a self-ruling polity is a polity with its own sovereign ruler, whatever the form of 
government, and is not merely the province of a larger polity. And as we have already noted, conquest 
attempts in the midst of war are less aberrations from conquest desistance due to the unpredictability and 




conquests during the latter period, though attributable partially to the modus vivendi 
between confessional groups made possible by the Westphalian settlement,86 is 
nonetheless to a large extent due to the long-term transformation of dynastic warfare 
concomitant to the increasing density of kinship relations between European royal 
dynasties. The increasingly absolute nature of warfare between European monarchs in the 
overseas territories, in large part due to outsized the role of joint-stock enterprises there 
such as the Dutch East India Company, and the frequent change of sovereignty that 
accompanied such intense conflict,87 underlines the anomalous state of affairs that existed 
in early modern Europe during the period 1648-1789. 
	
																																																								
86 The reason we cannot attribute this longue durée shift entirely to the confessional modus vivendi, is 
because if true it should have entirely eliminated conflict between states with different confessional 
allegiances. This the Peace of Augsburg and Westphalian did not accomplish. For instance, the three 
definite conquest attempts during the latter period we examine took place across the Protestant-Catholic 
confessional divide. However, the motivating logics animating these military actions, was not primarily of 
a confessional nature.  
87 The different nature of conflict drew in part from the fact that the priorities of such joint-stock enterprises 
diverged significantly from the dynastic priorities of European dynastic politics, and involved above all the 
pursuit of economic prosperity and the uninhibited pursuit of wealth. On this point, see J. H. Shennan, 




EXPLAINING COMPOSITE STATE LONGEVITY 
 
Now we have examined some representative cases of early death composite states 
to gain a better insight into disintegrative forces, we must examine two archetypical late 
survival composite states: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Holy Roman 
Empire. When we examine cases of late surviving composite polities and ask what best 
explains their longevity, we consider two sets of historical facts. Firstly, we examine 
historical moments of existential crisis when state collapse was most imperiled. Based on 
the serious threat to composite state survival posed by external military intervention, we 
here examine conquest attempts that almost succeeded. Secondly, we examine the final 
dissolution of the composite polity, and ask what triggered eventual state death. As the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Holy Roman Empire were the two composite 
polities that survived for the longest duration until the epochal transformations of the 
French Revolution,1 we examine these two polities in more depth to establish how they 
were able to ward-off state death for so long. 
Holdovers from the feudal era, both of these polities—besides being the last 
composite states to survive from the dawn of the post-Westphalian period—were also 
elective monarchies for much of the early modern period.2 The Holy Roman Empire is 
																																																								
1 We should note that other composite polities that seem late surviving do not rival these two cases for a 
number of reasons. The personal union between Great Britain (later the United Kingdom) and the Kingdom 
of Hanover was resurrected after being dissolved during the Napoleonic Wars, but it was established in 
1714 with the Hanoverian succession, quite late in the period under examination. The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, often cited as a quintessential example of a composite state, was only established in 1867.   
2 The elective principle of the Holy Roman Empire coalesced around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
when the expression ‘Prince Elector’ started to gain currency, and the practice of elections was formalized 
with the Golden Bull of 1356, which fixed the form and practices of the electoral college of the Empire. 
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particularly important for our study as the only true example of a secondary composite 
state in ancien régime Europe. Moreover, the dissolution processes of both of these 
composite states exemplify the remaining two pathways to composite state death: 
conquest (or partition) in the case of Poland-Lithuania, and disestablishment in the case 
of the Reich. When examining the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Holy Roman 
Empire (a relatively pure elective monarchy and de facto hereditary elective monarchy, 
respectively), we find that dynastic deterrence was an important preventive factor that 
facilitated longevity as long as the rulers of these dynasties maintained the practice of de 
facto hereditary succession, and in such manner they were successful in deterring 
conquest attempts. In addition, when initial occupation was successful but conquest 
impossible (as occurred twice with attacks on the Commonwealth), we find the 
illegitimacy of brute conquest acted as a strong impediment to the completion of 
territorial conquest.3  
																																																								
After Frederick III’s election in 1440, the Holy Roman Empire came to function as a de facto dynastic 
monarchy whereby successive members of the Austrian Habsburg dynasty (often sons but sometimes 
siblings of the sitting emperor) were elected to succeed the Imperial throne. The Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was closer to the ideal-type of an elective monarchy, (the ideal-type of an elective 
monarchy is independent of dynastic succession), but nonetheless also functioned as a quasi-dynastic 
monarchy for significant stretches of its history. After the death of the last Jagiellon king (the childless 
Sigismund Augustus on 7 July 1572) the recently united Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was forced to 
solve the problem of succession to the Polish throne, and in 1573 its Sejm (assembly) arrived at the 
decision to select kings via elective principle through a process of trial and error. In contrast to the electoral 
college of the Empire, which allowed only a small group of Prince Electors the right to vote, the elections 
for the Commonwealth were open to all noblemen present, and the king was not allowed the right to 
designate or choose a successor. The Commonwealth was ruled by consecutive members of the same 
dynasty between 1587-1668 (the Vasas) and 1698-1763 (the Wettins), and as we shall see, this relatively 
‘pure’ elective nature of the throne of the Commonwealth lent itself to large degree of instability whereas 
the Empire was to a significant extent protected by the de facto dynastic and hereditary nature of its crown. 
For more on these cases, see Harold Nicolson, Kings, Courts and Monarchy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1962), p. 178. Peter Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2016), Chapter 
7. Almut Bues, “The Formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century,” in The 
Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c.1500-1795, ed. Richard Butterwick (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 68-9. 
3 The role of powerful allies and protectors was an additional supportive factor preventing the completion 
of early modern conquest. 
	
	 208	
When we examine the eventual demise of these two composite polities, we 
discover that the designs of a predatory ruler uninhibited by dynastic norms alongside the 
weakening of the conquest taboo during the Napoleonic Wars was sufficient to sound the 
death knell to these political forms. The most severe near-death crises faced by the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth involved two partially successful military conquests 
(by the Swedish kings Charles X and Charles XII) that did not achieve absorption of the 
Commonwealth into Sweden due to domestic Polish resistance and strategic 
miscalculation. Ultimately the non-dynastic Commonwealth was unable to protect itself 
from demise in the face of rapacious and non-dynastically oriented rulers (here Frederick 
II and Catherine the Great), and weakening norms against conquest. The Holy Roman 
Empire, due to its quasi-dynastic monarchy, saw the Habsburgs deploy dynastic 
marriages successfully to co-opt monarchies within and surrounding the Reich into a 
zone of dynastic suzerainty where conquest was not considered appropriate. These 
regional dynastic kinship relations protected the Habsburgs from conquest attempts until 
the continental wars set off by Republican France under the command of the non-
dynastic ruler, Napoleon Bonaparte. The contrast between these two composite polities 
(with diverging succession norms) exemplifies the mechanism of dynastic deterrence in 
operation, and shows the protective role of dynastic marriages for composite states 
governed by de facto hereditary succession principles. 
 
The Survival of Existential Crisis 
 




Elective Monarchy as an Anomaly 
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth exemplifies an important anomalous case 
for the study of dynasticism and war in ancien régime Europe. Not only was it one of the 
longest surviving elective monarchies, but the Commonwealth was invaded twice (by the 
Swedish kings Charles X and Charles XII) and sunk into a deep state of dependence on 
powerful neighbors during the eighteenth century. Here we can observe the difficulties an 
ideal-typical elective monarchy faced when competing in a milieu where its neighbors 
were mostly hereditary monarchies.  
In contrast to hereditary monarchies which could weave a network of dynastic 
kinship ties acting as a first line of defense against covetous neighbors, the elective nature 
of the Commonwealth left it mostly without a long-term ruling dynasty and could not 
deploy such strategies. Instead, without interlocking dynastic ties with its neighbors, the 
Commonwealth was vulnerable to occasional conquest attempts and thus depended for its 
survival on its size and difficulty of conquest, the military protection of patrons, and the 
dynastic desistance from conquest. While dynastic norms and the disdain of brute 
conquest remained strong within Europe, would-be conquerors found it difficult to 
convert their occupation of the Commonwealth into permanent annexation. Due to the 
weakening of these dynastic norms, the long-term survival of the Commonwealth was 
increasingly threatened, and eventually it was partitioned out of existence in the late 
1700s. 
The Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, as a relatively pure elective monarchy, 
was inherently quite unstable, despite its surprisingly long-life. In this regard, despite 
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being a late surviving composite state, it exhibits markedly diverging tendencies from the 
Holy Roman Empire. As Anderson has noted: 
[E]ach successive royal election provoked party conflicts and personal intrigues which 
often led to civil war, as well as pressure and even forcible intervention from abroad on 
behalf of competing candidates. The kings of Poland, often foreigners, their hands ties by 
promises made to the greater nobility at their accession, had to submit to continuous 
scrutiny and control by the same nobles. Any effort to increase their powers, most of all 
any suggestion that the Crown might once more become hereditary, at once aroused the 
most violent opposition.4 
 
The weakness of an elective monarchy in a system of hereditary monarchies—due 
to its inability to secure stable dynastic alliances—is a better explanation for the long-
term weakness of Poland-Lithuania than the buffer state argument sometimes given in IR 
scholarship. The buffer state argument posits that the geographical location of Poland as a 
state interposed between fierce rivals (such as Russia, Austria and Prussia) was the key 
factor that led to its congenital weakness. However, this view does not account for 
variations in the Commonwealth’s security even given its constant geographical position. 
Even if it is accepted that the Commonwealth declined in strength precipitously around 
the same time as the rise of Russia, nonetheless Poland was threatened even before the 
rise of the Russian Empire by the rivalry between the Austrian Habsburgs and the 
Sublime Porte, which occupied parts of nearby Hungary. Yet the Commonwealth 
experienced periods of strength even during this period. The constitutional structure and 
its limitations, with less weakness during periods of de facto hereditary dynastic 
																																																								




succession, is a factor that better accounts for variations in Poland-Lithuania’s overall 
security and military capabilities than geographical location.5  
Given the Commonwealth did not have the luxury of stable cross-generational 
dynastic alliances to provide it with deterrence effects, the primary reason it survived for 
so long must be that its survival was in some part a consequence of factors external to 
itself, rather than of internal factors. Therefore, to an extent we must see the longevity of 
Poland-Lithuania as epiphenomenal whereas longevity of the Holy Roman Empire was 
not. Particularly after the restoration of Augustus II in 1709, the Commonwealth survived 
primarily due to the patronage of another state, Russia, which guaranteed its sovereignty.  
 
The 1655 Invasion 
We proceed first by examining the existential crises that most threatened the 
survival of Poland-Lithuania before we turn later in the chapter to the factors that 
underlay its actual demise during the Polish partitions. The moments of maximal crisis 
for the Commonwealth were undoubtedly the two invasions by Swedish kings, which 
threatened the very survival of the state. Commonly known in Poland as the ‘Deluge,’ the 
first of these invasions by Charles X of Sweden in 1655 had dynastic roots, insofar as it 
can partially be traced to the dissolution of the composite monarchy uniting the Kingdom 
of Sweden and the Commonwealth, which came into existence under Sigismund III Vasa 
between 1592-1599, half a century earlier. After he was deposed from his Swedish throne 
																																																								
5 The exemplary version of the buffer state argument is given by Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics 




in 1599 in a rebellion led by his uncle, Charles IX,6 Sigismund never reconciled himself 
to the loss of his Swedish crown, and the conflict between the two branches of the Vasa 
dynasty would continue on and off until the peace of Oliva in 1660.7  
In the early years of the seventeenth century, the competition between these two 
dynastic branches would largely center around Livonia, and the Polish Vasas would pay a 
heavy price for their continued preoccupation with their Swedish inheritance when they 
lost most of Livonia during the Thirty Years’ War to Gustavus Adolphus with the 
armistice of Altmark of 1629, simultaneously assisting the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns in 
strengthening their grip on the dukedom of Prussia.8 It is notable that, unlike the Spanish 
and Austrian branches of the Habsburg dynasty—which frequently intermarried and 
largely avoided direct conflict—the two Vasa branches maintained a relationship of 
rivalry rather than condominium. The conflict between Sweden and the Commonwealth 
under the Vasas is a case of an unusual analytical category: hostile composite polity 
disintegration.9 Besides the longstanding dynastic conflict, the expansionist and 
militaristic orientation of successive Swedish monarchs was also an important factor in 
creating the conditions for the invasion of 1655.  
																																																								
6 The forces driving the rebellion were largely confessional (Sigismund was Catholic whereas the 
population of the Kingdom was largely Protestant), but the Swedish nobles had also opposed his father, 
John III, and his absentee rule (as his court was based in Kraków) did not endear him to his Swedish 
subjects. Paul Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p. 11. 
7 Jablonowski, H., (1970), “Poland–Lithuania 1609–48,” in J.P. Cooper (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern 
History Vol. IV, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 598 
8 Ibid., p. 600 
9 The dissolution of the Sweden-Poland-Lithuania composite state falls under this category due to the 
dynastically contested nature of the rebellion that deposed Sigismund. Such a circumstance leads to the 
danger of subsequent attempts at coercive reunification by one of the rival claimants. In this regard, Luard 
has correctly noted that “a major motive for Sweden in her war with Poland in 1655 was the desire to 
destroy a potential claimant to the Swedish throne at a time when the Poles were already embroiled in 




Be that as it may, the proximate drivers of the invasion lay in the vulnerability felt 
by Charles X upon his accession to the Swedish throne in 1654. There were three reasons 
for this vulnerability, two dynastic and one power political. Firstly, Charles’ predecessor, 
Queen Christina, had abdicated the throne childless, and thus Charles’ dynastic 
legitimacy was insecure, to the extent that his succession had been opposed by the Privy 
Council before Christina utilized divisions within the nobility to gain acceptance of her 
cousin as heir to the throne.10 Secondly, the steadfast refusal of John II Casimir (himself a 
son of Sigismund III) to renounce his hereditary claim to Sweden upon his election to the 
Polish throne in 1648 meant that Charles X felt an additional source of pressure on his 
dynastic legitimacy. Finally, in the face of the ineffectiveness of the Polish military in 
ensuring the defense of Poland-Lithuania in the face of incursions from the East by 
Muscovite and Cossack forces,11 the situation in the Commonwealth was seen by Charles 
and his council as a security crisis for the Swedes, with Russian territorial gains in Poland 
posing a serious threat to the eastern territories of the Swedish Empire.12 The invasion of 
the Commonwealth by Charles X was thus over-determined by both dynastic and power 
politics, and the fact that the dynastic rulers of Sweden and the Commonwealth were 
descended from a dissolved composite monarchy meant that dynastic deterrence was 
disabled in this case.13  
																																																								
10 Jerker Rosén, (1961), “Scandinavia and the Baltic,” in The New Cambridge Modern History Vol. V, ed 
F.L. Carsten (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 521. 
11 This situation was also a consequence of what was perceived by the nobility to be an increasing 
divergence between the interests of the Commonwealth (seen to be the defense of the home territory), and 
those of the monarchy (which was preoccupied with foreign interventions, such as the pursuit of the Vasa’s 
dynastic claims in Livonia). Robert Frost, After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern 
War 1655-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 17. 
12 Paul Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p. 95. 
13 This is due to its characteristic as in many ways an intra-dynastic, rather than an inter-dynastic struggle. 
	
	 214	
Nonetheless, it is instructive that the first impulse of Charles X was to attempt to 
ally with Poland-Lithuania against Russia. However, the price that Charles set John 
Casimir for an alliance was the renunciation of the latter’s claim on the Swedish throne 
and de jure recognition of Swedish rule in Livonia.14 John Casimir refused to accept this 
condition, and this meant these two polities saw each other as illegitimate pretenders, and 
this in turn opened up the use of invasion as a legitimate means to be used against a rogue 
‘internal’ province. The decision of John Casimir to refuse to renounce his claim to the 
Swedish throne (and thereby jeopardize the Swedish alliance) was taken as a devastating 
mistake by the Polish nobility, which saw an alliance with Sweden as essential to the 
Commonwealth’s survival. This hostility toward John Casimir on the part of the nobility 
has been argued to underpin the capitulation of the Polish-Lithuanian forces to the 
Swedish invasion, though this has not been conclusively proven.15 
Although the 1655 Swedish invasion was shaped by the dynastic context and 
driven in part by the military collapse of Poland-Lithuania in the face of invading Russian 
forces,16 the speed with which the nobility bandwagoned and sided with the Swedish king 
was an indication of a much deeper malaise within the polity of the Commonwealth. The 
divergence which the nobility perceived between their own interests and those of the 
monarch, due to the preoccupation of the Vasas with their Swedish claims, led to what 
Frost calls an ominous “feeling…that the monarchy’s concerns were different from those 
of the Commonwealth.”17 At the same time as yet the king commanded insufficient 
loyalty from the nobility to be able to guarantee the safety of the Commonwealth alone, 
																																																								
14 Ibid., p. 95; Frost, After the Deluge, p. 39. 
15 Frost, After the Deluge, pp. 34-35. 
16 By the end of 1654, they had captured Smolensk and the following summer they controlled large swaths 
of Lithuania. Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century, p. 95. 
17 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 17. 
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the monarchy was dependent on the szlachta militarily and politically due to the absence 
of a standing army, a fatal combination. 
In the face of the shock of the military collapse of 1655, the Diet should have 
implemented reforms to curtail their own power and strengthen the monarchy to create a 
more robust military force. However, reform proposals as gained circulation between 
1656 and 1662 were ultimately rejected, and the power of the nobility through the 
liberum veto, or the practice via which the vote of one deputy was sufficient to break up 
the parliament, or Sejm, was enhanced at the cost of crippling the Diet as an effective 
parliamentary body.18 Rather than establishing a more robust system to face external 
threats, the Sejm further curtailed the power of the monarch, and in the process crippled 
the defensive capabilities of the Commonwealth. After repelling the occupation of 
Charles X with the assistance of surrounding powers, this was the degraded condition in 
which the Commonwealth subsisted more or less until the invasion of Charles XII in 
1701. The relatively emergent and unsettled pattern of political interactions in the Baltic 
region also added to the instability of politics in Northern Europe.19  
Charles X had succeeded in occupying Poland-Lithuania due to the degraded state 
of its military capability brought about by the unusual elective nature of the Polish throne 
and the great power this gave to the nobility at the expense of the monarchy. However, 
military weakness of the Commonwealth was not the only salient factor that allowed 
these invasions to take place—it was rather an efficient cause but not a permissive cause. 
For there were many other militarily defenseless small states and duchies in Europe that 
																																																								
18 Robert Frost, (1986), “Initium Calamitatis Regni? John Casimir and Monarchical Power in Poland-
Lithuania, 1648-68,” European History Quarterly, 16 (1986): p. 193; Frost, After the Deluge, p. 14. 
19 Frost, After the Deluge, p. 13. Even the much-lauded victory of John III Sobieski over the Turks during 
the siege of Vienna in 1683 has been argued to represent a lesser victory than its reputation suggests, due to 
the militarily backward condition of the Sublime Porte at the time. 
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by this measure should have been invaded and annexed but were not. The background 
factors that made possible these two invasions, despite the existence of dynastic 
deterrence and norms inveighing against conquest during this period, must be 
reexamined.  
 
The Failure of Dynastic Deterrence 
Both Swedish invasions were embedded in larger conflicts that threatened the 
security of Sweden: in the case of the invasion of 1655 the joint Muscovite and Cossack 
invasion (or the Russo-Polish War) that had come atop a simmering six-year-old Cossack 
revolt; in the case of the 1701 invasion the tripartite predatory offensive by Denmark, 
Saxony, and Russia against Sweden led by a newly crowned and inexperienced Charles 
XII. In both contexts, the threat to Sweden was considered to be existential, and both 
invasions of the Commonwealth were argued (regardless of the merits of the case) to be 
defensive and militarily necessary. The limited failure of dynastic deterrence here can be 
put down to two factors. Firstly, we have the fact that the conflict between Sweden and 
the Commonwealth combined elements of an inter- and intra-dynastic conflict, and 
dynastic deterrence was weak to non-existent within dynasties. Secondly, during the 1655 
invasion, a damaging divide between the monarch and the nobility undermined the 
willingness of nobility to come to the defense of the Commonwealth in the face of the 
powerful Swedish expeditionary force, and this rapid collapse of military resistance 
encouraged a greater Swedish incursion than was originally planned.  
The Muscovite war had also exacerbated latent tensions between Poland and 
Lithuania, due to the greater losses borne by the latter from the fighting, which weakened 
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their resolve to defend the greater Commonwealth.20 Thus it was not surprising that 
Lithuania was first to submit to Sweden and swear allegiance to the Swedish king. The 
willingness to surrender on the part of some of the Commonwealth’s troops during the 
invasion was a consequence both of the insufficient commitment to the defense of the 
polity exhibited by sections of the nobility, as well as a general sense that the 
Commonwealth was in no shape to defend itself against a fully fledged attack.21 
However, it was the background dynastic context, which was the main factor 
permitting the Swedish invasions to take place. The 1655 invasion came against the 
background of years of internecine conflict between two branches of the Vasa dynasty, 
each of which disputed the dynastic legitimacy of the other. In this regard, the Swedish 
invasion of 1655 displayed elements of a civil war as much as it possessed aspects of 
inter-dynastic conflict. Nonetheless, even here the influence of dynastic ties reveals itself, 
as Charles X first attempted to forge an alliance with John Casimir against Muscovy, and 
it was only after this these overtures failed that an invasion was launched. The 1701 
invasion by Charles was equally framed by the dynastic context. Rather than annex the 
Commonwealth for itself, the goal of Charles XII was to install a puppet monarch 
favorable to Sweden on the Polish-Lithuanian throne. This latter case shows that the 
conventions of dynastic politics still shaped the pathway through which power political 
goals could be pursued.  
The existence of weak dynastic ties between Charles X and John Casimir, (both 
were descended from Gustav I, though Charles X maternally) as also between Charles 
																																																								
20 Ibid., pp. 43-49. 
21 Ibid., p. 46. 
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XII and Augustus II (they were cousins on their mother’s side),22 does not directly 
contradict the pattern of dynastic deterrence, as the kinship relation in neither case was 
via marriage, nor double marriage. It does show the limits of weaker forms of dynastic 
kinship to prevent war, especially when the ties are between two branches of the same 
dynasty. Here, the third mechanism of intermarriage expectations well accounts for why 
these invasions were not in fact totally counterintuitive, as the expectation of dynastic 
intermarriage did not exist between the two Vasa branches, furthermore the two Vasa 
branches saw each other’s head as an illegitimate dynastic pretender. 
 In the case of the 1701 invasion, the dynastic relations between the ruling Wettin 
dynasty of Saxony and the Swedish Palatinate-Zweibrücken dynasty had already broken 
down, due to the invasion of Sweden hatched in secret by Augustus II and his two co-
conspirators. The expectations held by Charles XII for future amicable dynastic relations 
with the Danish Oldenburgs as well as with the Wettins were at a low ebb. In this 
context, it is unsurprising that Charles XII would have viewed his battle with Augustus II 
to be an existential one. Moreover, the fact of the non-linearity of conflict, meaning that 
the unfolding of military interactions during war are characterized by uncertainty and 
unintended consequences arising from a plethora of feedback effects, meant that the 
norms operative during peacetime have less force during times of war. As Beyerchen has 
noted, positive amplifying feedback is especially evident during war, making severe 
losses exponentially more likely after an initial defeat than they would be at the outset of 
hostilities.23 The inclination of Charles XII to push his advantage as far as it could 
																																																								
22 R. M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1986), p. 103. 
23 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, 
no. 3 (1992/1993): pp. 59-90. 
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possibly go was no doubt exacerbated by his youth—as he was not yet at this time old 
enough to marry or have children, let alone to have adopted a dynastic worldview.  
As we elaborated previously, dynastic deterrence is operative only when a 
dynastic ruler is married with children, or has clearly adopted the worldview of dynastic 
politics. Charles XII, at the time he decided to continue and wage a war of conquest 
against Poland-Lithuania, possessed none of the attributes necessary to be oriented 
toward dynastic goals, and was locked in a conflict formation where the expectations of 
future dynastic intermarriage were low. It is little surprise, then, that he was 







The Emergence of Balancing During Occupation 
It has been argued that balance of power considerations, first forming during this 
period, were behind the shifting dynamics of war that followed the initial invasion of the 
Commonwealth and its partial occupation. Certainly, after the initial invasion, more 
unvarnished military dynamics came into play, as they often do in conditions of conflict. 
Even without rising external opposition to the Swedish occupation of the 
Commonwealth, several factors served to retard the gains of the Swedes with the progress 
of time. The territory of Poland-Lithuania is flat and hard to control, especially with an 
insufficiently large army. Indeed, the army of Charles X was from the beginning 
insufficient to indefinitely occupy the parts of the Commonwealth they held, and was 
stretched to the limit by the task of occupation. In this regard, the composite nature of the 
Commonwealth—which gave to it its expansive terrain—was well suited if not for 
defense in depth (as the concept had yet to be invented), then at least for swallowing up 
the efforts of ambitious invaders in the graveyard of fruitless occupations. Furthermore, 
Charles, who had at the outset of the occupation pledged to uphold the traditional 
liberties of the nobility and regularly call the diet, but subsequently violated this pledge, 
rapidly squandered the goodwill of the people.  
Resistance to the Swedish occupation first appeared in November of 1655.24 By 
April 1656 most of the Poles had turned against the Swedish occupation, and Charles, 
rather than attempt to maintain control over the whole of the Commonwealth, decided to 
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concentrate his efforts on securing control of Livonia and Royal Prussia.25 It has been 
argued that an expanding Swedish threat triggered the intervention of surrounding powers 
on the side of the Commonwealth, but it should be remembered that the medieval origins 
of the balance of power lie in its function as assisting less powerful polities defend 
themselves against the predatory behavior of the more powerful. Brandenburg, which 
initially had allied itself with Sweden, defected and joined the Commonwealth in return 
for recognition of its possession of Ducal Prussia.26 The Dutch did likewise, and the 
Emperor Leopold also came to the aid of the Commonwealth in 1657. When Denmark 
declared war on Sweden in 1657, hoping to take advantage of the Swedes preoccupation 
with their troubled occupation, the Swedish position became overextended.27 By this 
time, Charles was already withdrawing his Swedish occupation army into Pomerania.28 
While the military dynamic certainly took on a life of its own once the occupation 
had begun, consideration of dynastic factors is important for understanding why the 
Swedish occupations following these two invasions was left ‘incomplete’ without formal 
annexation. The strong distaste of dynastic politics for unprovoked aggression was an 
important factor that activated balancing behavior on the part of rulers on the periphery of 
Poland-Lithuania, and the resistance to legitimizing Swedish possession of the 
Commonwealth assisted it to gain allies against Sweden. As Lockhart notes:  
Gustav Adolf had been a hero; Karl Gustav was an unprincipled aggressor. The wars 
against Poland and Denmark had alienated nearly all of Sweden’s potential allies and 
enraged her traditional enemies.29 
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28 Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century, p. 97. 
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After Charles X retreated to Pomerania and then turned his attention to 
subjugating Denmark, the forces aligned against him were too strong. By 1659 the 
Swedish forces were in retreat in Prussia, and were trapped in Denmark with no obvious 
means of escape. It was only the death of Charles on the 23rd of February, 1660, and the 
accession of a five year old king, that Sweden was released from its predicament, with 
the regency government eager to negotiate peace.30 Given the aversion to legitimizing 
conquest in Europe, it is unsurprising that the Peace of Oliva (May 1660) negotiated in 
the aftermath of the Second Northern War, was conservative. The peace re-established 
the status quo ante bellum of 1655 but recognized Swedish claims to Livonia while John 
Casimir finally agreed to renounce the Polish Vasas’ claim to the Swedish throne.31 
 
Poland-Lithuania and the 1701 Invasion of Charles XII 
 
Charles XII’s invasion of Poland-Lithuania also took place in the context of an 
ongoing war, the Great Northern War (1700-1721), which began with the formation of a 
threefold alliance between Denmark’s Frederick IV, Saxony’s Augustus II (who was also 
king of the Commonwealth in a personal union), and Peter of Russia. The allies all 
wished to acquire vulnerable parts of the scattered Swedish Empire which they felt to be 
																																																								
neighbors. As the early modern period progressed, the balance of power progressively came to proscribe 
not small states being annexed, but large states growing too large. In other words, the balance of power 
became preoccupied not with protecting small states, but with checking the expansion of predatory large 
states. In this regard, the defection of various monarchs from being allies of the Swedes to joining the side 
of the Commonwealth exemplified classic balancing behavior, and was propelled not merely by the fact of 
Swedish aggression, but by the absence of a strong legal claim buttressing Charles’ invasion of the 
Commonwealth. 




rightfully theirs: the Danes intended to annex the Holstein-Gottorp lands and perhaps 
regain some parts of southern Sweden; the Saxons wished to regain Livonia on behalf of 
Poland, as well as the port of Riga; and the Russians eyed lands in Ingria which Sweden 
had earlier seized from them in 1617.32 The alliance planned to attack Sweden on three 
fronts with a view to quickly subduing an enemy they saw to be weak and led by an 
inexperienced teenage king only recently ascended to the throne. However, as well 
encapsulated by McKay and Scott, “unfortunately for the allies, their young 
inexperienced victim turned out to be a military genius with a far superior army.”33 
 
Invasion and the Unpredictable Course of War  
The military dynamic took an unpredictable course as might have been expected 
once the three-pronged attack of Denmark, Saxony, and Russia was underway. With the 
assistance of the English and Dutch navy, Charles first repelled the Dutch attack by 
threatening Copenhagen and forcing Frederick IV to sue for peace. Then, Charles’ army 
soundly routed Peter’s army at Ingria in November of 1700, and rather than pursue 
Peter’s army quickly to force a peace, he turned—in what has traditionally been 
interpreted as a strategic mistake—south to invade the Commonwealth.34 In doing so, 
Charles intention was to defeat Augustus and the Saxons first before turning to Russia. 
Though Charles and the Swedes felt that Tsar Peter was the greater enemy, it was decided 
that leaving Augustus’ Saxon army in the Commonwealth undefeated would cause 
																																																								
32 Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983), p. 
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problems and possibly leave open a renewal of the alliance between Augustus and Peter 
at a later time.35  
Charles’ plan, therefore, was to invade Poland-Lithuania and force the 
dethronement of Augustus as king of Poland, replacing him with a Swedish-friendly 
candidate, thereby ending the dangerous dynastic union between the Commonwealth and 
Saxony and effectively turning the Commonwealth into a puppet state.36 This strategy 
was strongly criticized by Frederick II, who later wrote:  
The method Charles pursued in the Polish war was certainly very defective. The conquest 
of Poland, which is everywhere an open country without fortresses, is a thing of no 
difficulty, but to hold Poland…is very precarious. The more easily conquered, the more 
difficult it is for a conqueror to fix and maintain himself.37 
 
Soon, Charles’ Swedish army overran the Commonwealth, whose troops 
collapsed as a military power in battles including Warsaw (1705), Fraustadt (1706) and 
Kalisz (1706). This collapse astonished contemporary observers, alerting them to the sad 
state of the Commonwealth’s military.38 The goal of installing a puppet ruler rather than 
attempting to govern the Commonwealth directly was an evolution from the earlier 
strategy of Charles X and reflected an accommodation with the difficulty of annexing 
territory without the pretext of a dynastic claim. It was also a function of the difficulty of 
occupying a vast land as the Commonwealth and ruling it directly. As Hatton notes, “the 
																																																								
35 R. M. Hatton, (1970), “Charles XII and the Great Northern War,” in The New Cambridge Modern 
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country was geographically too vast for…the Swedish army to control it by military 
means.”39  
After a number of years of military operations in the Commonwealth consisting of 
skirmishes between Charles and Augustus as they tried to outmaneuver each other on 
Polish territory, Charles was finally successful in dethroning Augustus and installing 
Stanisław Leszczyński on the Polish throne in 1705 as a Swedish puppet.40 After 
occupying the Commonwealth, Charles turned to Saxony, which he invaded in 1706, 
coercing Augustus to recognize the loss of his Polish crown in September of the same 
year.41 However, Charles’ intervention in Poland-Lithuania had allowed Tsar Peter vital 
breathing space to increase and improve his army, as well as to found St Petersburg on 
the Neva River.42 Meanwhile, the situation in the Commonwealth deteriorated due to 
Leszczyński (the Swedish backed puppet) being unable to consolidate native support for 
his rule.  
 
The Russian Defeat of Sweden 
Charles had been ‘unable to conciliate or crush his enemies,’ and the majority of 
the szlachta withheld support for Leszczyński due to their exclusion from offices and 
privileges being distributed by the new king.43 Charles’ Polish policy was harsh and 
absolutist, with little attempt to cloak Swedish coercive influence over, and contempt for, 
Polish institutions and legal norms.44 On the other hand, Tsar Peter’s Polish policy 
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showed more signs of gaining local acceptance than that of Charles, due to greater 
consideration for the preferences of his ally Augustus, who still commanded a significant 
section of the army of the Commonwealth.45 The Russian policy of allowing greater 
autonomy on the part of their Polish allies, in contrast to Charles’ constant interference, 
led to influential Polish nobles refraining from assisting Charles in his campaign against 
Russia at the critical moment in 1708-9.46  
When in 1708 Charles impetuously invaded Russia, Peter’s army had been 
significantly strengthened from modernization efforts, and after a detour through the 
Ukraine, the Swedish forces met the Russian army at Poltava on the 8th of July 1709. At 
Poltava the Swedish army was routed by the Russians in a devastating defeat, losing 
about 10,000 men. The defeat was exacerbated when most of the remaining army 
surrendered to their Russian pursuers three days later.47 This astonishing sequence of 
events forced Charles to flee into exile in Turkey, and the Swedish position in the eastern 
Baltic collapsed. After full confirmation of the total nature of Charles’ defeat to Peter, 
Augustus re-entered Poland in August 1709 with 11,000 men and support for 
Leszczyński collapsed as Russian troops poured in from the East. Peter reassured the 
Poles that their traditional laws and liberties would be restored, and Augustus was 
restored to the Polish-Lithuanian throne in the Diet of February-April 1710.48 The Wettin 
restoration ushered in a long era of Polish-Lithuanian political dependence on Russia, 
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47 Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793, p. 23. 
48 Jerzy Lukowski, Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century, 1697-
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symbolized by the acceptance by the Diet of the right of Russia to intervene inside the 
Commonwealth on behalf of the Orthodox population.49   
The strategic mistakes of Charles in bringing about his defeat at the hands of the 
Russians in 1709 have been much discussed. High among the purported errors include 
neglecting to chase down the Russian army and forcing terms after routing them at Narva 
in 1700, as well as his congenital impetuousness which led to spectacular tactical 
victories but also contributed to an inadequate attention to supply-lines and 
inattentiveness to the limitations of Sweden’s army during the Russian campaign.50 His 
unwillingness to negotiate and accept peace offers, such as his rejection of Peter’s offer 
to restore most of Russia’s conquests in return for St Petersburg on the eve of the Russian 
invasion, has also been cited as an error. Whatever the strategic limitations of Charles’ 
prosecution of his war against Russia, his eschewal of a conventional dynastic approach 
of maintaining firm alliances with other ruling dynasties—a function it would seem of his 
youth upon accession and inadequate socialization into dynastic norms due to military 
responsibilities—prevented him from seeing the value of a dynastic approach. As Hatton 
notes of this unwillingness of Charles to play the dynastic game: 
There is…a sense in which one can speak of Sweden as forfeiting international goodwill 
in a competitive age by too ‘selfish’ a policy: she did not want, or could not afford, the 
ties of firm alliances and lost the…advantages which such alliances might have brought.51 
 
 
Dynastic Norms Condemning Conquest 
When we wish to understand the factors that prevented conversion of the Swedish 
occupation into a more stable set of arrangements, we start by pointing to the role of 
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strategic errors. The extreme tactical impetuousness that Charles XII displayed was 
closely related to the absence of a dynastic dimension to his strategic approach. Both 
Charles’ fearlessness in the face of superior materiel, and his disregard of conventional 
diplomatic methods, arose from his disdain for tradition and also point to a problematic 
lack of prudence that could have tempered his risk-taking. In the absence of such 
prudence, it was inevitable that sooner or later Charles’s expansionist wartime policy 
would have faced an insurmountable adversary. A lone wolf monarch fighting for 
regional hegemony with little help from dynastic allies in a dynastic world was bound to 
fail, especially when considering that Charles’ Sweden did not alone possess the 
resources (human or materiel) to sustain the commitments of a great power.  
Beyond the limitations of Charles’ strategic approach, the crucial background 
factor that prevented Sweden from annexing, or attempting to annex Poland-Lithuania, 
was the still widely accepted norm of dynastic inheritance right which cut against the 
recognition of possession arising from brute military conquest. Even if Charles X or 
Charles XII had succeeded in occupying Poland-Lithuania for a longer period, it is 
doubtful, given the diplomatic norms of the period in terms of practice, that any claim by 
Sweden to annex Poland-Lithuania would have been accepted in the ensuing peace 
negotiations. Osiander has written of the practical distaste of dynastic rulers in the early 
modern period to acquiesce the conquests claimed by rulers during the Thirty Years’ 
War, such as France and Sweden: 
France and Sweden did seek to introduce change into the system, in the shape of 
territorial adjustments to be made in their favor. These territorial gains were supposed to 
serve as a ‘satisfaction’ or indemnity for services rendered to their German allies. But 
although the territories that they coveted were already under their military control, their 
wish to appropriate them permanently faced stiff opposition. The opposition to the 
French and Swedish demands took strength from the fact that the two crowns had no 
tituli legitimae possessionis, that is legal titles, to the territories in question. Those actors 
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who did were not easily convinced of the need to part with them. Interestingly, the right 
of conquest was admitted in theory as a means of legitimizing territorial change. But, 
contrary to the popular perception of the period, it was universally rejected in practice.52 
 
It is probable that an attempt by Sweden to annex the Commonwealth would not 
have been recognized by the other dynastic rulers of the period, and the strong voices 
objecting to foreigners holding the Polish throne even prior to Augustus’ restoration 
indicates the difficulty that would have accompanied any attempt by Charles to stand for 
election himself.53 These practical and normative barriers explain why Charles’ strategy 
for the Commonwealth centered around installation of a Swedish puppet on the Polish-
Lithuanian throne rather than outright annexation. 
 
Elective Monarchy as Allowing Invasions 
One characteristic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth rendered it 
susceptible to invasion by neighboring rulers. The elective and largely non-dynastic 
nature of the Commonwealth meant its monarchs had difficulty in deploying dynastic 
marriage ties as a forward layer of diplomatic influence and protection against the 
predatory impulses of neighboring rulers. Given that each monarchical election contained 
the possibility of a dynastic change, reputational effects flowing from normatively 
unacceptable behavior did not easily deter rulers from invading the Commonwealth. Even 
if the explanation for the unfinished nature of Swedish occupations of the 
Commonwealth rests in part on strategic errors, the fact that the Commonwealth could be 
invaded at all on a massive scale was in part a consequence of the permissive role of its 
constitutional structure as an elective monarchy. 
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The case of the Commonwealth can be seen as an elective monarchy that survived 
beyond a point when it was in control of its own fate in a threatening constellation of 
hereditary monarchies. It should be remembered that the underdeveloped nature of 
nationalism and the lack of non-interference norms for monarchical elections rendered 
elective monarchies of the ancien régime inherently susceptible to outside interference. 
Additionally, the security of the Commonwealth was further compromised by its 
geographical location at the Eastern edge of the zone of Christendom, making it the 
logical target of the predatory impulses of rising Orthodox and Islamic powers such as 
Russia and the Sublime Porte. This is significant, as the interactions between the sphere 
of Christendom and its other, were fraught and relatively unconstrained by the conquest 
taboo. It is therefore unsurprising that the Commonwealth was one of the first European 
states to be erased from the political map, due in part to the actions of a ruler outside the 
historical bounds of Christendom (Russia’s Catherine the Great) acting in collusion with 
another ruler relatively unconstrained by dynastic norms (Frederick II) to swallow it 
whole.54  
 
Crisis in Poland-Lithuania and Competing Expectations 
The Swedish invasion of 1655 was the closest that Poland-Lithuania came to 
sovereign extinction during the ancien régime. The manner in which the invasion came 
about and the attempted conquest failed is instructive for the study of composite state 
survival. Though direct invasion is usually foreclosed when two dynasties are closely 
related, we saw here that the relations between two branches of the same dynasty were 
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sometimes fraught by conflict, especially when the two branches had broken apart under 
contentious circumstances and claimed legitimacy over the other. However, the dynastic 
ties between Sweden and the Commonwealth were operative in driving Charles X to 
initially seek an alliance with John Casimir against the Russians, though the attempt 
failed due to John Casimir’s unwillingness to give up his claim to the Swedish throne. 
The intransigence of Casimir in pursuing what seemed to most of the Polish nobility a 
claim impossible to realize, cost him greatly in terms of their support and likely 
contributed to the collapse of the Commonwealth’s military defenses in the face of the 
Swedish advance. 
The 1701 invasion of Charles XII was a threat not so much of the loss of 
sovereignty of the Polish-Lithuanian monarch as it was a threat to the independence of 
the monarchy. Three facts lead to the conclusion that this invasion was not a conclusive 
refutation of the operation of dynastic deterrence. Firstly, the invasion of the 
Commonwealth took place during an already heated conflict, a situation in which the 
constraining influence of conquest desistance is somewhat vitiated. Secondly, the 
invasion did not aim for annexation, as the goal of Charles was to consolidate a Swedish 
puppet on the Polish throne. Though the historical record does not provide evidence of 
the reasons behind Charles’ choice of approach, undoubtedly the decision to install a 
puppet ruler was in some part due to what he would have known as the low chance of 
success of any annexation attempt. Finally, as we discussed in Chapter Three, Charles 
was an atypical example of the dynastic ruler relatively uncommitted to dynastic goals. 
The dynastic norm of conquest avoidance is disabled in cases where a ruler is not 
committed to such goals.  
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More broadly, the expectation of dynasticism that pure-type elective monarchies 
are at a disadvantage in an environment where dynastic states could weave a network of 
kinship relations to stabilize their sovereignty against external threats was given moderate 
support here. Poland-Lithuania was a relatively pure elective monarchy, only departing 
from its a-dynastic tendency on a number of occasions over its history, and though 
Charles was related to the sitting Polish king Augustus II at the time of the 1701 invasion, 
there would have been no expectation at the time that Augustus’ dynastic house of Wettin 
would come to dominate the throne of the Commonwealth for several generations. In 
these circumstances, and given the exceptional circumstances active in this case, the 
dynastic approach would have expected Poland-Lithuania under Augustus to be 
moderately more vulnerable to invasion attempts than a normal hereditary monarchy. 
When evaluating the expectations from realism, we look to the composite nature 
of the Commonwealth and ask whether the additional materiel provided by the composite 
domains were important in either giving it an enhanced defensive capability in military 
conflict, or in deterring military offensives from the outside. To be sure, the extensive 
territory of the Commonwealth made conquest difficult for a smaller power such as 
Sweden, due to the sheer logistical difficulty of occupying the entirety of the 
Commonwealth and the effectiveness of defense in depth resistance strategies in the case 
of partial occupations such as occurred in these cases. However, the military incapacity 
of the Commonwealth in the face of external invasion was pronounced, and the 
constitutional weakness of the central monarchy in amassing military power outweighed 
any numerical advantage that might have accrued from the composite domains. A larger 
and more populous power than Sweden would not have been hampered in occupying and 
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imposing its will on the Commonwealth in the same manner. Moreover, force deterrence 
was clearly inoperative in these two cases, as some of the most invasive and ambitious 
military invasions of the post-Westphalian period were launched against Poland-
Lithuania by Sweden. For these reasons, the expectations from dynastic deterrence seem 
on firmer ground than those of early modern realism, when examining near-death events 
in the life of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the post-Westphalian period. 
When applying the leadership learning approach to these cases of composite state 
near-death, the expectations this approach derives are not as they might seem at first 
glance. In fact three of the relevant rulers in the two invasions—the Swedish king Charles 
XII as well as John Casimir and Augustus II—all received a royal dynastic upbringing. 
John Casimir of the Polish Vasas came of age at a time when the Vasas ruled the 
Commonwealth as a de facto hereditary monarchy, and Augustus II had been raised in 
the ruling house of the Electorate of Saxony. Only Charles X, who had been raised as a 
member of the ruling house of the County Palatine of Zweibrücken (a small state of the 
Holy Roman Empire), was deprived of the education of what would have been 
considered royalty. Though he was later elevated to become Swedish monarch due to 
succession failure after the reign of Queen Christina, we would expect Charles X to have 
been least inculcated in dynastic norms than his counterparts. This was likely partially at 
play in his decision to invade the Commonwealth. Yet John Casimir as the second son of 
Sigismund III—meaning he was not granted the full rigorous education given to his elder 
brother—and Augustus II as the second son of his father, John George III Elector of 
Saxony, were hardly in a significantly superior position with regards to inter-generational 
leadership learning. Furthermore, Charles XII, who we might expect to have been most 
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inculcated in dynastic norms and learning, acceded to the throne at the tender age of 
fifteen, and was forced into a life or death war a mere three years later. 
Given that all of the main protagonists during the two invasions were somewhat 
handicapped in terms of leadership learning, clearly diverging expectations cannot be 
derived, but it is noteworthy that the dynastic norm-breaking Swedish invasions were 
both undertaken by dynastic rulers deprived of what would be considered a complete 
course of rigorous training for a life of rulership. Furthermore, insofar as a well-rounded 
dynastic education might have counseled against the wisdom of radically aggressive 
moves without sufficient support from allies, it is suggestive that Charles XII had been 
forced to the throne at an age before he could have gained a good appreciation of the 
pitfalls of strategic improvisation. As the strategic overextension of both Charles X and 
XII could have resulted in greatly deleterious consequences for their state, the role of 
leadership learning is seen here in its absence, as permitting hasty and unwise decisions 
where its presence may have constrained these rulers from making such mistakes. 
 
The Holy Roman Empire and the War of the Austrian Succession 
 
In contrast to Poland-Lithuania, the Holy Roman Empire—due to its blend of an 
elective constitution with hereditary succession superimposed above it—was a polity that 
successfully ameliorated the weakness of the elective mechanism through the strengths 
afforded by dynastic marriage and hereditary succession. The structure of the Reich as a 
secondary composite state with dynastic ties between the monarchic core and the 
peripheral domains also exercised an important supporting role. As such the Empire was 
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effectively able to protect itself from the predation of neighboring kingdoms, despite 
being subject to similar external pressures as Poland-Lithuania. In particular, the greater 
control over the monarchic center arising from a small selectorate—due to an electoral 
college composed of less than ten prince-electors compared with the larger selectorate of 
the Polish-Lithuanian nobility—and the dynastic marriage ties that connected the ruling 
Habsburg dynasty with ruling dynasties inside and outside the Empire, provided it with a 
dynastic buffer-zone where invasion was unthinkable, in addition to giving surrounding 
states a stake in its survival. The essence of the Habsburg survival strategy involved co-
opting surrounding dynasties by making them stakeholders in the survival of the Empire 
through interwoven kinship ties. 
Let us first examine the dynastic mechanisms of the Reich in operation so as to 
better understand the manner in which they protected the Empire from conquest attempts. 
Though the Empire was also endangered by severe existential threats during the period in 
question 1648-1789, none was more severe than the threat to Vienna during the War of 
the Austrian Succession.55 The Habsburgs successfully parried this threat via the 
deterrent effect of dynastic ties. However, we see in this case, as well as in the Seven 
Years War, the emergence of a destructive systemic influence in the person of Frederick 
II, a leader unconstrained by dynastic norms, who due to his willingness to invade 
countries even without strong dynastic claims loosened the adherence of contemporary 
monarchs to these norms. In the limited success of the Holy Roman Empire in parrying 
these existential threats, we observe in action the dynastic desistance from conquest and 
																																																								
55 The other severe existential crisis faced by the Reich, was the siege of Vienna of 1683. However, as this 
pitted the Habsburgs and their allies against the Sublime Porte (not part of the same civilizational sphere of 
Christendom), the dynamics of that siege are not relevant for our current study. 
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its empirical manifestation in the buffer zone of dynastic kinship ties that protected the 
Empire from invasion. 
 
Frederick II and the Origins of the War 
Though the possibility of a conflict over the outcome of the Austrian succession 
was opened decades earlier with the heirless emperor, Charles VI, needing to gain 
acceptance for the Pragmatic Sanction via his revision of Salic Law (allowing females to 
succeed to the throne in Habsburg possessions such as the Archduchy of Austria, the 
Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, etc), the War of the Austrian Succession was 
immediately precipitated by the new young ruler of Prussia, Frederick II, when he 
invaded the Austrian province of Silesia.56 Two months after Charles’ death in October of 
1740, Frederick II, who had recently acceded to the Prussian throne in May of the same 
year, invaded Silesia, and initiated a war that would push the Habsburgs to the brink of 
losing their grip over their hereditary domains.  
The aims of Frederick in the invasion were an admixture of various motives: 
territorial, strategic and dynastic. Insofar as Frederick desired to expand Prussia’s 
exposed position to make it more defensible, and also gain a wealthy territory well placed 
to divide the Elector of Saxony from his holdings in Saxony and his Polish-Lithuanian 
throne, his aims were territorial. Strategically, he felt the timing to be optimal as it would 
preempt what was felt to be imminent attempts by Saxony and Bavaria to also make 
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by Charles’ eldest daughter Maria Theresa, Habsburg diplomacy thenceforth aimed toward and succeeded 
in obtaining guarantees to respect the Pragmatic Sanction from the other major powers of Europe by 1735. 
Spain gave its assent in the Treaty of Vienna of 1725, Russia by alliance with the Emperor in 1726, Britain 




territorial gains in the wake of the accession of the youthful Maria Theresa. As Frederick 
wrote, in October of 1740, just before executing his famed invasion: 
The superiority of our troops over those of our neighbors, the promptitude with which we 
can act, and, in sum, the advantage which we possess over our neighbors, is complete, 
and gives us, in an unforeseen occasion such as this, an infinite superiority over all other 
European Powers. If we wait to act until Saxony and Bavaria have made the first hostile 
moves, we shall be unable to prevent Saxony from enlarging her territory, which, 
however, is entirely contrary to our interests, and in that case we have no good pretext.57 
 
However, he had to orient his choice at least minimally to dynasticism in his 
choice of Silesia over other possible targets of predation, as he felt the claims of the 
House of Brandenburg over Silesia to be the strongest. Nonetheless, the claim he made 
on Silesia was very tenuous, and was made only to maintain the veneer of dynastic 
legality.58 
 Though the Silesian invasion would not be the most egregious infringement of 
dynastic morality that Frederick would commit, nonetheless it was his first offense and 
the beginning of his attack on dynastic norms that would accelerate with the invasion of 
Saxony less than two decades later, and culminate with the first Partition of Poland. 
Shortly after Frederick’s death, the entire system of European dynasticism would face its 
nadir during the Napoleonic Wars. Still, compared to later actions, the invasion of Silesia 
was distantly moored in dynastic convention, and Silesia was only a small territorial 
																																																								
57 Frederick II, “Ideas on Political Projects to be Formed in Connection with the Death of the Emperor, 
(1740),” in The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. 
C.A. Macartney (New York: Walker and Company, 1970), p. 327. 
58 Though Louis XIV had made some tenuous dynastic claims, particularly in the War of Devolution and 
the Reunions, the brazenness with which Frederick set about to expand his territorial holdings, was 
breathtaking. The most problematic part of the dynastic claim made on Silesia by Frederick on behalf of the 
Hohenzollerns, was that it had lapsed. As Macaulay notes: 
“It is certain that, whoever might originally have been in the right, Prussia had submitted. Prince after 
prince of the House of Brandenburg had acquiesced in the existing agreement. Nay, the Court of Berlin had 
recently been allied with that of Vienna, and had guaranteed the integrity of the Austrian states. Is it not 
perfectly clear that, if antiquated claims are to be set up against recent treaties and long possession, the 
world can never be at peace for a day? The laws of all nations have wisely established a time of limitation, 
after which titles, however illegitimate in their origin, cannot be questioned.” Thomas Babington Macaulay, 
An Essay on Frederic the Great (New York: Maynard Merrill, 1893), p. 29. 
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holding of the Habsburg dynasty. This war, then, still conforms with the structure of wars 
of the dynastic period, namely the war of limited territorial gain.  
 
Frederick’s Non-Dynastic Outlook 
With scant legal justification and a deft sense of strategic timing, Frederick 
invaded a relatively defenseless Silesia—defended by only 6000 men and no artillery at a 
time when Austrian defenses were concentrated on Hungary and its Italian possessions —
and proceeded to successfully annex the province.59 As Silesia was only a province and 
not a sovereign territory (and thus the invasion not one of conquest) dynastic deterrence 
was inoperative. After occupying the province, Frederick offered Maria Theresa a 
guarantee for all other German Habsburg holdings, monetary compensation, and a vote 
for her husband Francis in the forthcoming imperial election, in return for cession of the 
province. The young archduchess refused the terms offered by Frederick, making war 
inevitable, and at the same time putting paid to Frederick’s hopes to acquire Silesia 
without a war.60  
It has been charged that: “few events in history show more clearly the way in 
which its course can be changed by the arbitrary and unpredictable effects of an 
individual personality.”61 However, the personality of Frederick did not arise in a 
vacuum. Rather, we must see Frederick as the product of an upbringing that was uniquely 
suited to creating a non-dynastically oriented monarch who would frequently transgress 
dynastic norms in his foreign policy. As we have already noted, Frederick was married 
																																																								
59 Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, p. 290. 
60 Ibid., p. 290 
61 M. S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession 1740-1748 (London: Longman, 1995), p. 68. 
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but was quite likely homosexual, and he seems to have had little interest in intimate 
relations with his spouse, who was chosen for him against his will by his willful father, 
Frederick William. The troubled relationship Frederick had with his authoritarian father 
was, beside his sexual orientation, perhaps the most significant factor in inculcating the 
young prince to an anti-dynastic worldview. Frederick William was deeply authoritarian 
as well as militaristic, and any differences in temperament between father and son were 
exacerbated by the former’s outright brutal approach to his paternal duties. As narrated 
by Blanning: 
In the case of Frederick William and Frederick, the natural tensions of the latter’s teenage 
years went way beyond what was normal to reach physical violence and climaxed with a 
near-filicide. It was a sustained campaign to break Frederick’s will and turn him into a 
subservient instrument.62  
 
Whether as a means of subconsciously resisting the hated father, or a consequence 
of his disinterest in family matters more generally, by the time of his accession Frederick 
had come to hold a profoundly non-dynastic worldview that consisted of putting the 
welfare of the state above that of self or dynasty, a perspective which contrasted 
markedly with many of the other dynastic rulers of the time. Whereas Frederick William 
had deeply revered the imperial office of the Emperor, and counseled his successor never 
to enter into an alliance against it, Frederick was enamored of such views, and it has been 
said that his “insistence on the subordination of self to country became the most 
celebrated leitmotiv of Frederick’s political discourse.”63 In contrast, the most 
dynastically oriented ruler among Frederick’s contemporaries, his antithesis Maria 
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Theresa, “was taught that sovereigns must rule their peoples as branches of one Christian 
family.”64 
 
Charles Albert’s March on Vienna 
Thus Frederick’s disdain for dynastic norms was deep seated and unusual in the 
context of the time, even granting the strength of such norms was dissipating. It was no 
surprise that Frederick’s invasion and occupation of Silesia, and the refusal of the 
youthful Maria Theresa to accept Frederick’s terms of cession, led quickly to war. The 
financial weakness of Austria meant that Maria Theresa was heavily dependent on 
external assistance, in particular from Great Britain. On the side of Austria’s enemies, 
Prussia was joined by the French under Maréchal Belle-Isle (intent on dealing a severe 
blow to his old Habsburg rival), and by May of 1741 Bavaria and Spain also joined the 
forces ranged against Austria under the Treaty of Nymphenburg.65  
The situation of Austria began to look increasingly precarious, as the power of 
France at the time was still formidable despite financial drains incurred during the rule of 
Louis XIV, and the intention of Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, to assert his tenuous 
claim to all of the Habsburg hereditary lands placed further pressure on the position of 
Maria Theresa. Maria Theresa herself could not seek election to the imperial throne as 
only a male could be elected Emperor, so she sought the election of her husband, Francis 
Stephen, the Duke of Lorraine. Though the archduchess was able to obtain pledges of 
support from the ruler of Hesse-Kassel and Augustus the Elector of Saxony, this would 
																																																								
64 W. F. Reddaway, Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), p. 
92. 
65 Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783, p. 291. 
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come at a heavy financial cost, and Austria was defeated in the first battle of the war, at 
Mollwitz in April of 1740, and soon was threatened by a march on Vienna by the 
combined forces of Bavaria, France and Prussia.  
Of the circumstances of Austria in the summer of 1741, Anderson has written that 
“never until the final collapse of 1918 was Habsburg power to be under such threat as 
during these months.”66 The War of the Austrian Succession would in this year bring the 
Habsburgs face to face with the gravest threat to its rule with the march on Vienna, and 
we infer that dynastic deterrence contributed to protecting the Habsburgs from this dire 
threat. Though this was not an example of dynastic deterrence in its purest form, namely 
a dynastic marriage, nonetheless the kinship tie of Charles Albert to the Habsburgs was 
close, as his spouse, Maria Amalia, was the second daughter of Emperor Joseph I, the 
uncle of Maria Theresa. Frederick II was urging Charles Albert to march on Vienna as a 
condition of his support in the imperial election, and the unwillingness of Maria Theresa 
to compromise on ceding Silesia to Frederick, and Frederick’s unwillingness to accept 
monetary compensation to abandon his occupation of the province, meant the last chance 
to stop the advance on Vienna was lost.  
Though there were certainly divisions and mutual mistrust among the allies 
arrayed against the Habsburgs, (the chief among them being their inability to trust 
Frederick due to his invasion of Silesia having confirmed his unreliability and 
selfishness),67 nonetheless their combined strength was formidable, and Belle-Isle sensed 
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the early and complete defeat of Austria.68 Given the strong perceived advantage of the 
offense, military deterrence was certainly not operative at this pivotal moment. Anderson 
writes that the attack on Vienna “would probably have succeeded; and there were clear 
indications that the Bavarian elector was by no means unwelcome as ruler to many of his 
potential subjects.”69 During September and October, hasty preparations were made for a 
siege in Vienna, and Maria Theresa attempted to buy off some of the enemies arrayed 
against her through various enticements.  
 
The Protective Role of Dynastic Ties 
These diplomatic attempts generally have conventionally been understood as 
having failed, but the contact Maria Theresa made with the Empress Wilhelmine Amalia, 
the mother-in-law of Charles Albert (and spouse of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I) in an 
effort to convince the Bavarian Elector to renounce his claims against the main Habsburg 
territories,70 may actually in part have been successful. This we can infer from 
Frederick’s account of the period, when he notes that Charles Albert conveyed to him a 
letter from the empress Amelia, an exhortation for “him to come to an accommodation 
with the queen of Hungary, by the month of December…”71 The decision of Charles 
Albert to pass a message to Frederick from his mother-in-law appealing for a settlement 
indicates the Bavarian Elector was acting at least in part as an emissary on behalf of the 
Habsburgs. The strong pull of dynastic kinship that the appeal from his mother-in-law 
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would have effected, together with the betrayal that conquering the ancestral territory of 
his spouse would have represented, must have weighed on him heavily, as can be inferred 
from the hesitation which overtook him when debating whether to advance on Vienna.72 
In the event, despite the Franco-Bavarian army reaching perilously close to 
Vienna, the push was diverted at the last moment to a northward advance into Bohemia. 
What would have been the devastating capture of the Habsburg capital had been 
miraculously avoided. Frederick in his writings also implies that deceptive diplomacy by 
the Habsburgs was successful in convincing the opposing armies that they had somehow 
“all appointed a general rendezvous in Bohemia.”73  
The standard explanation of the aborted attack is that Charles Albert became 
fearful that his claim to the Bohemian crown would be dismissed were he not physically 
present in Bohemia.74 However, we put forward that the kinship tie between Charles 
Albert via his Habsburg spouse, Maria Amalia, was just as important a factor in deterring 
the Bavarian Elector from advancing his claims. Indeed, these claims had originally been 
made for hereditary Habsburg territories, and Frederick was clearly still straining for the 
fight, thus making it all the more puzzling that Charles Albert would fail to press the 
offensive and seek first to consolidate his claim to the Bohemian crown. 
The aborted attack on Vienna was a pivotal moment in the war, as it was the 
gravest threat that Maria Theresa would face to her dynastic possessions. Dynastic 
deterrence differs in its strength in varying cases, and in this case we postulate that the 
deterrent effect was not so strong as to altogether deter an invasion—Charles Albert’s 
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spouse Maria Amalia and Maria Theresa were merely first cousins, an extended rather 
than conjugal family tie—though it did deter the ultimate advance upon Vienna, meaning 
the mechanism came into effect before the culmination of conquest.  
 
Table 4: The Dynastic Ties between Maria Amalia and Maria Theresa 
 
The Outcome of the War 
Though the Bohemian crown would be lost upon the fall of Prague in November 
of 1741 to the forces aligned with Charles Albert, and the Bavarian Elector’s election as 
Holy Roman Emperor in January of 1742 represented a damaging loss of prestige for the 
Habsburg dynasty, the Austrian forces recovered momentum due to the assistance of the 
Hungarian army. As soon as he had been elected as Emperor, Charles Albert was once 
again on the defensive in a free-flowing series of engagements, and was driven from his 
own capital by the Austrian forces after Frederick suspended operations against Maria 
Theresa.75 Gradually improving its position, Austrian forces retook Bohemia in 1743, and 
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after Charles Albert died prematurely in 1745, Maria Theresa was able to engineer the 
election of her husband, Francis, to the imperial throne.  
The supreme crisis had been averted, and not only had the Habsburgs managed to 
retain control over their hereditary domains, but Maria Theresa had been able to regain 
the prestige of the imperial title through her husband. The crisis of the Habsburg dynasty 
represented by the War of the Austrian Succession was overcome in a manner that 
demonstrates the power of dynastic kinship ties to weaken the resolve of adversaries to 
conquer the territories of rival dynasties with which they are closely related. The kinship 
ties between Charles Albert and the Habsburg dynasty, represented a critical mechanism 
through which his original desire to press his claim to Habsburg hereditary possessions 
was weakened and ultimately diverted. 
The survival of the Habsburg dynasty in the face of aggressive moves by 
Frederick II and his allies signifies the victory of dynastic mechanisms over purely 
military calculations. The War of Austrian Succession itself, though catalyzed by a ruler 
who thought less in dynastic terms than most of his contemporaries, was at least cloaked 
in the language of dynasticism, insofar as Frederick framed his occupation of Silesia in 
dynastic terms, no matter how questionable, and Charles Albert’s participation was also 
anchored by his desire to claim Habsburg territories he believed (fancifully) belonged to 
the Wittelsbach dynasty.  
The role of dynastic ties and dynastic deterrence in parrying the most dangerous 
threat faced by the Habsburg dynasty during the Franco-Bavarian march on Vienna was 
more efficacious than that of alternate postulated explanations. Noteworthy is the 
structure of the Reich as a secondary composite state, as the Bavarian Elector was 
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technically the ruler of a territory of the Reich, and though the decentralized structure of 
the Empire has often been held as a weakness, the protective role of dynastic ties between 
the dynastic core and peripheral dynastic domains played a significant role in preventing 
the overthrow of the monarchical center by a peripheral dynasty. The part 
domestic/international nature of this war is also evident due to this secondary composite 
structure and the relative permeability of ‘domestic’ politics in the Empire to external 
intervention, but overshadowing the differences between these two spheres is the 
homogeneity of interactive dynamics on the level of dynasty-dynasty relations. 
The role of military deterrence can be doubted as having swayed Charles Albert’s 
calculations, as various contemporaneous accounts from the French side mention the 
Franco-Bavarian army as holding a significant advantage over the Habsburg forces. Such 
observations have clout, as French observations that their side held the advantage are 
tantamount to an admission of error, given the advantage was not pressed home and the 
opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat over the Habsburgs lost. Leadership learning is not 
a salient factor in this case, except for the role of Frederick II in setting the war in motion, 
as both Charles Albert and Maria Theresa were the scions of old and prestigious 
dynasties atop the European aristocratic hierarchy. In fact, if we observe that Maria 
Theresa was female and for this reason given a far inferior education by her father 
Charles VI than would normally be reserved for a male heir apparent, then both her 
accomplishments as a Habsburg ruler in war, and sagaciousness in governing her 
domains seem to cut against the approach of leadership learning which might expect such 
a ruler to be severely handicapped and incompetent in his/her exercise of rule. Thus, the 
case of the survival of the Habsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire during the War of the 
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Austrian Succession gives qualified support to the efficacious role of dynasticism in 
aiding the survival of the Reich, while failing to support alternate expectations from 
competing approaches. 
 
Late-Survival Composite State Death 
 
The Partitions of Poland-Lithuania  
 
We turn now to examine the ultimate demise of late surviving composite polities 
as a means to understand the unique concatenation of factors that penetrated the defenses 
of these polities, leading them to succumb after surviving earlier crises. In earlier sections 
of the present chapter, we have seen that composite polities such as the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and the Holy Roman Empire managed to survive existential crisis 
primarily due to two factors. The primary threats these composite polities faced, in 
contrast to the cases of early dissolution, were invasions from the outside. Thus the aid of 
allies in rolling back an occupation as well as the general resistance to legitimizing 
conquest in Europe constituted an efficient set of causes for these polities being able to 
deter invasion and/or prevent annexation. In the case of the Holy Roman Empire, we saw 
that the severe threat to dynastic survival posed by the march on Vienna by the joint 
Bavarian-French force during the War of Austrian Succession, was evaded by the 
presence of dynastic kinship ties between the Bavarian Elector (who was leading the 
attack on Vienna) and the Habsburgs. The manner in which such a kinship tie led Charles 
Albert to desist from invading Vienna pointed to the existence of a network of dynastic 
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marriage and kinship ties surrounding the Habsburg patrimonial estates in a protective 
zone where conquest was considered an inappropriate means of foreign policy. In 
Chapter Three, we put forward these latent kinship ties as a background cause for the 
relative absence of conquest attempts in ancien régime Europe in the period 1648-1789. 
The following cases of late composite state death provides additional strong 
evidence for the nature of the most serious existential threats faced by such composite 
states. By examining the actual manner in which these states died, we gain further insight 
into the forces to which they were always vulnerable. In both the case of Poland-
Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire, an external ruler unconstrained by dynastic 
norms was largely responsible for state collapse. Frederick II initiated the decades long 
process through which the Commonwealth would become extinct through his key role in 
the first Polish partition. Napoleon Bonaparte, the absolute leader of Republican France, 
was the elemental force which, through his military genius and disregard for dynastic 
practices, created a decisive military advantage for France, allowing it to defeat and 
reshape multiple European states, including the Holy Roman Empire. If it was powerful 
non-dynastically oriented leaders who precipitated state death in these cases, we can 
conclude from analogy that it would have been external threats from non-dynastic leaders 
that posed the greatest threat in earlier cases. Furthermore, as dynastic marriage and 
kinship ties constrain rulers through the force of these ties, we can conclude that it was 
dynastic deterrence and the latent network of dynastic marriage and kinship ties that, 
where such existed, protected them from an earlier demise. 
However, dynastic deterrence mechanisms did not prevent wars from taking place 
altogether. Wars in early modern Europe between 1648-1789 were primarily limited wars 
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aimed at the consolidation of small territorial gains to demarcate and strengthen emerging 
territorial frontiers and boundaries. Besides wars for limited territorial gain, dynastic wars 
also frequently arose during succession crises, though as we noted these wars during the 
period we study, were oriented to defend the status quo and aimed to prevent the pooling 
of inheritances after succession breakdown, rather than acquisitive (i.e. aimed at 
enforcing a claim unilaterally over an entire patrimony via conquest). Early modern 
European war was certainly fiercely fought, and notwithstanding the relative absence of 
unprovoked conquest attempts, actions approaching conquest did occur during a war, 
such as we saw with the Swedish invasions of Poland-Lithuania.  
Moreover, such deterrence mechanisms did not prevent conquest attempts in 
circumstances where dynastic kinship ties were weak or involved intra-dynastic conflict 
(i.e. the rivalry between the two branches of the Vasa dynasty). Additionally, we saw that 
true elective monarchies were vulnerable due to their inability to take advantage of cross-
generational reputational effects and weakness when accumulating dynastic capital in the 
absence of hereditary succession. And dynastic rulers could in rare cases hold strikingly 
non-dynastic goals due to idiosyncratic factors in their upbringing or personality. This 
was certainly the case with Frederick II of Prussia, and he gradually accumulated a 
reputation for disruptive actions—such as the invasions of Silesia and Saxony—which 
were scandalous in their disregard for the logic of dynastic inheritance and claims. The 
final demise of Poland-Lithuania also owes much to the disruptive role of Frederick, as 
we shall see. 
 
The First Partition of Poland 
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Despite its longevity, allowing it to survive well into the eighteenth century, 
Poland-Lithuania had been a shadow of its former self since at least 1709 with the 
restoration of the crown to Augustus—who had effectively become a puppet due to 
Russia’s role in defeating the occupying forces of Sweden—and it was Russia’s 
continued patronage which underlay the Commonwealth’s survival despite it lacking an 
effective military force to ensure its own defense. The condition of weakness and 
dependency only worsened as the century wore on. As Schroeder writes:  
Other states, especially Russia, assembled armies on Polish soil, marched troops across it, 
and even conducted military campaigns in Polish territory. The climax was reached in the 
Seven Years’ War. Poland, though neutral, was a principal theatre of the fighting and a 
virtual puppet of the belligerents, again especially Russia. Poles could no longer freely 
choose their own sovereign, preserve or alter their constitution, prevent neighboring 
powers from intervening in their internal affairs…or conduct their own foreign policy.76 
 
Thus the longevity of Poland-Lithuania, as already noted, was to an important 
degree dependent on the willingness of external patrons to allow its survival as long as it 
posed them no threat. Continuing weakness of the Commonwealth became a state of 
affairs that powerful patrons, such as Russia and Austria, came to appreciate. As an 
example, Maria Theresa had in 1748 blocked the abolition of the liberum veto, which 
would have significantly strengthened the monarchy.77  
In 1733 Augustus II had died, setting off a leadership contest in the Sejm where 
the two main contestants were Stanisław Leszczyński, who had previously been deposed 
by the Russians, and Augustus’ son Frederick Augustus, the new elector of Saxony. Soon 
afterwards Leszczyński was elected king for the second time, Russia sent a military force 
of 30,000 men into the Commonwealth, and due to this intimidation Leszczyński fled the 
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country. Subsequently Frederick Augustus was elected as King of Poland mostly by the 
clients of Lithuanian magnates, whose estates and privileges might have been endangered 
if they displeased the Russian Empress Anna.78 These events set off the War of the Polish 
Succession, which extended for five years and pitted an Austro-Russian-Saxon alliance 
against French troops aiming for the restoration of Leszczyński, and at its conclusion 
Russian dominance over the Commonwealth was confirmed.  
 
The Role of Wettin-Habsburg Dynastic Ties 
Though Russian patronage was an important factor in ensuring the 
Commonwealth’s survival until the first partition, even here the role of dynastic ties 
cannot be underestimated. A close dynastic kinship tie connected the ruling Wettin 
dynasty of Saxony and the Habsburg dynasty, for Augustus III was married to the 
Austrian archduchess Maria Josepha, daughter of Emperor Joseph I, elder sister of Maria 
Amalia (spouse of Charles Albert) and first cousin of Maria Theresa. An additional tie 
connected these two dynasties, as Maria Theresa’s second surviving daughter, Maria 
Christina, was also married to Albert Casimir, a younger son of Augustus III. 
Analogously to the case of the War of the Austrian Succession, we would expect a 
dynastic tie of at least this strength to lead to the operation of deterrence effects to a 
measurable extent.  
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Table 5: The Dynastic Ties Between Maria Josepha and Maria Theresa 
 
It is difficult to isolate the separate impact of the dynastic tie on Polish survival, 
due to the fact that Russian patronage was also protecting the Commonwealth from 
conquest during its period of dependency, and this rendered survival an overdetermined 
outcome. However, we can infer the deterrent strength of the dynastic tie compared with 
Russian patronage, as the Polish throne ceased to be held by the Wettin dynasty after 
Empress Catherine of Russia and Frederick II jointly engineered the election of Stanisław 
August Poniatowski to the Polish-Lithuanian throne after the death of Augustus III in 
1763.  
By this logic, we would expect that if Maria Theresa were to acquiesce to the 
violation of Polish-Lithuanian sovereignty, it would most likely occur after the Wettins 
no longer held the Polish-Lithuanian crown, when the Wettin-Habsburg dynastic tie was 
no longer active. As the new king Stanisław’s family was of the Polish nobility and not 
tied by kinship to the Habsburgs, the Habsburgs would have no dynastic reasons to 
buttress the security of the Commonwealth under his rule. Indeed, the severe violation of 
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Polish-Lithuanian sovereignty in the form of the First Partition took place in 1772 after 
the accession of Stanisław II August, and Maria Theresa even participated, though with 
reluctance, in the territorial annexation. This shift in Maria Theresa’s policy vis-à-vis the 
Commonwealth is well captured by Lewitter: 
Austria had no designs on Poland and, until Poniatowski’s election, pursued the policy of 
counterbalancing the growing might of Prussia by supporting Poland’s Saxon kings, to 
whom the Habsburgs were bound by dynastic ties. After 1764, Maria Theresa steered a 
middle course in the hope of maintaining the status quo; but Austria’s occupation of Zips 
in 1769, though not inexcusable as a military precaution backed by a legal claim, 
announced her readiness to join in a partition and set an example that Catherine and 
Frederick were soon to follow.79 
 
Viewing history through the dynastic lens allows us to explain an otherwise 
inexplicable fact, namely Maria Theresa’s shift from a position protective of sovereignty 
in general, to one willing to acquiesce in its violation in the case of Poland-Lithuania. 
When we compare Maria Theresa’s position vis-à-vis Saxony in the aftermath of the 
Seven Years War with her position with regards to the Commonwealth during the first 
partition, we see that in the first instance she was insistent on the restoration of Saxony to 
Augustus III (though Saxony was still partly occupied by the Prussian army) whereas she 
eventually acquiesced and even participated in the first partition of Poland-Lithuania.  
Szabo notes that, in the concluding negotiations of the Seven Years War, the 
Habsburg Empress’ secret instructions to her negotiator, Collenbach, “allowed him to 
relinquish Austrian claims to Glatz, and…posited the evacuation of Saxony and all other 
occupied territory as non-negotiable,” and to emphasize her wishes with regard to 
Saxony, she “insisted that Saxony must be included as a formal signatory partner in the 
peace.”80 Though in the first case the Habsburg Empress certainly had good reason to 
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support restoration—as Frederick was her sworn rival and acquiescing to Prussian 
annexation of Saxony would dangerously destabilize the politics of the Empire—her 
acquiescence in the partition has always been considered somewhat puzzling given her 
overly moralistic worldview. It was all the more so because Austria had the most to lose 
from any partition, as it would weaken the Commonwealth (its traditional ally) and 
inevitably strengthen Prussia.81  
However, if we refine the picture by noting that Maria Theresa’s morality was one 
closely tethered to notions of dynastic honor, then her participation in the First Partition 
of Poland is no longer puzzling. The Habsburg Empress would most likely have been 
strictly opposed to any Polish partition during the lifetime of Augustus III, and might 
even have fought a war to prevent such an outcome. It was only with the accession of the 
dynastically unrelated Poniatowski to the Polish throne that a partition of Poland became 
imaginable for Maria Theresa.82  
 
The Catalytic Role of Frederick 
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Nonetheless, the prime mover in instigating the partitions must be acknowledged 
to have been Frederick. The role of the dynastic shift with the 1764 election of Stanisław 
II August and the subsequent actions of Austria in occupying the area of Zips, were both 
permissive factors that signaled to Frederick that propitious conditions for attempting to 
acquire parts of Poland-Lithuania had arrived.  
The Austrian occupation of Polish territory was initiated by accident. Poniatowski 
had in February 1769 asked the Austrians to occupy the Zips province, where some of his 
opponents had taken refuge. The Austrians agreed to this, though they noted that Zips 
was technically Hungarian territory pledged to Poland in 1412, and since then under 
Polish administration. Kaunitz had, in agreeing to Poniatowski’s request, assured 
diplomats in Vienna that Austria had no intention of infringing Poland’s occupational 
rights in the province.83 However, in October 1769, a Hungarian bureaucrat, Joseph 
Török, concluded—intentionally or unintentionally—that Polish settlers had 
surreptitiously shifted the frontier, and recommended to Kaunitz that Austria could 
reclaim its former territory without threat of military confrontation.84  
Though Kaunitz was not initially enthusiastic, Maria Theresa’s son Joseph was 
amenable to reclaiming the ‘lost’ Hungarian land, and the Austrians began to push 
approximately twenty miles into the border in July of 1770, an action officially approved 
shortly thereafter by Maria Theresa, Joseph and the Staatsrat.85 The basis of the 
																																																								
83 Macartney, Maria Theresa and the House of Austria, p. 142. 
84 Jerzy Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London: Longman, 1999), p. 57. 
85 Ibid., p. 57-8. 
	
	 257	
Habsburg claim to Zips was problematic, but the process of occupation created its own 
dynamic, and in the same year three more districts were occupied.86 
This occupation created the pretext for Frederick II to float the notion of a 
partition of Poland-Lithuania to Catherine via her representative Count Solms in St 
Petersburg. Frederick had long held the hope of annexing a part of Polish territory—the 
part separating Pomerania from East Prussia—which would create an unbroken block of 
territory and allow Prussia to control Polish trade down the Vistula River.87 The letter 
sent by Frederick was soon reciprocated by Catherine, who had until then held to the 
traditional Russian policy of undivided influence over the Commonwealth rather than 
partitioning its territory.88 She had learnt of the Austrian occupation of Zips, and replied 
to Frederick (via the Prussian diplomat, Prince Henry), that the other powers should take 
some territory for themselves.89  
Agreement in principle had been reached between Frederick and Catherine, and it 
would now be difficult for Austria to stand in the way. A clumsy intervention in the face 
of the united front of Prussia and Russia, namely Maria Theresa’s assurance to the 
Prussian ambassador at Vienna in 1771 that she would never allow Austria to go to war, 
took matters beyond the point of no-return.90 Soon thereafter a preliminary agreement on 
partition had been signed by Frederick and Catherine, and despite the vigorous opposition 
of Maria Theresa, the outcome was sealed when her son Joseph and trusted advisor 
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Kaunitz stated their agreement with the need for partition.91 It is recounted that for Maria 
Theresa, realizing that her son had been won over to Frederick’s unabashed realpolitik 
methods “made her sick with shame.”92 
If we view the preferences of the three key monarchs involved in the Polish 
Partition—Frederick II, Catherine of Russia and Maria Theresa—it is clear that Frederick 
was the most strongly desirous of the partition. This is based on the fact that he had 
already recorded his wish to acquire Polish Prussia in his Political Testament of 1752.93 
The Empress Catherine had been largely content to retain Russian suzerainty over the 
Commonwealth before being brought round by Frederick to seeing the advantages of 
partition, and Maria Theresa was generally opposed to partition, though her policy shifted 
from one of violent resistance to unwilling acquiescence. This signifies the significant 
role played by Frederick in catalyzing the First Partition. 
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Causes and Alternative Explanations 
Though the Austrian occupation of Zips in 1769 was likely not meant to presage a 
full-blown annexation effort on the part of Austria, it nonetheless signaled to Frederick 
and Catherine that Maria Theresa (or her son Joseph) might be amenable to such an 
annexation. Such a conclusion would, however, probably not have been drawn by them if 
the Commonwealth’s crown was still held by a close dynastic ally of the Habsburgs. 
Thus, the dynastic mechanism operated by both weakening Maria Theresa’s implacable 
opposition to a partition, and also signaling to Frederick and Catherine that the dynastic 
tie between the Habsburgs and the Commonwealth had been broken and thus the security 
of the latter was especially vulnerable. But the dynastic shift in the Commonwealth 
(breaking the dynastic alliance between the Habsburgs and Wettins) and the willingness 
of Catherine to change the Russian policy of Polish suzerainty were merely permissive 
factors that removed the barriers to partition. The insistent goal of Frederick II to acquire 
Polish territory for Prussia was the critical driver and efficient cause of the first partition.  
The principal role given to the balance of power as an explanans by some authors, 
therefore, cannot be seen as more than a background factor, as too much of the 
explanandum would remain unexplained. The imperative of ‘balancing’ can at best 
explain the manner in which the partition was executed, and the final apportionment of 
territory between the three powers, (i.e. the relative parity of gains). But the initial 
decision to pursue partition by Frederick and the timing of his moves cannot be 
sufficiently explained by the balance of power alone. Though balancing imperatives 
should have driven the formation of a Prussia-Austria front against Russia (given that 
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Russia had gained some major victories in the Russo-Turkish war and looked set to 
expand their territory significantly), nonetheless such an alliance never emerged. As 
Schroeder has noted, there existed a fundamental divergence in what Prussia and Austria 
took a desirable balance to be: “[f]or Prussia it meant equality with Austria, for Austria 
superiority over Prussia.”94 With such a divergence in perceptions, it was difficult for 
Prussia and Austria to form the proposed temporary alliance95 to prevent Russian 
westward expansion, a move that might have prevented the partitions from taking place.  
This is another way of saying that the prescriptions of balance of power theory are 
often indeterminate, and rarely in early modern history did so-called balancing 
imperatives lead states to draw up an agreement to partition another intermediate state as 
a means to create or maintain the balance. It should also be remembered that there were 
other strategies besides balancing, such as hiding, transcending and hedging, that were 
sometimes employed during the early modern period and which these rulers might have 
deployed when dealing with the problem of Poland-Lithuania.96 Neither does the fact that 
the rhetoric of the balance of power was employed by two of the three monarchs to 
explain their actions prove more than the prevalent use of the ‘balancing’ trope to justify 
foreign policies in the late eighteenth century. The concept of the balance had been 
circulating widely since at least the late eighteenth century, but the degree to which it 
actually drove decision-making in a world still strongly driven by dynastic imperatives, is 
open to question. Now it was explicitly being claimed as the driver, but the acquisitive 
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impulse of the Prussian ruler was still to a large extent responsible for the device of 
territorial apportionment being accepted as a fair exchange for a curtailment of Russian 
suzerainty over Poland-Lithuania, and Habsburg hegemony over the Empire.97 
In any case, the Treaty of Partition finally agreed upon by the three powers at St 
Petersburg on 5 August 1772, ostensibly due to the fact that Polish anarchy threatened the 
European peace,98 left Russia with the largest share of territory, with 92,000 square 
kilometers, Austria with a slightly smaller portion (with 83,000 square kilometers), and 
Prussia with a smaller but strategically important share of Polish or West Prussia, (with 
36,000 square kilometers).99 
The manner in which Poland was divided up by the three powers, though 
unsurprising given the essentially defenseless state into which Poland-Lithuania had sunk 
since the restoration of Augustus II, was nonetheless shocking for Europe due to the way 
in which the partition broke with the existing custom of at least paying lip-service to 
dynastic claims when acquiring territory, and having taken place during the reign of a 
sitting king rather coinciding with a succession crisis. Wheaton in 1844 called the 
partition “the most flagrant violation of natural justice and international law which has 
occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism,”100 and Schroeder writes that, 
“Poland was…not even treated like a European state, but like colonial territory.”101  
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The Second and Third Partitions 
With the first partition complete, having been forced through the Polish-
Lithuanian Diet with well-timed intimidation from Russian soldiers, the Poles attempted 
to create a more viable state and to this end they embarked on a program of reform. This 
period has been called “a burst of intense intellectual activity unequalled since the 
sixteenth century.”102 These reforms in the cultural and educational sphere, culminated in 
the ‘Great Sejm’ of 1788-1792, which built on the centralization measures of the 
preceding years and passed a new constitution on May 3, 1791. The most important of 
the changes wrought by the constitution were the abolition of the elective monarchy and 
the unanimity principle for passing legislation in the Sejm, as well as the establishment of 
the king as a hereditary and constitutional monarch.103 These were the beginnings of the 
reforms necessary for strengthening the monarch and state, lifting it from the wholly 
weakened circumstances into which it had fallen. However, the budding renaissance of 
the Commonwealth was not to flower, and was soon trampled on by Catherine, who 
ordered Russian troops into Poland in 1793 to lend support to the reactionary segment of 
the nobility—the Targowica Confederacy—who were implacably opposed to the new 
constitution.  
Though the structural opportunity for Catherine to act had been provided by a 
realignment of forces in Germany in 1790, with the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold II 
expressing his willingness to negotiate with the Turks and leaving Prussia unwilling to 
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honor its alliance obligations to Poland,104 the main catalyst for the partition is commonly 
accepted to have been the threat posed by the nascent indigenous Polish reforms to 
Russia’s suzerainty in what remained of the country. The floodgates had been opened 
with the first groundbreaking partition of Poland in 1772, and after the Commonwealth’s 
troops were overwhelmed in the Russian invasion of 1793, (meant to put a stop to the 
reform process), Catherine soon opted to pursue another partition, with Prussia to be 
compensated with a share of the territorial spoils.105 It is noteworthy here that Catherine 
ruled a state that had been only loosely integrated into the European system even at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, and in this sense it may have been that Catherine, 
just as Frederick, was less constrained by the conservative norms of dynasticism due to 
the structural location of Russia both inside and outside the European dynastic system. 
The second partition was signed on 23 January 1793, and Poland was left a small area of 
land under Russian protection, and the previous reforms resulting from the Great Sejm 
were revoked. The partition was justified as having been necessary to thwart 
revolution.106 
In the aftermath of the first and second partitions, an insurrection rapidly began in 
1794 led by General Tadeusz Kościuszko, who in the wake of the French Revolution had 
hoped that an uprising of peasants would bring about a national awakening and liberate 
the remnant of the Commonwealth from Russian and Prussian domination.107 The 
uprising, which drew its strongest support from the citizens of Warsaw, was doomed to 
fail from the start, given the overwhelming advantage of force enjoyed by the Russians. 
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Though his forces fought valiantly and managed to mobilize an unexpectedly large 
number of men, Kościuszko was roundly defeated by Russia at the Battle of 
Maciejowice, and Catherine had decided in favor of a complete abolition of the Polish 
Kingdom and partition of the rump of its remaining territory. Being in the ascendant, 
Catherine dictated the terms of the partition to the Austrians, and the Prussians had no 
choice but to agree to terms. The final partition treaty was signed in St Petersburg on 24 
October 1795, and on this day, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was permanently 
erased from the political map.108  
It would only be resurrected in a renovated form in the aftermath of World War I. 
The decisive break that the partition and extinction of Poland-Lithuania represented both 
for the meaning of the balance of power and for Europe more generally, is well captured 
by the contemporary observer Friedrich von Gentz when he wrote of the partitions: 
[T]he division of Poland was the first event which by an abuse of form deranged the 
political balance of Europe, it was likewise one of the first which begot an apathy of 
spirit, and stupid insensibility to the general interest. The silence of France and England, 
the silence of all Europe, when a measure of so much importance was planned and 
executed, is almost as astonishing as the event itself.109 
 
 Though the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth have been seen to 
be the inevitable consequence of state failure brought about by an inability of the 
monarchy to institute reforms to centralize authority against the powerful nobility, or a 
natural response of powerful regional rulers to shifting balance of power considerations, a 
more nuanced view is necessary. The dynastic context and weakness of the pure type 
elective monarchy was an important permissive factor that allowed the partitions to take 
place, especially after the election of Stanisław II August, a ruler without strong dynastic 
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ties to any of the Commonwealth’s traditional allies. This context significantly weakened 
the Habsburg commitment to provide military support for the defense of its longtime 
dynastic ally. In addition, Frederick II and his single-minded pursuit of territorial 
aggrandizement for Prussia to the exclusion of other considerations—an obsession that 
was initially out of step with dynastic practice but which eventually influenced many 
European rulers around him—was an important efficient factor driving the first partition. 
The first partition essentially created a vicious cycle where the negative precedent set at 
the outset was almost certain to be repeated. The first partition represented an important 
development where dynastic claims were not deployed even as a pretext to legitimize 
princely ambition. This departure from existing practice would prove to have 
destabilizing consequences in Europe, particularly when combined with the valorization 
of Frederick as a model for late eighteenth century rulers and the even more radical 
changes brought about by the French Revolution. 
 
The Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire 
 
We now turn to the last late-survival composite polity within the purview of our 
study—the Holy Roman Empire—and examine its dissolution during the Napoleonic 
Wars. In the preceding pages, we saw that the dissolution of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was brought about by an interaction of two factors: the permissive factor 
of change in dynastic ties between the Commonwealth and one of its traditional allies, the 
Habsburg dynasty; and the efficient factor of the intervention of a non-dynastically 
oriented ruler—Frederick II—with no scruples for pursuing naked territorial 
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aggrandizement without constraint from dynastic norms. Though the factors that led to 
the dissolution of Poland-Lithuania were specific to it, we should note that in contrast 
many of the causes of the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire were not specific but 
general factors insofar as similar causes led to the defeat of many other ancien régime 
states during the Napoleonic Wars. Nonetheless we shall foreground the way in which 
they interacted with the particular circumstances of the Holy Roman Empire during the 
period leading to its demise.  
The impact of Frederick II and the diffusion of his ideas about the goals of 
warfare, as well as the learning this induced in other monarchic leaders that followed 
him, would prove to play an important role in creating the conditions in which the 
wholesale conquest of states (including composite states) would become possible during 
the Napoleonic era.110 The breakdown in the norms that constrained ancien régime 
warfare and limited conquest largely to the colonial world, would take place due to a 
number of factors, among them the destabilization of the ancien régime dynastic system 
that first took place in France with the French Revolution, and the opening this gave for a 
genuinely non-dynastic leader to take the reins of the nascent French Republic.  
 
The Spread of Militarism 
Though an analysis of the French Revolution is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, nonetheless we will elaborate in skeletal form the way in which some of the 
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innovations that Napoleon adopted were anticipated by developments in France predating 
the revolution, and how these developments converged with the loosening of dynastic 
norms brought by the revolution itself. It would be the space opened up by this 
concatenation of events, as well as the emergence of the first strong non-dynastic leader 
in Europe, that would catch monarchic leaders off-guard and give Napoleon a decisive 
advantage in waging war while not being bound by the same self-imposed rules as were 
his adversaries. It would ultimately be the inability of ancien régime monarchic rulers to 
adapt to the new goals of war pursued by Napoleon, that would doom many of them—
including the Holy Roman Empire—to military defeat and subjugation. 
Certain developments in France prior to the Revolution suggest that things were 
moving in the direction of an emphasized role for national consciousness and militarism 
regardless of the outcome of the Revolution. As Anderson notes, even before the 
revolution took place: 
Already the feeling that national unity was an ultimate value and the belief that all 
Frenchmen were, or ought to be, bound together in some common citizenship, ideas to 
which the Revolution was to give an immense impetus, were rapidly gaining ground. 
France was becoming a nation or a patrie and ceasing to be a mere royaume.111 
 
Similarly, Paret has written that: “The French Revolution coincided with a 
revolution in war that had been under way through the last decades of the monarchy.”112 
This ‘revolution’ in war was, in broad strokes, one where the goals of war were to be 
determined not by dynastic claims but by goals oriented toward the good of the state, and 
together with this shift in focus there came an increasing tendency to emphasize the 
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military over other institutions and extol it as an paragon for political development more 
broadly.  
This tendency was taken to its furthest development in Prussia and Russia, 
(especially in the former), and Frederick II was a pivotal figure in not only propelling the 
evolution of the Prussian military, but also in reorganizing Prussia as a military-centric 
society. The widespread admiration of Prussia common at the time, and what was seen as 
its astonishing elevation to great power status during the second-half of the eighteenth 
century, meant that the approach of Frederick and its lessons—along with his disregard 
for dynastic norms and practices—would be widely diffused among political and military 
elites of the time.113 
Though the increasing diffusion of such a militaristic vision during the late 
eighteenth century suggests that an ongoing weakening of dynastic forces was likely even 
without the Revolution, the ideological ferment brought on by the revolution (and 
congealing in the principle of nationalism) did not immediately replace the earlier 
contradiction between the dynastic system of the ancien régime and the raison d’état 
principle of power politics. This can be seen from the fact that dynastic competition 
would insinuate itself even into the wars that Napoleon waged against his monarchic 
rivals, as these wars were at least peripherally concerned with winning dynastic 
recognition for Napoleon and his family from his monarchical rivals. Furthermore, many 
of the states established after 1815 were dynastic in structure and resembled the ancien 
régime polities in terms of their internal religious and linguistic diversity.114  
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The sociologically complex and diverse polity of the ancien régime factually 
survived the revolutionary era, even if the rhetoric of nationalism would gain increasing 
traction during the nineteenth century. Nor was it preordained that a leader like Napoleon 
would emerge to propel the Revolution in the direction of a continental war of 
conquest—in the process laying to waste the ancien régime system. The gap between 
Napoleon and the ablest of his colleagues in terms of the sheer will to dominate and 
destroy enemies, meant that had Napoleon somehow been killed or captured before 
France embarked on its path to continent wide warfare, the direction of French 
development would most likely have been significantly different. In such an event, some 
remnants of the ancien régime system might even have survived, as France would 
probably have had no choice but to aim for some kind of accommodation with the 
existing order rather than aiming to dominate and annihilate it entirely.115 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to interpret history solely as the tale of what might have 
been. In actuality, the gradual decline of dynastic claims as the main axis of political 
competition—due to the precariousness of acquiring territory solely via inheritance—
meant that undisguised territorial aggrandizement shorn of dynastic justifications, as well 
as the balance of power (even if it functioned at the time more as ideology than as 
reality), continued to gain a foothold throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century 
due to the audacity of Frederick II and others who followed in his footsteps, such as 
Joseph II. It was in this milieu of an emerging acceptance of power politics accompanied 
by a degree of ambivalence about its appropriateness, that the rulers of the ancien régime 
																																																								
115 Paret, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” p. 126. 
	
	 271	
were confronted with the military threat of Revolutionary France and the ‘war of peoples 
against kings’ that some of its ideologues had been advocating.116  
 
The Dissolution of the Franco-Austrian Dynastic Alliance 
The alliance between Bourbon France and Habsburg Austria made possible by the 
‘diplomatic revolution’ of 1756 had been an important anchor for Habsburg foreign 
policy in the succeeding years, and this alliance was challenged by the opening years of 
the French Revolution, when the French monarchy was marginalized and then 
imprisoned by the Constituent Assembly. Though it has been rightly argued that this 
alliance exacerbated the emerging tension between the Austrians and the revolutionary 
regime in France, the manner in which it did so should be correctly understood.117  
The Franco-Austrian alliance had been reinforced by dynastic marriage ties 
between the Bourbons and Habsburgs, most notably the union between Louis XIV and 
the Archduchess Marie Antoinette. Thus, when the Bourbon monarchy was in danger of 
being overthrown by the Revolution, the Habsburgs perceived the Revolutionary 
government as a threat, and as essentially illegitimate. In other words, the strategic 
interaction emerging between the two countries was actually played out between three 
parties: the Habsburg and Bourbon Courts—both allied, and the National Constituent 
Assembly, which was antagonistic to both of these monarchies. This was a situation 
similar in some ways to the legitimacy conflict that surrounded the two Vasa branches 
during the first decades of the seventeenth century, and which made their interaction 
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more volatile. The escalating estrangement between the Constituent Assembly and the 
two allied monarchies would provide the context in which republican France and dynastic 
Austria would drift closer to war. In this game, escalating coercive actions taken by the 
Assembly against the French royal family would mark critical junctures when the 
Austrian Habsburgs would be left with no choice but to come to the aid of their 
monarchical brethren.118  
The Declaration of Pillnitz of 27 August 1791, made jointly by Emperor Leopold 
II and the King of Prussia, was a toothless but symbolic expression of solidarity with the 
French king, and though its call for action on behalf of the French monarchy was not 
heeded by the other dynastic monarchs, nonetheless it gave fuel to French fears that 
monarchical intervention to quash the revolution was close at hand.119 There was an 
element of the security dilemma in all this, and as has been noted Pillnitz exemplified a 
growing gap between French and Austrian perceptions, a gap that would have explosive 
consequences, with the French coming to believe a counter-revolutionary attack was 
imminent, and Austria believing that France could be coerced into making 
concessions.120 The monarchical leaders in turn were divided in how they felt they should 
respond to the threat from the French Revolution. Some were preoccupied with more 
pressing concerns in their sphere of influence, such as Catherine and Russia’s concerns in 
Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. Others, such as Britain, were relatively 
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indifferent until the more radical course taken by the Revolution in 1792 threatened them 
directly.121 In any case, the situation remained tense but calm until the death of the 
Emperor Leopold II and accession of Francis II, which brought a significantly more 
bellicose cohort of advisors to power in Vienna, eclipsing the moderate voices of the old 
guard such as Kaunitz.122 Given the Franco-Austrian alliance was one of the main sources 
of regional stability in the pre-revolutionary period, it would be symptomatic that when 
war broke out in April of 1792—with France declaring war on Austria—it would be 
between France and the Habsburgs, and that their enmity would drive the emerging 
bifurcation between France and Europe. 
In the origins of the War of 1792, then, was the central dynamic that would 
accelerate during the evolution of the Revolutionary Wars of the 1790s into the 
Napoleonic wars of the next decade. The motives behind the declaration of war on the 
French side were a departure from the limited territorial goals of ancien régime warfare. 
The Legislative Assembly had come under the sway of the Brissotin faction, and fears of 
counter-revolution (fed by deep suspicion regarding the motives of Louis XVI and the 
Austrian Court) led the Assembly to effectively rule out compromise with any monarchic 
regime, including that of Austria. The die had been cast, and the coming war would be 
fought for the sake of preserving the Constitution and national sovereignty.123 The 
ambivalence that other monarchical rulers felt towards the French Revolution was soon 
obviated by the evolution of the Franco-Austrian war and the first successes of the French 
army in the Rhineland and the Austrian Netherlands, as well as the more radical direction 
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taken by the revolution after the execution of Louis XVI in January of 1793. France had 
declared war on Britain, Holland and Spain by March of 1793, and the unfolding of 
radical intentions by the revolutionaries to export their anti-monarchical system to all 
peoples who wished also to overthrow their oppressive regimes showed European 
monarchs that they would have to defeat the French Revolution. 124  
																																																								






Ancien Régime Goals versus Napoleonic Goals 
Though it is not our intention to provide a narrative account of the waves of 
military combat that convulsed the continent until the point where the Holy Roman 
Empire faced its final defeat, we should note the way in which the goals of the 
monarchical powers were still structured by the system of warfare that had developed 
prior to the revolution, namely as limited wars for territorial gain. Even the partition of 
Poland-Lithuania took place in stages such that the revolutionary nature and scandalous 
fact of the extinction of its sovereignty was felt with less force than might have been the 
case had the three partitions been condensed into a single moment. The disjuncture 
between the conservative goals formulated by the ancien régime and the far more radical 
goals formulated by the military leaders of the Revolution, was explicable given the 
general disdain of dynastic rulers for absolute wars in general and wars of conquest in 
particular, and yet this cautiousness would fatally undermine the ability of dynastic rulers 
to co-ordinate with each other to decisively defeat Revolutionary France. 
For instance, Prussia as well as Russia became distracted in a competition to 
maneuver into a favorable position in anticipation of the final partition of Poland, and 
Britain became distracted in an effort to gain colonial territory from France. As McKay 
and Scott note, the belief on the part of the monarchic leaders that defeating the 
Revolution would not be overly difficult, led them to separately formulate their own 
“territorial objectives in the war against France, and these came to be more vigorously 
pursued than the aim of defeating the Revolution.”125 More fundamentally, the monarchic 
leaders were deeply ambivalent about whether they should appease the French 
																																																								
125 McKay and Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815, pp. 284-5. 
	
	 277	
revolutionary government, fight it in a series of wars for limited gains or fight it in a war 
of ultimate victory. This lack of clarity, undoubtedly conditioned by the fact that fighting 
a war of conquest was difficult to conceive for these rulers given the existing constraints 
of ancien régime warfare, would continue to make coordination difficult for the 
monarchies during the wars fought against revolutionary France.  
On the other hand, while the ancien régime rulers became distracted and lacked 
coordination due to the disparate goals they hoped for in the war against France, the 
French forces would soon start to formulate an approach to warfare that was not only 
organizationally all-enveloping—due to the levée en masse (or universal conscription) 
which allowed them to draw on far greater reserves of manpower for their war effort—
but was also totalizing in terms of its goals. The final stage of evolution of these changes 
took place under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, who would draw upon the 
strategic ideas developed by dynastic leaders enamored of realpolitik views—most 
notably Frederick II—and concentrate them still further by conceiving of war as aimed 
toward the realization of a project of continental empire.  
Napoleon had clearly studied the wars of Frederick, and was strongly influenced 
by the Prussian leader in his own philosophy of war. Frederick was an influence insofar 
as he condemned the wars of position and territorial aggrandizement typical of dynastic 
warfare, and instead advocated fighting war with the aim of forcing a swift and decisive 
outcome.126 Napoleon would also adopt an approach deeply resistant to the dynastic 
warfare characteristic of the eighteenth century, and he would conclude in a striking 
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repudiation of existing conventions, that: “In war all that is useful is legitimate.”127 
Chandler characterizes Napoleon’s overall philosophy of war in the following way: 
Once a state of hostilities existed between France and another power—whether war was 
formally declared or not was a matter of minor significance—the Emperor set out without 
delay or hesitation to destroy the enemy’s field forces by all available means and thus 
break the national will to resist (or so he hoped). The means to the end were the shortest 
and sharpest methods available; all other considerations were to be considered 
secondary.128 
 
The grand military goals of Napoleon were akin to those of Frederick, but 
Frederick was limited in the social technologies at his disposal to destroy his enemies, as 
the radical social transformations brought about by the Revolution were yet to come and 
did not allow him to, for instance, build military highways in Europe to enhance mobility 
by using massive manpower.129 Thus Frederick’s strategic imagination was limited by the 
dynastic paradigm whereas Napoleon was free to conceive of strategic possibilities on a 
far grander scale. The major territorial acquisitions of Frederick—Silesia (during 
wartime) and Poland-Lithuania (through negotiated partition)—were still relatively 
restricted, whereas Napoleon was able to pacify much of Europe due to the vastly greater 
destructive capabilities of his marauding armies.  
However, the differences of strategic vision between Frederick and Napoleon 
were not solely due to the different military technologies each had access to, for despite 
his overall non-dynastic orientation, Frederick was nonetheless a leader raised in a 
dynastic milieu who remained tethered, in extremis, by a grudging acceptance of the 
dynastic system. In contrast, Napoleon was truly a product of the first European state to 
tear itself from the dynastic fabric that held together the aristocratic society of the old 
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regime, and he accordingly was able to think outside of its usual constraints. This point is 
well captured by Schroeder when he describes Napoleon metaphorically as the ‘leader of 
a criminal enterprise’ insofar as he was rapacious in his urge for constant expansion while 
lacking a positive normative vision (similar to criminal behavior’s general lack of 
normative content), and seemingly without “any final aim or coherent overarching 
scheme of empire behind his imperialism.”130 Similarly, Lynn writes that “Napoleon had 
no clear conception of a peaceful and stable Europe, so he had no long-range policy at 
all.”131  
With such a thoroughgoing opportunist at the helm, it would prove difficult for 
other European leaders to arrive at stable compromises, and for this reason Schroeder 
argues that efforts to accommodate Napoleon (as other European rulers repeatedly 
attempted), were soon undermined by the constant state of insecurity engendered by 
Napoleon’s policy. Any peace concluded with Napoleonic France was bound to fail. The 
wars, then, that Napoleon prosecuted would be qualitatively different from those of the 
ancien régime, as they would draw on and synthesize a society that had thrown off the 
yoke of the old aristocratic order, and were led by a ruler who was not himself a dynast 
and thus un-tethered by its rules and constraints. As Ferrero has noted of the 
transformation brought about by the Napoleonic Wars: 
Restricted warfare was one of the loftiest achievements of the eighteenth century. It 
belongs to the class of hot-house plants which can only thrive in an aristocratic and 
qualitative civilization. We are no longer capable of it. It is one of the fine things which 
we have lost as a result of the French Revolution.132 
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Faced with the sociological changes that allowed France to mobilize greater 
resources for its war efforts as well as the unqualified opportunism of Napoleon, it was 
difficult for the monarchies to compete with Napoleon militarily, and perhaps sensing 
this, many of them attempted to appease Napoleonic France more than they resisted it. 
Schroeder, for instance, notes that “[b]etween 1800 and 1812 almost every government in 
Europe, and most statesmen in Europe, went much further in trying to appease Napoleon 
than Chamberlain did with Hitler.”133 The clash that characterized the chasm between the 
French Republic and the monarchies, was not one of two implacably opposed ideologies 
(as for instance capitalism versus communism) as much as it was the clash between a 
leader unconstrained by existing norms with a hunger to expand, and a system that held 
some forms of war as being legitimate forms of competition but took legitimately held 
sovereignty to be sacrosanct. The Napoleonic Wars, in other words, represented the clash 
between an expansionist non-dynastic leader, and a status quo system of interconnected 
dynasties desperately aiming to contain the spread of revolutionary ferment. 
 
Historical Explanations for the Weakness of the Reich 
In the face of a French army that was able to subjugate much that stood before it, 
we can see in hindsight that the Holy Roman Empire was in a similar position of 
weakness to that of the other monarchies. It would have been almost impossible, in the 
long run, to resist the irresistible onward march of the grande armée. Nonetheless, it was 
not the disparity in military power per se that endangered the monarchical regimes. For 
the emergence of an expansionist (or imperialistic) non-dynastic leader in a powerful 
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European country was the sine qua non for the dissolution not only of the Reich but also 
for the ancien régime system more generally. In this sense, the demise of the Holy 
Roman Empire is a special case of the failure of dynastic deterrence, the limit case of 
dynastic deterrence where a dynastic state is threatened by a non-dynastic state holding 
anti-dynastic goals.  
This said, the efficient causes of the demise of individual old regime polities 
differed from case to case. For this reason, the specific factors underpinning the demise 
of the Holy Roman Empire are of more than passing interest. The standard explanations 
of the demise of the Empire have focused upon the following factors: modernization 
failure; centrifugal forces in the Empire; and an implacable rivalry between France and 
the Habsburgs. Each of these explanations have their limitations, but we should also add 
a final factor, the strategic decision of Francis II to disestablish the Empire in order to 
forestall the imminent loss of Habsburg dynastic dominance. 
The argument for modernization failure as fatally hobbling the Empire takes it 
that the decentralized structure of the Empire left it fragmented and unable to adequately 
compete militarily against the increasing cohesion of France.134  According to this view, 
barring modernization reforms creating a more centralized authority, the Reich’s demise 
was inevitable. Simms makes a parallel point when he argues that the structure of the 
Empire meant it was not well equipped to play the game of power politics, and he writes 
that “the whole ethos of the Reich was so profoundly traditional and anti-modern that 
modernization was not merely problematic, but fundamentally antithetical to its 
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continued existence.135 However, this view is anachronistic, as the Empire had evolved to 
fit not the later system dominated by Napoleonic France, but the pre-revolutionary old 
regime system, which was only partially anchored around the principle of power political 
competition.  
Moreover, at least in the beginning, “the conflict between France and the Reich 
was not a conflict between a modern state and a relic of the past.”136 The Empire was, 
contrary to the prevalent view, far from a moribund traditional system incapable of 
change. Rulers such as Frederick II and Joseph II had been responsible for weakening 
dynastic values somewhat, and the limited reforms that took place in the Empire—such 
as the Prussian reforms and the failed centralizing agenda of ‘Josephinism’ pursued by 
Joseph II—even left some parts of the Empire more politically dynamic than France at 
the cusp of its revolution. That a revolution never took place in the Empire has been 
widely taken to indicate the resilience of the Reich,137 but had a full-blown revolution 
taken place, far from initiating a series of revitalizing reforms the Empire would likely 
have faced an even earlier demise. 
Another conventional explanation for the Reich’s demise argues that the 
competition between Austria and Prussia within the Empire since the start of the War of 
the Austrian Succession in 1740 and Frederick’s rise created a polarizing dynamic that 
prevented cooperation between the components of the Empire during the Revolutionary 
Wars.138 The most cogent version of this argument asserts that it was the residual 
antagonism between these two rival polities that fatally retarded the creation of a unified 
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Imperial front to fight France, leaving Austria to fight France alone and exhausting it 
militarily in the process.  
The pivotal moment, for this view, would be not the Austro-Prussian 
rapprochement of 1790 or the Imperial declaration of war on France in March of 1793, 
but the moment when Prussia chose to make a separate peace with France in April 
1795.139 However, it must be noted that the Prussian withdrawal from the war and 
conversion of Northern Germany into a neutrality zone (thus aiding France) was not 
driven primarily by the desire to demolish or dominate the Reich, but by military failure 
and dire financial circumstances. In fact, Prussian ministers were hoping the old order in 
Germany could be salvaged in some form, and the earlier rapprochement with Austria 
shows that the animus between these German rivals did not rule out all forms of 
cooperation.140 Both Francis II and his principal adviser in foreign affairs, Franz Maria 
von Thugut, have been heavily criticized for a path of action that unnecessarily locked 
Austria into an unending war with France. However, this too has been interpreted as 
driven by a defensive intention to save the Reich, rather than to aggrandize Austria at all 
costs. Indeed, their determination to prevail due to the great threat posed by France can 
be seen as a more adequate perception of the danger involved than the Prussian decision 
to appease France.141 
The coordination problems of the Reich, though they were damaging for the 
ability of the Empire to successfully mobilize for war and defend itself, were nonetheless 
an integral characteristic of the Reich’s political structure, and it is difficult to imagine a 
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counterfactual in which these coordination problems would have been successfully 
overcome. To an extent, it could be validly argued that even the limited coordination 
achieved by Austria and Prussia until 1795 was better than might have been expected 
given the structural limits. And as we have seen, it was the peculiar second-order 
structure of the Reich as a composite state with dynastic kinship ties internally as well as 
externally, that protected it in crisis moments of the past. Thus even if decentralization 
was a weakness in the face of the Napoleonic threat, the Reich might not have even 
existed to fight Napoleon were it not for this feature. Nonetheless, when Napoleon 
defeated the Second Coalition in 1801, this had given France a dominance that allowed it 
to reconstruct the Reich, and in the resulting reconstitution (the Imperial Recess of 
February 1803) the number of ecclesiastical princes and Imperial cities would be 
drastically consolidated.142  
 
Francis II and the Dissolution of the Empire 
The dynastic element would at this point reassert itself. Napoleon in May of 1804, 
crowned himself Napoleon I, Emperor of France. Francis, in order not to lose precedence 
to Napoleon in the event of the demise of the Empire, took for himself the title of 
hereditary emperor of Austria on August 11, 1804. The creation of this title would 
decrease the commitment of Francis to his Imperial crown, and in the process made more 
likely the Imperial dissolution that it was intended to hedge against. The Austrian defeat 
at Austerlitz in December of 1805 would further cement Napoleon’s dominance, and he 
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proceeded to undertake a further reorganization of the smaller states of the Empire to 
create four French client states: Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Württemberg.  
The Confederation of the Rhine which consolidated these states under French 
control, and the dynastic marriages between the Bonaparte family and the German 
princely families, both indicated to Francis that his own hegemony over the Holy Roman 
Empire was about to end.143 Napoleon was now self-consciously pursuing a dynastic 
strategy himself to consolidate control over his domains, in the process betraying his real 
motives as having had more to do with imperial conquest than the spread of 
republicanism. In this final act, the elective nature of the Reich would prove to be a 
severe vulnerability, as there was little preventing Napoleon from engineering his own 
election as Holy Roman Emperor. Rather than allow Napoleon to consolidate the Reich 
under his control—and perhaps even gain the Imperial crown—Francis abdicated and 
disestablished the Empire on 6 August 1806, and with this action the illustrious history of 
the Holy Roman Empire came to an end. 
The final end of the Holy Roman Empire was conditioned by the collapse of the 
military capabilities of ancien régime rulers due to their inability to comprehend the non-
dynastic goals that Napoleon had in mind when engaging them in war. The dynastic 
system, which through intermarriage and the system of mutual obligations it engendered, 
had managed to foster stability and deter the instability arising from conquests due to the 
delicately balanced system of dynastic ties. However, once the French Revolution had 
brought a non-dynastic ruler to lead one of the great powers—and a military genius at 
that—it would have required a leap of the imagination too great for dynastic rulers to 
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muster to anticipate and forestall the continental conquests that Napoleon desired. Absent 
such superhuman foresight, there would be nothing that could save the ancien régime 
system from collapse.  
Francis II, though he had perceived the threat of Napoleon more clearly than 
many of the other monarchs of the time, was nonetheless unwilling to undertake the 
disruptive social and military reforms that would have made the Austrian military more 
competitive due to his innate conservatism. If he had not dissolved the Empire, the Reich 
would surely have come under the dominion of Napoleon, but might nonetheless have 
survived in some form. The Habsburg pride and sense of the Imperial title as a dynastic 
possession, would not allow Francis to let go of the Imperial crown. In this sense, 
disestablishment was a path that only a ruler seized by the pride that ran as a current 
through the value system of the old regime, could envisage. Though the Reich was 
heading toward a condition of subjugation, the path of disestablishment could not have 
been imagined by a republican ruler without the strong sense of possession that dynastic 
rulers held over the domains they ruled. Francis’ intense unwillingness to surrender the 
Imperial crown had spurred him to a revolutionary decision that would steal a partial 
victory from the jaws of defeat. 
 
Late Survival Composite State Death and Theoretical Expectations 
In the two cases of late survival composite state death we examined, we found 
that the failure of dynastic deterrence where it had previously been operative, played an 
important role in bringing about terminal composite state death. In the case of Poland-
Lithuania, though the Commonwealth had long sunk into an effective state of dependence 
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on the benevolence of its patrons—Russia and Austria—we can conjecture that the 
kinship relations that tied Augustus III to Maria Theresa would have stirred violent 
resistance to partition efforts on the part of the Habsburg Empress, had such moves taken 
place during Augustus’ reign. Though the outcome of conquest was likely over-
determined due to the severe imbalance between the Commonwealth’s defenses and the 
military capacities of her more powerful neighbors, nonetheless it is significant that 
partition began only after the accession of Stanisław Poniatowski—a Polish noble with 
few kinship ties to European royalty—to the Polish throne. The timing of the partition 
suggests that dynastic deterrence could have been operative during the reign of Augustus 
III. 
Nonetheless, the efficient cause of the First Partition, the ceaseless maneuverings 
of Frederick II to acquire more territory, also shows in a negative manner, the importance 
of dynastic deterrence. Frederick was, due to the idiosyncrasies of his childhood and 
sexuality, an atypical dynastic ruler with little attachment to dynastic objectives and 
norms, and thus was relatively free to act outside its strictures. Given that Frederick was 
the prime mover in the events leading up to the First Partition, the expectations of 
dynasticism accord closely with fact that the demise of the Commonwealth was initiated 
by a non-dynastically inclined ruler, as does the fact that the Commonwealth (as a non-
dynastic state) would be particularly vulnerable to predation. Once the First Partition had 
taken place, and given that Joseph II and Catherine had in their respective ways come 
under the spell of Frederick and his realpolitik approach, it was almost a matter of course 
that the ongoing interaction between the three powers would reach its logical conclusion 
with the complete partitioning of the Commonwealth. 
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Poland-Lithuania had long been unable to ensure its own security, and the 
additional military capability provided by Lithuania was unable to reverse the state of 
dependence into which the Commonwealth had fallen. The problem in this case was 
weakness that lay on the level of constitutional structure obstructing the political reforms 
that could have created a powerful standing army in place of the fragmented forces of the 
Polish nobility. Lack of cohesion was a relevant factor in the congenital weakness of 
Poland-Lithuania, but it arose not from sociological diversity but from constitutionally 
determined limits placed on the authority of the monarchical center.  
The demise of the Commonwealth, then, presents no surprise for the early modern 
realist perspective, though the survival of the Commonwealth so long after its collapse 
into dependence is somewhat counterintuitive—given this survival could not have been 
caused by force deterrence due to its widely known helplessness—and requires additional 
explanatory factors. The role of a residual conquest taboo that spilled over to structure 
even relations between rulers not tied by kinship might be one possibility we cannot 
explore further here. The leadership learning perspective is not directly relevant given 
that the partitions were largely externally driven events, but nonetheless events inside the 
Commonwealth demonstrate that rulers educated dynastically are not always the best 
qualified to undertake necessary reforms. Stanisław Poniatowski, a Polish noble whose 
sole qualification for ascending the throne was “that he had been Catherine’s lover,”144 
nonetheless displayed a remarkable capacity for learning while king, and the proposed 
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project of reform he initiated might have succeeded in revitalizing the Commonwealth 
had the country not ceased to exist. 
When evaluating the ultimate demise of the Holy Roman Empire, the expectations 
from the approach of dynasticism are largely confirmed, as analogously to the Polish 
case, a non-dynastic or anti-dynastic ruler (Napoleon Bonaparte) was responsible for 
bringing the entire ancien régime system close to collapse due to his ability to pursue 
goals outside of the conservative (but stability inducing) parameters of dynasticism as a 
system. Though the causal factors underlying the Reich’s military vulnerability against 
Napoleonic France were not unique to it as a composite state—as the response of all 
ancien régime states (composite and simple) evinced a collective inability to adapt to the 
radical departures of France—nonetheless the markedly decentralized structure of the 
Reich as a secondary composite state left it particularly vulnerable to external influence.  
Prussia in deciding to seek neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars—forcing 
Austria to fight alone against France—was a relevant factor in weakening Austria’s 
ability to withstand French military onslaughts, and this outcome cannot be separated 
from the Reich’s structure as in part a supranational state. However, the fact that the 
military failure was not restricted to the Reich but afflicted also relatively centralized 
states of the ancien régime, suggests the critical weakness was not one of capability, but 
of both coordination and vision. This vitiates the explanatory power of early modern 
realism when understanding this case. The dynastic cohort of rulers could not conceive 
the real objectives of Napoleon, as they had never been faced with a leader with such 
radically anti-dynastic and absolutist ambitions as he had.  
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The French state under the rule of Napoleon serves as an important test case of 
many of the theoretical approaches we outlined. Napoleonic France confirms 
expectations from dynasticism that non-dynastic states are more prone to attempt 
conquest. This is amply shown by the expansionist goals of Napoleon’s armies. 
Furthermore, Napoleon as a non-dynastic leader would be expected not to have been well 
steeped in the cross-generational learning that such systems can transmit. Indeed, his lack 
of strategic prudence by falling victim to the error of military overexpansion, and 
eventually arousing dissent and disloyalty among his populace, is ample proof of 
Napoleon’s ignorance of the dangers of overestimating one’s position. However, early 
modern realism seems limited in explaining the nature of the weakness of ancien régime 
rulers when facing France. The primary weakness of these dynastic rulers seems to have 
been one of limited vision and an inability to comprehend the true nature of Napoleon’s 
methods and goals.  
Finally, the pathway of composite state death by disestablishment we saw to be 
one uniquely associated with the dynastic state. Only the dynastic ruler who presumed to 
own the state he ruled could undertake such an arrogant action as to personally 
disestablish his state as Francis did, and only the state that saw itself as identical to a 
degree with the ruler would be subservient enough to follow through and implement such 
a proclamation. Though saving the Reich from domination by Napoleon and France, 
disestablishment of the Holy Roman Empire brought to an end an illustrious state that 
had done more than any other to midwife Europe’s transition from the Renaissance to the 
early modern age, and which had anchored the European continent in a set of dynastic 
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practices that had remarkable resilience and socializing power over its children who were 




UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND PRELIMINARY ANSWERS 
 
In this chapter, we outline some of the unanswered questions arising from this 
research requiring further study, questions that put together might be thought to constitute 
a research agenda for the study of dynasticism in the context of international relations. 
We also provide some preliminary answers to these questions, in lieu of a more 
developed analysis that will be pursued in future works. 
Firstly, we point to the role of anomalous leaders, and the question of when such 
anomalous leaders—in this case dynastic leaders who reached adulthood without 
imbibing a genuinely dynastic outlook—arise and/or were able to play an outsized role in 
dynastic politics. As we alluded to, leadership learning played an important role in the 
study of composite state survival, but not quite in the way expected by the approach laid 
out in Chapter One.  
In fact, leadership learning played a negligible and imprecise role in facilitating 
the survival of composite states through the postulated mechanisms, but it was perversely 
an important mechanism in composite state death—particularly of late survival composite 
states. Intergenerational learning within the dynastic line aided some rulers to avoid 
egregious errors, but a dynastic education could not prevent other dynastic rulers from 
failing to internalize the lessons stemming from the errors of their forefathers. Moreover, 
it seems likely that atypical dynastic rulers (and republican leaders) learnt lessons from 
each other across time and space about the possibilities of ignoring the norms and goals 
of dynasticism. Because such atypical rulers played an important role in the dissolution of 
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Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire, their role cannot be ignored though it 
constitutes in many ways a contingent historical variable and is difficult to generalize. 
Tim Blanning has written that Frederick turned his lust for power outwards 
whereas his father had confined his aggression to his son and his subjects.1 In doing so 
and having waged multiple aggressive wars based only loosely or not at all on dynastic 
claims, Frederick diverted the developmental path of European politics and set it 
decisively on a trajectory where dynastic politics was rapidly eclipsed by power politics. 
Despite the logic of the balance of power and territoriality becoming an increasingly 
pressing concern of many monarchic rulers during the eighteenth century, nonetheless it 
was due to the decisive role of rulers (such as Frederick) who eschewed dynastic logic 
and brazenly pursued a power political logic that the historical dialectic evolved.  
It still remains necessary to better understand the general conditions under which 
dynastic rulers emerged with only a weak grounding in dynastic norms, and perhaps more 
importantly, the nature of the inter-dynastic environment in which they could exercise an 
outsized influence. In the second half of the eighteenth century, an important set of 
factors converged to transform the practice of relations between European monarchical 
rulers. Despite the tentative steps made by the research laid out in the chapters above, 
opportunities exist to make major advances in our understanding of the following factors 
and their interaction.  
Moreover, I would suggest that it was in part the opportunities opened up by these 
changes that were seized by non-dynastically anchored monarchs, and the destabilizing 
non-dynastic means and ends of these monarchs was applied to systemic interactions to 
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further weaken the dynastic fabric in the manner of a feedback loop. The French 
Revolution was a critically important historical event, but the factors below operated in 
partial autonomy to the regime transformations brought about by that revolution, though 
in a quirk of history would become intertwined with them due to the rise of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Let me elaborate.  
The overarching long-term historical processes encompassing these separate 
questions, corresponds to the gradual transformation of dynastic goals—such as dynastic 
inheritance, status and conquest desistance—into balance of power and economic 
imperatives, in short the quest for greater power and wealth. Gaining a better insight into 
this shift would be an important part of explaining how balance of power considerations 
came to dominate European strategic culture, and how the dynastic system as a whole 
declined. In accordance with our preliminary findings, balance of power imperatives 
should be understood as a historically contingent phenomenon and not an eternal fact.  
The emergence of power politics and the balance of power as a dominant trope 
took place during the period we examine and occurred due to a confluence of the 
following factors: a) a conceptual shift of the meaning of ‘balance’ from balancing to 
protect the weak to balancing to resist the strong; b) a transformation of dynastic 
inheritance norms so that large dynastic territories could no longer be inherited un-
partitioned by a single claimant; c) a transformation of the relationship between ruler and 
subject and the displacement of dynastic interest by raison d’état; d) a transformation of 
military strategy emanating from fierce rivalry in the colonies; and e) the exemplar of 
influential monarchs (i.e. Charles XII, Frederick II) who changed the way that other 
monarchs conceived of their strategic priorities. We examine each of these in order. 
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1) It should be remembered that the balance of power had a dual origin in 
European history, and its conceptual content was forged through a dialectical interaction 
of at least two tendencies. The full nature of the evolution of the concept of the balance of 
power during the Middle Ages and early modern period has yet to be understood, despite 
the volumes that have already been written on this question. The first and most widely 
known account is that it originated during the Renaissance on the Italian peninsula, where 
the relatively self-contained system that existed there consisted of “five major city-states 
who sought to prevent the domination of the peninsula by any one power.”2 The second, 
lesser-known strand, is that it emerged during the Middle Ages as a device and 
imperative to ensure the survival of the smallest states and preserve dynastic rights from 
being extinguished. It was only later, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that 
it became entrenched as a means to check the power of the most powerful monarchs, the 
outcome of the blending of practices in Italy with those of the more feudally grounded 
northern states.  
The medieval notion of the ‘feud’ was a means to ensure collective action to 
punish wrongdoers and defend the ‘right’ cause, and this frequently operated as a device 
to protect the weaker members of a society. The prominent medievalist Otto Brunner 
noted that, “no less frequent than conflicts between an emperor and an imperial prince 
were those in which the subjects of a territory waged a feud against their territorial lord.”3 
And during the medieval era—a period thoroughly legalistic in its worldview—the 
restitution of possessions (particularly territory) taken by force without legitimate right 
																																																								
2 Moorhead Wright, Introduction to Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486-1914, ed. 
Moorhead Wright (London: Dent, 1975), p. ix. 
3 Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 37. 
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constituted one of the principle drivers of a feud. In an age when the boundary between 
private war and public war was undeveloped, the feud waged by subjects against a lord 
unjustly infringing on their rights was one of the main means of self-help, preventing 
their legal property rights from being obliterated by the powerful. This private means of 
self-help was to gradually be incorporated into the meaning of the balance of power 
during the early modern period.  
With the increasing institutionalization of the distinction between private and 
public war, and the significant expansion of some dynastic agglomerations (such as that 
of the Habsburgs) due to marriage strategy and dynastic inheritance—culminating in the 
early sixteenth century during the reign of Charles V with the continental pretensions of 
the Spanish Empire—the primary danger came to be felt as being from dominant powers 
rather than the extinction of private rights per se. This process was partly a consequence 
of the fragmentation of the hierarchical system of Christendom and the increasing 
autonomy of kings from the dictates of popes and emperors.4 Thus, we find transitional 
statements such as the following published in 1720 by the Archbishop of Cambray, who 
ties together the threat of the powerful and the need to defend the weak: “Tis a duty…as 
natural for neighboring nations to concur for the common safety against one who grows 
																																																								
4 Wight characterizes the transformation thus: “Medieval man had a customary loyalty to his immediate 
feudal superior, with whose authority he was in regular contact, and a customary religious obedience to the 
Church under the Pope, which governed every aspect of his life; but his loyalty to the King, whom he 
probably never saw and was seldom aware of, was weaker than either. In due course the King suppressed 
the feudal barons and challenged the Pope, becoming the protector and champion against oppression and 
disorder at home and against a corrupt and exacting ecclesiastical system whose headquarters was abroad.” 
Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 25. 
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too powerful, as it is for fellow-citizens to unite against an invader of the liberty of their 
country.”5 
It was the northward transmission of the concept of the balance of power (a 
journey that has yet to be fully traced by the history of political thought) with the demise 
of Christendom and the emergence of competitive relations between dynastic rulers that 
led to an expansion of the conceptual content of the balance of power and an evolution 
toward its modern meaning. Without the gradual evacuation of the medieval content of 
the balance of power as a means of protecting legal right, the modern meaning could not 
have emerged to be then taken up by early modern absolutist rulers. Even though it would 
be the role of leaders pursuing non-dynastic goals—such as Frederick II and Napoleon—
that would prove decisive in creating a realpolitik system, the conceptual tools they used 
to frame their innovative goals needed to be invented before they could think them. In the 
manner of dialectical evolution laid out by Herbert Butterfield, it was the feudal origins 
of the balance of power trope that would prove critical in rendering it attractive for early 
modern rulers to use. 
2) Around the turn of the eighteenth century, dynastic inheritance became 
insufficient as a means to acquire territory. The precise contours of this transition have 
yet to be properly enumerated, but at this point we do know that the secret partition 
treaties negotiated in 1698 and 1700 between Louis XIV and William III of England 
jointly as the most powerful monarchical rulers of their age, were an important milestone 
in this development. Though these secret partition treaties were never implemented, they 
were both innovative and deeply inimical to the dynastic system for two reasons. Firstly, 
																																																								
5 Archbishop of Cambray, “Two Essays on the Balance of Europe,” in A Collection of Scarce and Valuable 
Tracts Vol. XIII, ed. Sir Walter Scott (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1815), p. 768. 
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the notion of partition—implying divisible inheritance—cut against the right of 
primogeniture, which was prevalent at the time on the Continent, and which as an 
institution had empowered dynastic marriage as the primary means of maintaining and 
even accumulating territory. Secondly, and more importantly, the fact that the partition 
treaties included signatories who were not legal claimants to the territories disposed of, 
contradicted the deeply embedded notion of legal inheritance rights. Due to this fact, the 
treaty was not only repugnant to other rightful claimants of the Spanish succession, such 
as the Habsburg Emperor Leopold and the Spanish (who did not wish the Spanish Empire 
divided), but even in England “a good many people thought them immoral and blamed 
William for trying to dispose of lands that were not his own.”6 
As Shennan notes, it was the unique nature of the imminent Spanish succession 
crisis that drove the development of this new approach, as “the vastness of the Spanish 
empire made Louis realize that the traditional rules of dynastic inheritance could not be 
applied with any expectation of success” and would rather provide the basis for 
negotiations in which legitimate claimants would be expected to “acquire a share.”7 
Whatever the reasons for the employment of such an approach, as soon as dynastic 
inheritance rights came to be seen as insufficient to guarantee acquisition—which is 
essentially what the secret partition treaties portended—it became necessary for dynastic 
monarchs to start thinking of means toward territorial acquisition via alternate channels 
besides dynastic marriage and dynastic inheritance. As long as inheritance was a 
guaranteed means of acquiring territory, it could be considered superior to brute force due 
																																																								
6 Mark Thomson, “Self-determination and Collective Security as Factors in English and French Foreign 
Policy, 1689-1718,” in William III and Louis XIV, ed. Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1968), p. 276. 
7 J. H. Shennan, International Relations in Europe 1689-1789 (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 12. 
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to its significantly lower costs, but as the right of dynastic inheritance began to weaken, 
military means naturally came to take on greater importance. It was in such a context that 
brute conquest would be rehabilitated as a legitimate means of dynastic competition. 
3) The discourse of enlightened absolutism—which emerged during the 
eighteenth century from out of the nascent spheres of public discourse and political 
thought—led to the growing power of concepts such as ‘state’ and ‘nation’ as organizing 
frames to understand the obligations and goals of rulers. This development also 
converged with the increasing bureaucratization of both the government and army, and 
brought about a displacement of dynastic priorites in favor of the state-centric priorities 
pursued by the nascent personnel of the civil service.8 
As Blanning notes of the provenance of such concepts: 
This did not spring ready armed from the heads of the revolutionaries in 1789 but had 
been a long time in the making. Across western and central Europe, the two master nouns 
of political discourse were ‘state’ and ‘nation’…The alienation between monarchy and 
nation had been underway at least since 1713, when Louis XIV prompted Clement XI to 
issue the bull Unigenitus against the Jansenists. It became a chasm with the ‘diplomatic 
revolution’ of 1756 and was made finally unbridgeable by the Austrian marriage of 1770. 
Meanwhile, in Great Britain the Hanoverians were slowly, painfully but successfully 
constructing a new alliance between dynasty and nation, while in Prussia an odd but 
effective ‘state patriotism’ was promoted by Frederick the Great.9  
 
Though a full analysis of the emergence of such concepts lies outside the scope of 
this present study, these new modes shifted in important ways the manner in which 
monarchical rulers thought about their interests, and brought to the fore raison d’état as 
the organizing prism through which rulers should pursue their goals. It would finally be 
the marriage of state and nation during the French Revolution and its aftermath that 
																																																								
8 Stephen Kocs, “The Dynastic Constitution of Early Modern International Politics” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2010), p. 20.	
9 T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 4. 
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would consolidate the notion that a leader should pursue only actions aligned with the 
interests of the people as a whole. Actions framed solely by dynastic interests were 
gradually delegitimized. 
4) The accelerating global competition for colonial expansion and resource 
appropriation outside Europe, and the relatively lawless nature of this competition when 
compared with the nature of dynastic competition within Europe, gave rise to a 
boomerang effect in which the tools of warfare in the periphery were gradually seen to be 
legitimate for use in the center, leading to a concomitant decline in respect for traditional 
rules and norms, such as those of dynastic inheritance. In particular, the manner in which 
the property rights of the original inhabitants of these lands were routinely alienated by 
European settlers, and the trade and resource extraction toward the realization of which 
colonial government was organized, led brought about two important consequences.  
Firstly, it led to an expansion of the geographical arena in which competition 
between European monarchs played itself out. Though the European theater was still 
relatively autonomous from the colonial theater, there was inevitably a degree of 
spillover between the two, for instance as took place during the Seven Years War. 
Secondly, this expansion of perspective brought about a weakening of the hitherto 
exacting dynastic norms that had governed monarchical competition in Europe. If 
competition in the colonial arena was unconstrained by desistance from conquest, why 
should this norm continue to be rigorously upheld in Europe? In Europe, there took hold 
the idea that “a territorial and military balance in Europe was worth little unless it could 
be backed by a colonial and maritime one overseas, above all in America,” and on the 
peripheries of Europe increasing military interactions led to the incorporation into the 
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European system of extra-European powers unconcerned with a rigorous adherence to 
dynastic norms, such as Russia.10  
All of these longue durée transformations, only peripherally related to the 
question of the longevity of composite states, were nonetheless crucial factors molding 
the political context in which rulers such as Frederick II and Napoleon could conceive of 
transgressing dynastic norms and breaking down the parameters that had governed 
dynastic warfare in Europe at least since the Peace of Westphalia. To be sure, it was the 
groundbreaking actions of non-dynastically oriented European that played a critical role 
in the gradual desuetude of the conquest prohibition throughout the eighteenth century. 
The inter-generational learning process that encompassed the actions of king Charles XII 
of Sweden, a half century later Frederick the Great and another half century later 
Napoleon Bonaparte, all of whom with their progressive disregard for the dynastic limits 
of warfare facilitated a general weakening of this norm, was an important factor that 
made possible conquest attempts such as the 1756 Prussian invasion of Saxony and soon 
after this the extirpation of the sovereignty of Poland-Lithuania through multiple 
partitions.  
Without access to the strategic example of the Swedish King, whose impetuous 
wars and battles Frederick studied closely, it is difficult to envisage the great Prussian 
ruler developing a strategic vision with so little reverence for dynasticism and such lust 
for territorial expansion. However, the influence was not one of a unilateral 
amplification. Frederick’s expansive ambitions were also tempered by the failures of 
																																																								
10 Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793 (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), pp. 168-9. 
On the effect of colonial expansion on the balance of power, see also M. S. Anderson, “Eighteenth-Century 
Theories of the Balance of Power,” in Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. Ragnhild Hatton (London: 
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Charles XII, and particularly his defeat at Poltava. In his analysis Frederick applauds 
Charles’ ambition but views his desired conquest of Russia as being imprudent due to its 
being unrealistic and ultimately impossible. He thus notes that:  
It is a rule of war that one must never make deep penetrations and that wars undertaken 
near to the frontiers always succeed more happily than those where the army is ventured 
too far…from its magazines into enemy territory, without protecting its rear and 
providing for its security.11 
 
Though he excoriated Charles for having an imperfect understanding of strategic 
principles and thus overextending his army during the push into Russia, Frederick 
himself would ironically also lead Prussia into a dangerously overextended position in the 
Seven Years War with his 1756 invasion and subsequent occupation of Saxony, an 
invasion whose wisdom and morality had been doubted by his generals, and which 
through its harsh treatment of the occupied populace led to significant revulsion and 
resistance from the other principalities of the Empire.12  
Having violated the unwritten constitution of the Empire (and dynasticism) which 
prohibited the unprovoked conquest of one of its constituents by another, the Imperial 
Diet in January of 1757 expelled Prussia from the Empire and declared war against it.13 
After another four years of war, Prussia under Frederick was exhausted by the task of not 
only defending Silesia and Saxony against successive onslaughts by the Franco-Imperial 
army, but also faced the loss of Prussian Pomerania to the Russians. When Elizabeth of 
Russia died on 5 January 1762, Prussia had been on the brink of total defeat, but her 
unstable successor Peter III was a fanatical admirer of Frederick, and Peter’s stunning 
																																																								
11 Frederick II, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1999), p. 350. 
12 Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1996), p. 134, 146. 
13 Ibid., p. 146.	
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withdrawal from the war allowed Frederick to unexpectedly survive a withering war with 
Saxony restored in full to its ruler but Silesia remaining under the control of Prussia.14  
The willingness of Charles XII to wage war with disregard for dynastic norms had 
paved the way for Frederick II to unashamedly adopt unprovoked conquest as a means of 
warfare, and the Prussian ruler’s scandalous machinations to partition Poland undertaken 
with the willing participation of Catherine of Russia and the unwilling involvement of 
Maria Theresa, would in turn further normalize the practice of territorial annexation 
without regard for dynastic justifications. Though the role of iconoclastic rulers with 
scant regard for dynastic norms was of decisive importance in weakening the hold of the 
normative parameters of dynastic conflict, the conditions of emergence of iconoclastic 
leaders, and the specific conditions in which they could wield an outsized influence, are 
not well understood. The long-term processes outlined above which collectively loosened 
the system of dynastic practices and norms that had underpinned and stabilized the 
European system for centuries, was of decisive importance in creating a milieu in which 
the actions of deviant rulers could pass without massive censure and retaliation.  
However, the opportunities opened up by these transformations could not exercise 
any influence over the course of events had they not been exploited by rulers who saw 
these opportunities and took them. In this sense, the role of individual rulers who 
disregarded the dictates of dynastic deterrence and were guided primarily by the 
emerging raison d’état framework was integral to initiating the final dissolution of late 
																																																								




survival composite states such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Holy 
Roman Empire.15 
																																																								
15 One might ask the counter-factual question of whether, even without these historical personages, some 
other like-minded leaders would have come along who would have pursued similar policies, and in such 
manner propel an inexorable logic of historical development? This philosophical question is outside the 
purview of this study, and involves contemplating the unknowable question of whether it is individuals 
who are merely the vehicles or conduits for unstoppable historical trends, or whether the character of 
individual leaders does in fact shape the direction of history and channel it in discernible pathways that 




IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
In this conclusion, I reiterate the chief findings of the comparative historical 
analyses of earlier chapters while contextualizing dynastic deterrence as one response to 
the difficult problem of maintaining monarchical rule over composite states in early 
modern Europe. I also draw out some implications of our approach for three areas of 
international relations theory—alliances, deterrence and the democratic peace—and in 
doing so make some preliminary suggestions as to how the study of kinship ties and 
dynastic marriage in the ancien régime is relevant for our contemporary world. 
 
Dynastic Deterrence and Preserving Rule in Early Modern Composite States 
 
To talk of ‘policy’ in the context of the early modern monarchical state is to travel 
to a very different historical milieu where the practice of politics had a significantly 
different meaning from what we understand today. The French Revolution had not yet 
taken place, and the goals of government were more limited and ‘negative’ in nature 
when compared with the expansive ‘positive’ tasks that would attach themselves to state 
power with the birth of the modern state. This was due primarily to the relatively weak 
state capacity of early modern states. In this light, dynastic deterrence should be 
understood not merely as an unintended consequence of dynastic marriage practices, but 
also as a strategy meant to solve some of the intractable problems of political rule in the 
Baroque era. We illustrate the way in which dynastic marriage epitomized a powerful 
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answer to the problem of preserving indirect rule by juxtaposing it with the strategic 
injunctions Machiavelli draws for the ruler of mixed principalities. 
The main task of the early modern state (and dynasty) was to expand its territorial 
holdings where this was possible, but to always preserve control over existing domains 
and survive the constant military contestation typical of the time. Dynastic continuity 
within a house was to be ensured as far as possible, and when it could not the throne was 
passed to a house that would best preserve the customary laws and rights of the domain. 
Wealth accumulation and taxation were necessary only to the extent that mercenaries and 
burgeoning standing armies had to be paid for. These are also the priorities that animate 
the theory of principalities constructed by Niccolò Machiavelli, and the strikingly 
‘negative’ nature of early modern rule lends the works of Machiavelli an archaic 
character insofar as they deal predominantly with the task of preserving rule over those of 
other state functions. The contemporary distinction between foreign policy as self-help 
and domestic policy as the provision of public goods was not yet clear during this age, as 
domestic policy itself centered on self-preservation over and above distributive goals. 
As a theorist preoccupied with the goal of preserving political rule in 
principalities and republics, Machiavelli had to assume that human collectivities were 
impermanent and subject to growth and decay. As he writes, “all things of men are in 
motion and cannot stay steady, they must either rise or fall…”1 And against these ever-
present centrifugal forces, Machiavelli adopts the role of the political physician whose 
task it is to help the ruler diagnose and eliminate the causes of early demise, in such way 
aiding the longevity of political rule wherever possible. Though Machiavelli as such does 
																																																								
1  Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, tr. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 23. 
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not identify dynastic deterrence as one of the means through which the rule of a prince 
could be stabilized and preserved, it does fit neatly into his theoretical framework given 
that it resolves one of the central problems he raises: the proper means through which 
political rule could be preserved even in the absence of direct authority.  
A degree of instability always afflicted the composite state, as a composite 
structure necessarily involves indirect rule. When more than one royal title is held by a 
single ruler—as in the case of personal unions—there existed the ever-present danger that 
a pretender will emerge to usurp the crown of an absentee ruler in the peripheral domain. 
Moreover, where rule is exercised via an assembly or parliament in the peripheral polity, 
there is the parallel danger that the assembly will choose to divest the reigning monarch 
of his crown and bestow it on another candidate. This is what may be termed the problem 
of the absentee ruler, and is a subset of the problem of maintaining a composite state after 
it has been enlarged through the acquisition of an additional polity. Machiavelli in The 
Prince has discussed the problem of maintaining rule over a territory acquired by 
conquest, but the problem of maintaining rule over a territory acquired not through 
coercion but through consensual means—such as via inheritance and marriage—is 
fundamentally similar in form. 
In proposing a solution to the problem of the absentee ruler, Machiavelli notes 
that:  
One of the best and most effective solutions is for the conqueror to go and live there. This 
makes the possession more secure and more permanent…for if one does do that, troubles 
can be detected when they are just beginning and effective measures can be taken 
quickly. But if one does not, the troubles are encountered when they have grown, and 
nothing can be done about them. Moreover, under direct rule, the country will not be 
exploited by your officials; the subjects will be content if they have direct access to the 
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ruler. Consequently, they will have more reason to be devoted to him if they intend to 
behave well, and to fear him if they do not.2 
 
To reframe this problem in the context of the early modern composite state, we 
could say that the people of a territory can be more easily governed when a ruler is both 
geographically proximate and similar in terms of attributes to the people being ruled. In 
this regard, it should be noted that proxy rule in a peripheral polity by viceroys and 
governors was an inferior substitute for direct rule, given the tendency of such officials to 
lack significant ties with the local nobility, their inability to undertake truly autonomous 
decision-making, and their relative lack of prestige when compared with the kingly 
status. Moreover, when the governor was a junior member of the ruling dynasty, 
problems could emerge due to intra-dynastic rivalries.3 However, the impulse to acquire 
territory, despite its pitfalls, was strong during the early modern period, due to the 
perceived advantage (in terms of both prestige and resources) accruing from such 
acquisitions. Put simply the intractable problem—in a historical milieu where expansion 
was seen to be highly desirable—was to maintain control over an expanding array of 
territorial acquisitions through indirect means given the practical impossibility of 
maintaining direct rule in a large composite realm. 
As such, the decision to erase the composite structure of a state through 
amalgamation of the components parts was not one to be taken lightly. Where a 
composite state already existed, making indirect rule function within the existing 
structure was seen to be a less costly strategy than erasing the customary laws and rights 
																																																								
2 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 8. 
3 Though not as vicious as the competition between competing contenders for succession in polygynous 
societies as was generally the case outside Europe, nonetheless competition between members of the same 
dynasty could sometimes be severe, as was exemplified by competition between the different Vasa 
branches in Sweden and Poland-Lithuania outlined above in Chapter 4.   
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of peripheral domains and instituting direct rule by coercive means.4 This preference for 
maintaining an existing composite state attained especially where territories had been 
acquired through inheritance rather than through military might. Bringing about the 
‘death’ of a composite state via amalgamation and the imposition of direct rule was not a 
high priority for the early modern ruler. When it came to the question of how indirect rule 
could be consolidated, there were essentially only three strategies available in Baroque 
Europe. Firstly, the peripheral throne could be left vacant and the composite entity ruled 
remotely as a personal union with the cooperation of a regional assembly. Secondly, a 
peripheral throne could be occupied by a hereditary dynasty with ties to the dynasty 
ruling the monarchical center. And finally, a peripheral state could be ruled essentially as 
a province, such as when a member of the ruling dynasty, generally a younger sibling of 
the heir or the head of a cadet branch, was sent as a governor or viceroy in the peripheral 
domain.5 Rule by proxy or via assembly was the norm in most primary composite states, 
whereas the second option was generally available only in the case of secondary 
composite states, such as the Holy Roman Empire. 
In the context of the problem of the absentee ruler, rule in a peripheral territory by 
a hereditary dynasty represented somewhat of a middle way between rule by assembly 
and rule by proxy. Moreover, because it avoids the leadership vacuum and concomitant 
																																																								
4 Machiavelli notes that non-coercive means of exercising control, such as establishing colonies in an 
annexed territory, is preferable to coercive means, as more enemies are fomented through the use of force. 
Similarly, the destruction of the laws and institutions of a polity is only necessary when it has previously 
become used to a free (meaning here republican) way of life. Where a polity is already a principality, he 
argues that destruction of the ruling family is sufficient to preserve rule. Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 18-
19. 
5 Fichtner notes that for Habsburgs, such as Charles V, a surplus of offspring was desired as they would 
provide a ready supply of royal governors and viceroys. Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Dynastic Marriage in 




instability that ensued from an absentee ruler, it had an important advantage over the 
other two strategies. However, the most important advantage of direct dynastic rule in the 
periphery was in all likelihood the deep loyalty that could be engendered through a web 
of kinship ties build up cross-generationally. Because the principal danger of allowing 
dynastic rule in a peripheral domain was that the provincial dynasty would adopt an 
independent policy radically at odds with the interests of the monarchical center, the 
construction of such a web of kinship ties between center and periphery—essentially 
embedding the periphery into a patron-client relationship with the center—was a 
masterful solution to the task of ensuring that dynastic clients could be kept loyal and 
within the orbit of the center. By providing marriage partners to the client dynasty, the 
patron lent some of its prestige to the client, and at the same time discouraged the client 
from seeking marital unions (and hence alliances) with dynasties outside the composite 
state. 
To what extent did the mechanism of dynastic deterrence succeed in ensuring the 
preservation of composite states? Though dynastic deterrence is powerful in 
encapsulating the essence of early modern international relations, the question of the 
extent to which this mechanism succeeded in ensuring composite state longevity rests on 
whether its presence explains composite state survival in the face of existential threats, 
and its absence in hastening composite state death. In the cases of early composite state 
death by amalgamation—namely the demise of England-Scotland, England-Ireland, and 
Castile-Aragon—we saw that dynastic ties between the monarchic center and peripheral 
component polity were absent as there was no ruling dynasty in place in the peripheral 
domain. Similarly, in the one case of state death by secession—the dissolution of the 
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Iberian Union—there also did not exist dynastic ties between the monarchic center and 
peripheral unit, though dynastic ties between the Braganza claimants to the Portuguese 
throne and the English Stuarts were found to have been pivotal in giving succor to the 
secession effort during the Portuguese Restoration War. 
In none of these cases did strong kinship ties exist between the monarchic center 
and the peripheral polity, in part because all of these states lacked an intermediate level of 
dynastic rule in component polities mediating the relation between sovereign and subject. 
Extrapolating from the role played by inside-outside dynastic ties in facilitating the 
secession of Portugal, a strong counterfactual argument can be made that kinship ties—
were they to have existed between center and periphery—would have suppressed the 
impulse to amalgamate and/or secede in these varying cases. The presence of a dynastic 
patron in the peripheral polity would have precluded the need for amalgamation as there 
would have been a significantly attenuated threat of an independent foreign policy in the 
periphery, and similarly moves toward secession would have been significantly 
weakened. 
When we examine the Holy Roman Empire in more detail, we find that though 
client dynasties in the periphery were discouraged from establishing ties with dynasties 
outside the state, the Habsburgs themselves sent marriage partners to foreign dynasties 
surrounding the Empire. Not only does this demonstrate the unequal nature of the 
relationship between center and periphery within the Empire, but it also exemplifies the 
Machiavellian dictum that a ruler should become “a protector of the neighboring minor 
powers.”6 In this regard, the Habsburgs through their web of kinship ties circumvented to 
																																																								
6 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 9. 
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an extent the weakness of ‘star-shaped’ networks as described by Nexon, namely their 
vulnerability to cross-segment collaboration against the center.7 Local intermediaries in 
the early modern composite state were not all of a kind, and rule by a resident dynasty in 
the electorates and principalities of the Empire were significantly more robust and 
effective in their ability to garner loyalty within the peripheral polity than the typical 
governor or viceroy. While such loyalty was forthcoming, the likelihood of cross-
segment collaboration emerging remained low. Moreover dynastic kinship ties with 
foreign ruling houses brought an additional protective buffer zone to the state, due to 
amicable dynastic relations that eviscerated the conquest impulse. 
Given that kinship ties reinforced through marriage and the two-tiered structure of 
the Holy Roman Empire were so successful in preserving its composite structure in the 
face of the instability of indirect rule, why was this structure not more frequently 
replicated elsewhere in Europe? Though dynastic intermarriage was widely practiced in 
early modern Europe—a fact that affirms the usefulness that contemporary rulers saw in 
the practice—the sui generis nature of the Reich’s constitutional structure largely stems 
from the prevalent belief that the basic structure of a polity was not a property to be 
constructed de novo or manipulated through constitutional engineering. Rather, the 
theorists and practitioners of the ancien régime predominantly believed that a constitution 
was a cultural achievement that evolved painstakingly over time as the existing system of 
conventions and customs faced intermittent challenges. A strong belief in the ability of 
humans to create constitutional order would have to wait until the late eighteenth century 
																																																								




to develop, spurred by the dual revolutions of America and France and the constitutional 
conventions that followed them. 
It should be remembered that at the American founding, and notwithstanding 
criticisms they leveled at the Holy Roman Empire for its ‘nerveless’ structure marked by 
its inability to adequately order ordinary subjects,8 the structure of the Reich did 
nonetheless serve as an important source of insights. Indeed, the institution of the 
electoral college was borrowed directly from the Reich, and when we search for models 
among the states of Europe it must be acknowledged that the two-tiered federal structure 
devised for the United States at its founding more closely mirrored that of the Reich than 
it did any other European state of the time. In offering an answer to the problem of 
preserving indirect rule in the early modern composite state via a network of kinship ties 
between dynastic rule in the center and periphery, dynastic deterrence as a strategy as 
also the constitutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole provided an 
effective solution that proved remarkably resilient and long-lasting when compared with 
other composite states of the ancien régime. 
 
Implications for International Relations Theory 
 
It is to the great detriment of international relations theory that the ancien régime 
era is so seldom the object of close empirical examination. Despite a number of 
exceptions—most notably in the work of Martin Wight—the era following the Peace of 
																																																								
8 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist with Letters of “Brutus,” ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 84-89. 
	
	 314	
Westphalia has been largely neglected by international relations scholarship.9 Though the 
changing nature of empirical reality in different historical eras requires the development 
of diverse analytical tools to conceptualize different realities, nonetheless the desuetude 
of scholarly efforts to unravel the deep structure of early modern dynastic relations means 
that we weaken our ability to comprehend the past, and the discipline as a whole becomes 
subject to knowledge loss. Although social science theories rarely attempt to encompass 
all of the knowledge content of their predecessors contrary to Popperian and Lakatosian 
assumptions, beyond this there is often a loss in knowledge content when newer objects 
of study surpass older ones, and the gradual decline of scholarly interest in the ancien 
régime is a good example of such knowledge loss.10 In the spirit of recovering some of 
the undiscovered insights available to us from examining the ancien régime, I will draw 
out some of the most relevant implications from the preceding chapters for some central 
questions in international relations theory.  
 
Alliances 
Firstly, let us examine the topic of alliances and the difficulty of applying alliance 
concepts to the practice of statecraft in early modern Europe. When seen as embedded in 
a network of kinship and marriage ties, the stickiness and long-lasting nature of many 
																																																								
9 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946). Other important 
attempts by international relations scholarship to analyze the early modern period include: John Gerald 
Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131-157; Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. 
Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security, 19, no. 1 (1994): pp. 108-148. 
10 In fact, Laudan persuasively argues that such knowledge loss is also a characteristic of disciplinary 
development in the natural sciences. In a word, “there are usually problem losses as well as problem gains 
associated with the replacement of any older theory by a newer one.” Larry Laudan, Progress and Its 
Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 148. 
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early modern alliances—a fact otherwise difficult to explain—becomes explicable. 
During the early modern period, dynastic interests frequently crossed political boundaries 
due to the cross-territorial reach of dynastic houses, and the fact that early modern 
political alliances were often anchored upon the institution of the dynastic marriage 
renders the counterintuitive nature of some of these dynastic alliances more readily 
comprehensible. A deep web of kinship ties and a mutual interest in maintaining access 
to a pool of potential marriage partners allows us to see why rivalries between dynasties, 
far from solidifying into something resembling hard enmity, often exhibited the 
unexpected result of solidifying into an alliance robust even in the face of contrary 
pressures emanating from power political considerations. 
The long-term alliance between France and Spain after the accession of Philip V 
as King of Spain is one such case that confounds expectations arising from power 
politics, given that alliances between neighbors are usually exceedingly difficult to 
maintain in the long-term due to the rivalry and fear that is fomented by proximity. The 
fact that there existed ample sparks for conflict between these two kingdoms can be 
demonstrated by the historical enmity existing between the rulers of France and Spain 
since the beginning of the sixteenth century until the War of the Spanish Succession, as 
well that France under the reign of Louis XIV had reached the apogee of its power 
capabilities. However, it was the dynastic ties that bound together the rulers of these two 
kingdoms after the Bourbon dynasty secured the succession of its candidate, Philip V, to 
the Spanish throne. These two countries, which had previously been fierce rivals, became 
consistent allies, “fought together in every war of the century until the French 
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Revolution,” and consolidated their relations in three Family Compacts, of 1733, 1743, 
and 1761.11 
Early modern alliances defying realist expectations also include the longue durée 
family alliance in the seventeenth century between the Austrian and Spanish arms of the 
Habsburg dynasty. After Charles V separated the succession of the hereditary dominions 
unified under his rule, the German territories went to his brother Ferdinand, and Spain, 
Burgundy, and the Italian territories went to his son Philip II. As Wight wrote of this 
alliance, it “depended on family agreements and intermarriage in each generation, rather 
than on formal treaties,” and he writes that “for Spain, the relationship might be summed 
up in the statement that it was unthinkable ever to make war on the Austrian branch of 
the family.”12 Though kinship ties did not always guarantee that an alliance would 
develop, or that alliance commitments—where made—would be fulfilled, nonetheless the 
elective affinity between marriage ties and alliances in early modern Europe is strong 
enough that an understanding of political alliances in this milieu is incomplete without a 
consideration of the family relations underpinning them.  
The characteristically inflexible nature of early modern alliances, which goes 
against the realist dictum that a state should retain maximum flexibility to choose alliance 
partners for self-help purposes, were in part a consequence of the dynastic kinship ties 
that lent such alliances an additional layer of obligation on top of standard strategic 
considerations. Furthermore, the relative stability of sovereign control characteristic of 
ancien régime Europe indicates another factor in lending a degree of inflexibility to the 
																																																								
11 Evan Luard, The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 260. 
12 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 126. Wight in 
turn quotes C. H. Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs 1598-1625 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964). 
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alliances of the time. The relative absence of conquest attempts in early modern Europe 
suggests that, though rulers engaged in acute rivalries over limited goals, the fear of state 
death was not an omnipresent factor shaping the perception of threat. We can postulate 
that in relatively immature anarchic systems—where warfare is more intense, social 
norms less accepted, and the danger of state death more immediate—the nature of 
alliance formation (whether in terms of balancing or bandwagoning) will be flexible and 
unconstrained by considerations of identity or obligation. Conversely, in mature anarchic 
systems, or those where the likelihood of state death is otherwise attenuated, the urgency 
of maintaining a flexible posture toward alliances is correspondingly weaker, and 
inflexible alliances—such as those discernible in ancien régime politics—become more 
sustainable as a strategic choice.13 
Dynastic intermarriage survives as a deeply ingrained practice even today among 
the royal families of Europe, though these families no longer exercise much in the way of 
real power. Though the material politics of developed countries are no longer strongly 
colored by kinship ties between ruling families, in many parts of the non-Western 
world—and particularly in some authoritarian states—family ties still play an important 
role in determining the occupants of political roles. Furthermore, functioning monarchies 
survive in some parts of the Middle East, and where it does the practice of royal 
intermarriage still persists. In recent years, explaining the resilience of Middle Eastern 
monarchies in the face of the revolutions of the Arab Spring has become an important 
puzzle for political science, and influential research suggests that dynastic intermarriage 
has played an important part in both solidifying a sense of solidarity among ruling 
																																																								
13 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, Second Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), Chapter 4. 
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dynasties, but also in acting as a channel through which group strategic learning can take 
place. Even when inter-dynastic ties do not exist, the practices of dynasticism that place 
family members in key political positions have been argued to be strongly efficacious in 
ensuring regime loyalty.14  
The role of dynastic ties in facilitating regime survival is not limited to either 
monarchies or the Middle East. Political dynasties have long played an important role in 
the politics of East Asia, and though the continuing role of dynasties there do not simply 
reflect the survival of traditional attitudes but rather involve a complex reconstitution of 
traditional forms in a modern institutional environment,15 nonetheless the latter day 
resilience of dynasticism as a nexus for cultivating would-be leaders suggests that 
dynastic inheritance gives its beneficiaries an important comparative advantage in 
political competition. Besides the symbolic cachet and legitimacy gains that dynastic 
heritage can bestow on political parties, the heightened loyalty, secrecy and concentrated 
learning potential of the family laboratory is a critical resource. Nor does pointing to 
these somewhat archaic aspects entail culturalist or patronizing connotations, as we see 
with the current re-emergence of full-blown dynasticism in American politics.  
When planning political interventions to buttress or destabilize particular regimes, 
the aim of strengthening or disrupting kinship ties between key actors may be an 
important goal for governments and their opponents to aim towards. The family nexus 
will no doubt continue to provide an immensely rich source of political insight into the 
nature of alliances and regime resilience for years to come.   
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 Secondly, we point to deterrence theory as another important field of research 
where the study of dynastic deterrence can offer important insights. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the utility of deterrence as a strategy has come into question. Developed 
primarily in the United States as a body of doctrine to counter the threat emanating from 
the Soviet Union at the same time as avoiding nuclear war, deterrence theory was built 
largely upon the basic insight that “an enemy will not strike if it knows the defender can 
defeat the attack or can inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.”16 However, with the 
decline of the nuclear threat emanating from the Soviet Union with its disintegration and 
the rise of non-state threats from terrorist groups and extremist networks, the logic of 
deterrence was initially seen to be of limited use due to its perceived inability to counter 
threats where the adversary did not have a territorial mooring to which massive 
retaliation could be targeted.17 Moreover, deterrence theory as conceived at the height of 
bipolarity was a blunt instrument relying on the maintenance of severe punishment 
capabilities and the signaling of a readiness to retaliate, often in excess. In the new post-
Cold War context where the threat from state actors is seen to be manageable at least 
from the perspective of the lone superpower, deterrence was often seen to be needlessly 
combative where it was reasoned that reassurance might be better at mobilizing 
cooperation around shared goals. 
Though we hardly bemoan the decline of deterrence as a grand strategic doctrine 
organizing American foreign policy, nonetheless the analytical and prescriptive utility of 
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deterrence as a concept should not be prematurely abandoned. Even if we accept that 
deterrence is no strategic panacea, as an analytical tool it might yet be a powerful 
heuristic device to understand situations and settings where an international rivalry did 
not spiral out of control but unexpectedly regained equilibrium within a tolerable set of 
parameters. Resembling a homeostatic mechanism generated by negative feedback, the 
lesson from our study of early modern dynastic politics is that when such self-stabilizing 
equilibria are found, it is worth asking whether mechanisms resembling those of dynastic 
deterrence we outlined in previous chapters might not be operating invisibly to prevent 
the escalation of a conflict. The utility of deterrence as an explanatory device for 
capturing dynastic marriage as a factor limiting international conflict shows that a more 
general conceptualization of deterrence is valuable insofar as it allows for disparate 
phenomena to be interpreted through a common lens. As the classic distinction between 
the spiral model and the deterrence ‘model’ outlined by Robert Jervis makes clear, when 
spiral dynamics are prevalent conflicts can escalate uncontrollably due to unduly harsh 
punishments (a form of positive feedback), whereas in cases where deterrence dynamics 
are dominant, a self-sustaining homeostasis can be achieved through appropriate 
deterrent threats. The common assumption is that conflict escalation is undesirable.18 
To understand the utility of deterrence as a general framework for understanding 
interaction when each party has control over a source of value for an opponent, we might 
turn to the economic relationship between China and Japan. This relation, which due to 
the dependence of both countries on a statist protectionist development model seems 
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primed for escalation, manages to remain tense but stable. Katz has argued that the 
stability of the relationship, which he terms one of ‘mutually assured production,’ is 
largely due to a high degree of interdependence in economic structure, as “China needs to 
buy Japanese products as much as Japan needs to sell them.”19 The highly de-
territorialized production chains characteristic of high technology manufacturing today 
makes it difficult for countries to establish autarkic independence, and the high volume of 
high-end parts that China must import from Japan makes it highly dependent on access to 
Japanese markets. The same logic makes Japanese companies highly dependent on 
Chinese consumers for their profitability, and these economic imperatives—or so the 
argument runs—curtail the potential for escalation in the bilateral relationship. 
If we view this interaction in terms of deterrence concepts, it becomes clear that 
deterrence logic is not limited to the military sphere but also permeates economic 
relations. When each party of a dyad possesses—in its own domain—a resource essential 
or valuable for the other’s subsistence, the threat of each cutting off the other’s access 
leads to a stalemate and the dyad regains stability. If after this point conflict is to reignite 
and escalate, it must do so in another domain. The postulated ‘capitalist peace’ 
mechanism also operates much along these lines. Gartzke has argued that geographically 
contiguous dyads at a similar developmental stage are less likely to experience conflict, 
due to the preference for acquisition via trade over theft.20 Though normative preferences 
for coexistence may result from high levels of economic development, peaceful co-
existence is in many cases itself a precondition for the early initiation of economic 
development. Moreover, just as causally efficacious factors producing an outcome at the 
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beginning of a historical process may not be the same factors that produce the same 
outcome at a later point in time, detailed analysis of pacific dyads may reveal that 
contiguity masks the presence of hidden deterrent mechanisms at work. 
It is the characteristic nature of global capitalism that it widely distributes 
resources vital for economic prosperity into different territories even when the overall 
level of inequality between societies is on the rise. When studying international conflict 
and its interaction with the global economic system, deterrence analysis may still be able 
to play a crucial role in identifying when and where conflict is likely to emerge, as its 
logic would assert that regions and countries with few vital resources hostage in other 
territories and yet with control over a high volume of others’ needs, are more likely to 
feel emboldened when threatening others, and at the same time be less vulnerable to 
coercive diplomacy. This may correspond closely to countries and regions that are only 
weakly integrated into global production and consumption networks, such as North Korea 
and Africa. Asymmetries of interdependence21 can give less globalized states and regions 
increased strategic maneuverability and an offensive advantage due to their low degree of 
dependence on other countries for vital resources, a fact leading to relative 
imperviousness to deterrent threats. 
Where the preconditions for a high degree of mutual deterrence do not exist, they 
can nonetheless be cultivated. One of the basic insights of Cold War deterrence doctrine 
is that full-blown conflict is very costly and not to be preferred to a stable relationship of 
mutual deterrence where the latter is possible, and the wisdom of this realization should 
not be lost despite a greater awareness of the limits of Cold War thinking. The realm of 
																																																								




cyber-security is one where deterrence outwardly seems to have limited purchase, but this 
appearance is deceptive. One of the preconditions of effective deterrence is the ability 
and willingness to threaten an adversary with the certainty of unacceptable damage to key 
values. If aggressive state and non-state actors in cyberspace have not thus far been 
deterred from undertaking malicious cyber-attacks on American infrastructure, this is 
likely indicative of an insufficient investment in and/or willingness to use American 
cyber-warfare capabilities to punish adversaries more than it is an indictment of 
deterrence itself as a strategy. Deterrence of crime according to criminological theory 
requires certainty and celerity of punishment as well as punishment of sufficient severity 
to outweigh any possible gains from the offense.22 Effective deterrence in the cyber 
domain will depend on identification of the core sources of value of an adversary, and the 
willingness to punish an adversary quickly and forcefully at their point of maximum 
vulnerability to deter future attacks. 
 
The Liberal Peace 
In closing, we note that the theory of dynastic deterrence has two sets of 
implications for the liberal research paradigm within international relations. Firstly and 
most obviously, there is the prospect that extant works on the liberal peace have 
overlooked intermarriage and immigration between societies as effective pacific 
mechanisms. In a manner somewhat akin to Ann-Marie Slaughter’s depiction of 
disaggregated governmental networks,23 societal intermarriage and immigration—
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especially in regionally open systems such as the European Union—could constitute a 
type of concealed deterrence mechanism suppressing the escalation of interstate conflict. 
It would be a dividend if, when applying the central insights of our research, it was found 
that the core mechanism underlying dynastic deterrence might function to suppress the 
escalation of conflict in other political contexts. Secondly, and more pessimistically, 
societies deeply embedded in immigration and cross-border marriage networks could be 
susceptible to the fate that befell the Holy Roman Empire—namely that though it secured 
historical longevity its ruling house gradually became penetrated by the interests and 
demands of surrounding inferior dynasties. We look at each of these points in turn.  
The theory of the liberal peace asserts that liberal states exercise restraint with 
each other when it comes to warfare, though they are not averse to bellicosity when 
interacting with other non-liberal states. In a classic article, Michael Doyle argues that 
two threads within liberal thought lead to the expectation of a liberal peace. The first 
approach, or what he terms liberal pacifism, is an interest-based logic contending that as 
liberals seek gain and because war does not pay, liberals do not wage war. The second 
approach, or liberal internationalism, argues that regions where there exist certain 
attributes—such as representative institutions limiting resort to war, a collective security 
agreement enhancing security, and cosmopolitan laws allowing citizens hospitality and 
free movement across borders (thereby promoting cultural understanding)—will move 
gradually toward a general peace.24 The Kantian logic that is elaborated by Doyle does 
not specify intermarriage and immigration as an essential underpinning of the liberal 
peace, but in light of the role we have outlined of dynastic intermarriage in curbing the 
																																																								




conquest impulse in early modern Europe, these two factors would seem to be vitally 
important, though not in the way conventionally thought. 
Some liberals in the early twentieth century believed that the free movement of 
people would enhance the mutual understanding and sympathy of one man for another 
across national boundaries, and that this sympathy would inhibit the desire of men to 
wage war on one another. This line of thinking was propelled by deep globalizing forces 
that had gained a foothold in fin de siècle Europe, when vast numbers of people left their 
land of birth to start a new life in the colonies. As we know the first globalization wave 
did not lead to the end of warfare, and it has since become a truism that contact between 
people of different countries and races just as often fosters mutual suspicion and 
incomprehension as it does sympathy. It would be the two world wars of the last century 
that largely put paid to the widely held opinion that cross border movement fosters 
understanding and because of this curtails the impulse for war. 
Though today we are disabused of the earlier unduly optimistic view of the cross-
border movement of peoples, nonetheless the logic of dynastic deterrence applied to 
contemporary circumstances suggests that immigration and societal intermarriage might 
still under specific circumstances hold the potential to curb interstate conflict. However, 
the critical process in this case is not interaction between the people of different cultures 
leading to a deepened understanding and sympathy, but rather a bilateral exchange of a 
significant number of immigrants between two states providing a deterrent against either 
state waging war on the other.  
Even without cross-cultural understanding resulting from an exchange of 
immigrants, the fact that a significant group of a state’s nationals resides in another state 
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should be a significant deterrent to offensive operations being waged against that state 
(due to the anticipated detrimental consequences to one’s own nationals resident there). 
Though unidirectional migration might check the sending state’s aggressive designs 
somewhat, we assume that bidirectional migration will be required to completely check 
the outbreak of war in a dyad. A large number of cross-national marriages would lend 
further strength to this deterrent effect, due to the decreased mobility of the family unit 
and thus married couples’ diminished ability to escape threats emanating from the 
environment.  
The operative mechanism in this case is fear for the safety of one’s foreign 
nationals on the part of a government, rather than any edifying consequence of cross-
cultural interaction. However, it should be noted that one reason why immigration in the 
modern world may not fully yield its beneficent effects, is the largely unidirectional 
nature of population movements from underdeveloped regions to developed regions. 
Because the population-flow is predominantly one way, we might predict that the 
countries of the developed world will be relatively uninhibited in their use of force 
against developing countries, whereas the countries of the developing world may hesitate 
to threaten a developed country where a large number of their citizens reside. In this 
world where immigration and deterrence collide, allowing large inflows of immigrants 
may paradoxically be a protective strategy against the offensive designs of sending 
nations. 
One final sobering implication must be mentioned with regards to the liberal 
peace and our analysis of dynastic deterrence in early modern Europe. The Holy Roman 
Empire, though it existed before the era of liberalism, possessed one aspect of the 
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prototypical liberal state insofar as its complex structure left it relatively susceptible to 
external influence through the channel of its dynastic ties. Though the Reich managed to 
secure longevity through a two-tiered structure of dynastic rule and cross-territorial 
dynastic marriage ties, nonetheless it became susceptible to the demands of the dynasties 
that were tied by marriage to the House of Habsburg. Though a more powerful dynasty 
may manage to retain great influence in a network of kinship ties, the direction of 
influence is inevitably not entirely one way, and even powerful dynasties cannot 
quarantine themselves from being influenced by an inferior party. In this regard, dynastic 
intermarriage—as also cross-territorial marriage and immigration today—may be a 
strategy that renders a state particularly vulnerable to outside influence via the 
immigrants that reside within its borders and the ties they retain with their home 
countries. This susceptibility to influence may be exacerbated when electoral rules and/or 
their enforcement in a liberal state do not put a sufficiently strong curb on the lobbying 
activities of foreign interests. Though the perennial fear of fifth columns and foreign 
infiltration during the height of twentieth century conflict was surely mostly a product of 
paranoid thinking, nonetheless it is an uncomfortable truth that relatively open liberal 
societies do leave themselves susceptible to external influence. In such a milieu, the 
degree and nature of the external influence that a liberal society tolerates is a conscious 
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